Metaphysical Realism as Epistemological Disease
Diagnosis: One can interpret our demonstrable failure to make metaphysically real claims as an argument for epistemological skepticism (a la Rorty or our LJ friends who think we can only know “what works”), or we can interpret it as an argument for epistemological constructivism (a la Kant and Hegel). Rorty buys into the widespread, uncritical,
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Empirical realism is the middle road. Or at least it's one middle road available, once we don't have to choose between simple binary opposites like real and ideal. This is the lesson Fichte and Hegel are trying to teach.
For instance, how the world appears to us tends to work in getting us around in the metaphysically real world, whatever it may be like.
How do you know that?
First of all, what's the proof that "getting around" works, even in the limited sense of getting around the reality immanent to our experience? We're fairly limited in what we can do, even compared to many animals, and dangers abound. We're suited to some things in the world, and unsuited to a great many others.
Secondly, even if you assume that we're suited to some things in the world as experienced, it doesn't follow from this that we're suited to some problematic conception of reality beyond experience. I mean, if you weren't suited to it, how would you know? Unless what we've observed so far is wrong, it's not like things that you in principle can't experience can kill you or endanger you.
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um, serious?
First of all, what's the proof that "getting around" works, even in the limited sense of getting around the reality immanent to our experience? We're fairly limited in what we can do, even compared to many animals, and dangers abound. We're suited to some things in the world, and unsuited to a great many others.
i guess you are. well, the successes we have in finding food, building bridges, getting robots to mars, curing polio, mapping genomes, ad infinitum. if you really want to question whether we're able to successfully navigate the world, you've got the entire history of evolution, science, and culture working against you.
there's no question that our embodied experience of reality provides an accurate depiction of how reality really is. we wouldn't be able to have the success we do in navigating the world if it wasn't accurate. period. our perspective is not disembodied, which is what you mean by 'things in themselves'. but, nonetheless, it's an accurate perspective that allows us to have objective knowledge of the world.
Secondly, even if you assume that we're suited to some things in the world as experienced, it doesn't follow from this that we're suited to some problematic conception of reality beyond experience. I mean, if you weren't suited to it, how would you know? Unless what we've observed so far is wrong, it's not like things that you in principle can't experience can kill you or endanger you.
this is where you take the wrong turn. firstly, it is the world beyond experience that impinges upon our sensory systems. it is the world beyond experience that we interaction with through our motor functions. there is no way to account for the consistency of the 'world of experience' unless we posit that it is caused by the 'world beyond experience'. there's also no way we can make sense of our scientific worldview without positing that this world is there, and that it's what is causing experience. our scientific progress, including our ability to accurately predict phenomena, is undeniable evidence that we have an accurate grip on how the 'world beyond experience' is, from our embodied perspective.
in a sense, you're missing the point of the insights you here evince. you realize that our embodied experience is real knowledge of reality. yet, you turn right around and re-erect the same wall by claiming that it's not really real knowledge, it's just knowledge for us. it's like saying that our view of the beach from our hotel room doesn't tell us how the beach really is; it only tells us how the beach looks from the hotel room.
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The question isn't whether or not human beings can fix cars or build skyscrapers. The question is whether or not being able to do these things enables us to speak intelligently about a metaphysical reality -- that is to say, a reality that is entirely divorced from cars, skyscrapers, and all the other empirical objects we're familiar with. It doesn't, as far as I can tell, and you've given us no reason to think that it ever could.
it is the world beyond experience that impinges upon our sensory systems. it is the world beyond experience that we interaction with through our motor functions.
What? If it "impinges upon our sensory systems", it can be observed or inferred by experience. That makes it empirical, not metaphysical. I don't see why these distinctions are so mysterious for some people. If we can interact with it with our bodies, or infer anything about it using our senses, or even information derived from our senses, it's not metaphysical. It's empirical by definition. To speak of a metaphysical reality is to speak of one that inherently goes unobserved.
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firstly, that's not what homie said. he said:
Secondly, even if you assume that we're suited to some things in the world as experienced, it doesn't follow from this that we're suited to some problematic conception of reality beyond experience.
his claim here, as far as i can tell, is that our success in navigating the world of experience does not entail that we're successful in navigating the world beyond experience. it's not about whether we can talk about the world beyond experience in disembodied terms, i agree that we can't, it's about whether our embodied perspective provides us with an objective, really real, connection with reality.
again, the fact that we view reality from a perspective does not entail the claim that we aren't viewing reality as it is. it's like saying that because i'm looking at a statue through a camera, and from an angle, i'm not seeing the statue as it is. our perspective may be limited, but this doesn't mean it's not accurate.in fact, there is no other explanation for our scientific success. there is no other explanation for how organisms, who all have embodied perspectives of the world, could have survived, and evolved, for millions of years.
