[LINK] "The last Arab"
Maged Mandour's Open Democracy essay arguing that pan-Arab identities are declining in importance as national and sectarian identities surpass it in relevance looks convincing, at least.
The signs of the erosion of Arab identity are visible across the region. In Iraq, sectarianism is on the rise. The Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish communities are divided, with fault lines drawn in blood. The idea of being Iraqi is outdated, and the idea of being part of the Arab nation is even more distant.
Ever since the American invasion of Iraq, political divisions have been aggravated, and this has been deepened by political elites who have been using systematic state violence to stoke up sectarianism in order to cling to power. There has been a systemic elimination of Sunni community leaders from power by an overtly sectarian Iraqi government. The deliberate policy of "sectarianising" the security apparatus of the state has not only stoked sectarianism, it has caused the Sunni community as well as the Kurdish community to identify themselves in terms of their sect, rather than as Iraqi or Arab.
In Egypt, the inward-looking policy of de-Arabizing that started with President Sadat has reached its apex. The clearest symptom of this is the national sentiment towards Palestinians as well as Syrians. Egypt’s stance has dramatically shifted against Gaza, especially Hamas, who are now being blamed for the terrorist attacks in Sinai, with the military regime using these attacks to tighten the blockade of the strip and increase domestic support.
In terms of attitudes towards Syria, the majority have dramatically shifted their support to Assad, as the mania of “fighting terrorism” sweeps the nation. There is very little sympathy for the Syrian people’s suffering even though Assad has been on a rampage for the better part of three years.
[. . .]
Domestically, there is a large segment of Egyptian society that is not seen as Egyptian, but they are seen instead as agents of external powers, and most importantly, as foreign elements who identify themselves with a sect, namely the Muslim Brotherhood. Members of the Brotherhood are seen as placing their identity of belonging to the Brotherhood above their identity as Egyptians. In essence, Egypt is developing its own version of sectarianism. In this context, the divide is not religious or linguistic, it is secular/Islamist.
In Syria, the game of sectarianism has reached its apex. The revolt can now easily be characterised as a revolt by the Sunni majority against an openly sectarian regime. This, of course, ignores the more complex dynamic in Syria, with the critical role played by the Sunni urban middle class in their support for the regime. However, it is very difficult to ignore the fact that the Assad regime has mastered the sectarian game; gaining the support of the minorities as their protector against the Sunni onslaught, which threatens the very existence of some of these minorities, especially the Alawites. In effect, the struggle is turning into an existential struggle for these sects as they are no longer being identified as Syrian or Arab.
The signs of the erosion of Arab identity are visible across the region. In Iraq, sectarianism is on the rise. The Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish communities are divided, with fault lines drawn in blood. The idea of being Iraqi is outdated, and the idea of being part of the Arab nation is even more distant.
Ever since the American invasion of Iraq, political divisions have been aggravated, and this has been deepened by political elites who have been using systematic state violence to stoke up sectarianism in order to cling to power. There has been a systemic elimination of Sunni community leaders from power by an overtly sectarian Iraqi government. The deliberate policy of "sectarianising" the security apparatus of the state has not only stoked sectarianism, it has caused the Sunni community as well as the Kurdish community to identify themselves in terms of their sect, rather than as Iraqi or Arab.
In Egypt, the inward-looking policy of de-Arabizing that started with President Sadat has reached its apex. The clearest symptom of this is the national sentiment towards Palestinians as well as Syrians. Egypt’s stance has dramatically shifted against Gaza, especially Hamas, who are now being blamed for the terrorist attacks in Sinai, with the military regime using these attacks to tighten the blockade of the strip and increase domestic support.
In terms of attitudes towards Syria, the majority have dramatically shifted their support to Assad, as the mania of “fighting terrorism” sweeps the nation. There is very little sympathy for the Syrian people’s suffering even though Assad has been on a rampage for the better part of three years.
[. . .]
Domestically, there is a large segment of Egyptian society that is not seen as Egyptian, but they are seen instead as agents of external powers, and most importantly, as foreign elements who identify themselves with a sect, namely the Muslim Brotherhood. Members of the Brotherhood are seen as placing their identity of belonging to the Brotherhood above their identity as Egyptians. In essence, Egypt is developing its own version of sectarianism. In this context, the divide is not religious or linguistic, it is secular/Islamist.
In Syria, the game of sectarianism has reached its apex. The revolt can now easily be characterised as a revolt by the Sunni majority against an openly sectarian regime. This, of course, ignores the more complex dynamic in Syria, with the critical role played by the Sunni urban middle class in their support for the regime. However, it is very difficult to ignore the fact that the Assad regime has mastered the sectarian game; gaining the support of the minorities as their protector against the Sunni onslaught, which threatens the very existence of some of these minorities, especially the Alawites. In effect, the struggle is turning into an existential struggle for these sects as they are no longer being identified as Syrian or Arab.