epiphenomenalism vs. identity theory cage match
so, i'm reading gerald edelman's wider than the sky, and he has a whole chapter on "consciousness and causality." this chapter is essentially attemping to answer the question, "is consciousness causal?"
edelman's answer is "kinda sorta not really but in a way yes. but still no." say again? ok, i will:
(1) consciousness is necessarily entailed by certain physical brain states and/or processes, and
(2) consciousness is necessarily first person, that is, there can be no "homunculus" or third party external to the brain for whom these physical states and/or processes give rise to subjective experiences, but
(3) it is only the brain states and/or processes-and not the conscious experience resulting from those brain states-which have casual effects on the physical world.
does this even make sense? (3) looks like a dead ringer for epiphenomenalism to me, yet (1) and (2) are presented as if they somehow modify or soften epiphenomenalism.
this is the real question begged by edelman's approach: is there any alternative to epiphenomenalism other than completely rejecting it in favor of identity theory? in other words, can something be causal without being by definition physical?
it seems to me that these two viewpoints are entirely incompatible and any attempt to straddle them is just a fancy delusion motivated by not wanting to answer to the hard questions that come with taking a firm stand in one direction or the other. i know that a statement this bold edges into neighboring territories about which people in this community seem to be very opinionated, so i am curious to hear your thoughts on the matter.
edelman's answer is "kinda sorta not really but in a way yes. but still no." say again? ok, i will:
(1) consciousness is necessarily entailed by certain physical brain states and/or processes, and
(2) consciousness is necessarily first person, that is, there can be no "homunculus" or third party external to the brain for whom these physical states and/or processes give rise to subjective experiences, but
(3) it is only the brain states and/or processes-and not the conscious experience resulting from those brain states-which have casual effects on the physical world.
does this even make sense? (3) looks like a dead ringer for epiphenomenalism to me, yet (1) and (2) are presented as if they somehow modify or soften epiphenomenalism.
this is the real question begged by edelman's approach: is there any alternative to epiphenomenalism other than completely rejecting it in favor of identity theory? in other words, can something be causal without being by definition physical?
it seems to me that these two viewpoints are entirely incompatible and any attempt to straddle them is just a fancy delusion motivated by not wanting to answer to the hard questions that come with taking a firm stand in one direction or the other. i know that a statement this bold edges into neighboring territories about which people in this community seem to be very opinionated, so i am curious to hear your thoughts on the matter.