If it "impinges upon our sensory systems", it can be observed or inferred by experience. That makes it empirical, not metaphysical.
we get off the metaphysical horse. of course we can't describe things from a disembodied perspective; we can't have a view from nowhere. once that is admitted the distinction becomes meaningless. and simply calling our descriptions of the world empirical doesn't change the fact that they are accurate, objective, descriptions of reality. we are in touch with reality as it is; it's just that we always see it from a certain perspective.
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Yeah it is. He said that just because we're suited to things in the world we experience, this doesn't have anything to do with how we might conceive a world beyond experience. I said basically the same thing: being able to live in the world of empirical objects fruitfully leaves us in no position to speak about a world we never experience.
again, the fact that we view reality from a perspective does not entail the claim that we aren't viewing reality as it is.
You're really confusing me when you talk about the problem this way. What do you mean, "reality as it is"? As far as I can tell, "reality" is always the kind of thing that is experienced. Do you have evidence to the contrary?
in fact, there is no other explanation for our scientific success. there is no other explanation for how organisms, who all have embodied perspectives of the world, could have survived, and evolved, for millions of years.
So evolution can only make sense given metaphysical dualism? That's interesting. I don't recall seeing that in any of my biology textbooks, but thanks for enlightening me. I'm having a little trouble understanding the claim, though -- could you give me an example of an organism that interacts with metaphysical entities in order to survive? I mean, what would even qualify as this? Prayer? As far as I can tell, human beings and all life on Earth exist in a world of empirical objects. Organisms seem to survive by interacting with empirical objects -- you know, food, water, etc. Are you saying that there is some kind of spiritual sustenance that all life requires, too? Pretty wild.
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this is a trivial and, ironically, somewhat misleading claim. yes. whatever description we give of reality will be from our perspective. we have to use the concepts we are afforded by our particular embodiment in the world. but, holy shit must i say this for the twelfth time, this does not entail that we aren't describing reality as it exists beyond experience. there really are planets that exist in the world beyond experience. we know this because we come in contact with them in experience and they affect other things we come in contact with in experience. they really are there. beyond experience. and we talk about them.
you, and the other one, claim that because we're limited to talking in experiential terms, this implies that we can't talk about those things that exist outside of experience. this doesn't follow. simply because i have to talk about objects in a certain way doesn't imply that i'm not accurately, objectively, talking about those objects. planets exist in the world beyond experience; as do cars and bridges. know they exist independent of experience because we can't make sense of the world if they don't. in fact, nothing really makes sense unless most of the objects of experience exist in the world beyond experience.
1. we can only describe reality from our embodied perspective.
2. reality is not as we perceive it from our embodied perspective.
how does 2 follow from 1?
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It doesn't? Could you give me an example of something we can describe that is beyond experience?
there really are planets that exist in the world beyond experience.
Really? Can you name one? I can't think of an example of non-empirical planets. Even extrasolar planets that aren't observed directly are derived from an analysis of empirical data. Certainly, I've never heard of a metaphysically real planet. Then again, I'm not an expert in astronomy -- maybe, in addition to the Hubble Space Telescope, they hold seances.
we know this because we come in contact with them in experience and they affect other things we come in contact with in experience. they really are there. beyond experience. and we talk about them.
Wait. Are they beyond experience or not? You seem ambivalent on the issue. If it's "contacted" by experience, and if it can affect other objects of experience, then it's clearly an empirical object you're talking about.
you, and the other one, claim that because we're limited to talking in experiential terms, this implies that we can't talk about those things that exist outside of experience. this doesn't follow.
I think it does. Everything we seem to know about "in the world" is known empirically. There are a few exceptions to this -- mathematical and logical objects, I suppose -- but I don't see what would lead me to think that beyond the empirical objects I can observe in experience, that there are these other metaphysical objects floating around out there that I never experience, yet somehow "know" are there. I guess God would be the most common example of such an object. True, I can't disprove the existence of God based on what I experience, but I can say that on the ground that I have no experience of Him, I can't say anything intelligent about his existence. Do you disagree?
planets exist in the world beyond experience; as do cars and bridges.
They do? You mean like ghosts? I've never encountered a dog as anything other than an empirical object. Have you?
nothing really makes sense unless most of the objects of experience exist in the world beyond experience.
No, I think the opposite is true. I don't think it makes any sense at all to suppose that, in addition to the empirical world of objects we know from experience, there is some "extra" metaphysical world of things we never encounter, yet "know" by some mysterious faculty. That seems, I think, a rather baroque view to take.
1. we can only describe reality from our embodied perspective.
2. reality is not as we perceive it from our embodied perspective.
how does 2 follow from 1?
It doesn't. Who's making that argument? I'm the one saying that what we experience is the real thing. You're the one trying to say that it has something to do with weird metaphysical objects. I think it's sort of spooky, actually. Mysticism.
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By responding to thisisnotsteve in the manner by which you are, you're just continually reinforcing the strict version of the empirical/metaphysical distinction over and over again. But that is the very thing which was originally called into question! So you're not really addressing the issue, but rather just bantering in a rather self-infatuated circle.
Yes, we know what apperception meant by the distinction. We understand what you mean by it too. You don't need to reinforce the same issue. We are not calling into question what is meant by the distinction, but rather we are calling into question whether this way of looking at things-- this conceptual paradigm-- is exhaustive. We're wondering whether this distinction is necessary in every case.
I think there is some wiggle room here.
But you just keep on repeating over and over again that all objects of experience are necessarily empirical and empirical only. They are this way because you have convienently defined them as such-- because that is the paradigm from which you have illustrated the issue. It's a sign of dogmatism and intellectual bigotry, not a sign of superior command of the intellectual domain, to be incapable of seeing past your own paradigm when the paradigm itself is what is being questioned.
Now more to the point: If, as I briefly suggest in my original comment, there is a 'fuzzy' grade between the empirical and the metaphysical rather than a strict line, then it is quite possible that experienced objects, in being empirical, are also metaphysically real. Keep in mind that when I speak of them being 'metaphysically real' here, I am making a more precise distinction between what that means literally and what it means metaphorically. Thus, when I say there are some empirical experiences which are experiences of the metaphysical, I mean that as a metaphor for the metaphysical.
I think this leaves your distinction in tact, but while also leaving room for a lot more work. In other words, there is more that can be said of the metaphysical! Your work (Kant's work) is not complete. It's not the end-all. You should be open to that, not an ass.
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Yes, I realize that he's trying to call it into question. That's why I opened with this:
The question isn't whether or not human beings can fix cars or build skyscrapers. The question is whether or not being able to do these things enables us to speak intelligently about a metaphysical reality -- that is to say, a reality that is entirely divorced from cars, skyscrapers, and all the other empirical objects we're familiar with. It doesn't, as far as I can tell, and you've given us no reason to think that it ever could.
Now, there are three things thisisnotsteve could have done here. He could have proposed an alternative use of the terms, which I probably would I have rejected as a futile semantic exercise that confuses, rather than clarifies, the issue we're talking about. The second thing he could have done is try to give some reasons (which I asked for) for why, using the way the words are already defined, the distinction isn't as clear as I'm making it out to be. And the third thing he could do is assert repeatedly that empirical data is nothing other than access to a metaphysical realm, and say that this is the only interpretation of human activity I could possibly believe in.
Now, Steve decided to run -- not walk -- through door number 3. Therefore, I decided to simply argue critically from the perspective I actually believe in -- just like anyone else would do -- and wait for Steve to justify some of his positions.
They are this way because you have convienently defined them as such-- because that is the paradigm from which you have illustrated the issue.
Actually, I can't take credit here. This is what the terms mean, and have meant for hundreds of years. Don't blame it on me.
It's a sign of dogmatism and intellectual bigotry, not a sign of superior command of the intellectual domain, to be incapable of seeing past your own paradigm when the paradigm itself is what is being questioned.
I wasn't aware that observing the definitions of words is a sign of bigotry. The next thing I know using silverware will be a sign of sexism. If you want to question the paradigm, then question it with something. Don't just tell me that it doesn't work. I need to be given a reason for why my understanding of these terms is incorrect.
Now more to the point: If, as I briefly suggest in my original comment, there is a 'fuzzy' grade between the empirical and the metaphysical rather than a strict line, then it is quite possible that experienced objects, in being empirical, are also metaphysically real. Keep in mind that when I speak of them being 'metaphysically real' here, I am making a more precise distinction between what that means literally and what it means metaphorically. Thus, when I say there are some empirical experiences which are experiences of the metaphysical, I mean that as a metaphor for the metaphysical.
Well, that's great, but why would I believe this? The distinction seems to be clear and rather absolute. You say it isn't. Okay. Why not? If we can experience it, even if we can infer it from experience, then as far as I'm concerned, it's empirical. There's nothing metaphysical about it. Or if there is something metaphysical about it, to use your sense of the word, it's difficult to determine what that term would mean or what it tells us, or why we should use it in this way. If you want to actually go ahead and, you know, give reasons for why we would do this, be my guest. But apparently it's offensive if I don't just twiddle my thumbs and say, "Whatever you say!"
I think this leaves your distinction in tact, but while also leaving room for a lot more work. In other words, there is more that can be said of the metaphysical! Your work (Kant's work) is not complete. It's not the end-all. You should be open to that, not an ass.
I wasn't aware that expecting the people I have discussions with to justify or give reasons for the things they believe in is a form of offensive behavior.
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of course we can't describe things from a disembodied perspective; we can't have a view from nowhere. once that is admitted the distinction becomes meaningless. and simply calling our descriptions of the world empirical doesn't change the fact that they are accurate, objective, descriptions of reality. we are in touch with reality as it is; it's just that we always see it from a certain perspective.
you can call a disembodied description 'metaphysical' if you like. you can call an embodied description 'empirical' if you like. this doesn't change the fact that the access we have to what exists in the world is objective and accurate. you can keep asserting that everything known is known from an embodied perspective, but this doesn't count as an argument for why we shouldn't regard our embodied description as a perspectival view of a disembodied reality. again, just because we are looking at the beach from our hotel window doesn't mean that the beach isn't as it appears.
your fault, in this context, in your inability to get past simplistic idealistic/empiricist arguments. we don't experience experience. we experience the world. and your continued insistence that anything we experience is necessarily experienced through experience is trivial. you're building a false wall between sensation and reality. a wall, i might add, that does not follow from your assertions.
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I never claimed it's not objective or that it's not accurate. I'm an empirical realist, in case you haven't noticed, so of course I think we can form judgments about reality that are quite accurate. Why you continue to throw out this red herring is beyond me -- then again, in the absence of anything of real substance to discuss, or any substantiated point to make, perhaps it's understandable.
you can keep asserting that everything known is known from an embodied perspective, but this doesn't count as an argument for why we shouldn't regard our embodied description as a perspectival view of a disembodied reality.
If that's the best you can do, then it puts you solidly in the camp of the theist (an example I mentioned in my earlier reply, which you ignored) who says that the possibility of an exhaustive materialistic description of the universe can not provide an argument against the existence of God. And that's perfectly right. But rationally speaking, we tend to accept accounts that adequately explain our observations, and which can be argued for, and we tend to reject accounts that make claims that can't be substantiated, or claims which have no explanatory power whatsoever. Claiming that, in addition to empirical data, our experiences also magically (yet it an unexplained way) give us knowledge about a "disembodied" and "metaphysical" realm is a vague, unargued, unsupported, and philosophically useless position to take, one which you haven't provided a single justifiable reason for believing in.
your fault, in this context, in your inability to get past simplistic idealistic/empiricist arguments.
If they are so simplistic, then I'm puzzled as to why you haven't presented a single argument as to why such descriptions are inadequate, and why you've only been able to assert -- but not argue for -- a kind of dogmatic direct realism as a response. Call me cynical, but I would expect that someone who has transcended crude distinctions such as my own would be able to furnish even a very basic argument for why I ought to revise my assumptions.
and your continued insistence that anything we experience is necessarily experienced through experience is trivial.
If it is so trivial, then it seems reasonable that you would be able to demonstrate its limitations by arguing for a more nuanced and philosophically interesting view. Simply calling the rather basic distinctions I've deployed here a trivial "wall" doesn't really stand as an endorsement of an alternative, or does it even tell us what an alternative might look like.
again, just because we are looking at the beach from our hotel window doesn't mean that the beach isn't as it appears.
Non-sequitur. No one has made this argument.
Phenomenology of Spirit
The Critique of Pure Reason
Being and Time
The Phenomenology of Perception
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the point is that you haven't given us one damn reason to justify your, or kevin kline's, initial claim. even if we agree with you that we only ever view reality from an embodied perspective, which i do, you haven't even made an argument for the further claim that this entails that we can't talk meaningfully about a world that exists beyond embodiment. in fact, you've ignored both catachrestic's and my point that our success in navigating the world of experience can only be explained by the postulation, if it needs to come to that, that the world beyond experience is pretty much as we think it is. that's the simplest, most plausibly coherent possibility. if you've got another one, please share.
If they are so simplistic, then I'm puzzled as to why you haven't presented a single argument as to why such descriptions are inadequate
read your moore (refutation of idealism). and sellars (myth of the given). and davidson (scheme/content dualism). you're conflating experience with the objects of experience. we don't experience experience, we experience the world. you also seem to be still operatin within the spontaneity/receptivity framework, which is wrong. we can't cleanly seperate sensation from mind, as sensation is foundational, both physically and functionally, to mind.
but, again, until you actually provide reasons for your distinctions, it's kinda hard to make a detailed argument.
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Sure I have. I've said that this is an adequate view, in the sense that it can explain the world we experience, and that a "metaphysical reality" is an unsupported "extra" that can't be proven or disproven. Hence the analogy with disproving or proving God, one which you've ignored twice now. Furthermore, we seem to be able to explain and function in our world (I think you'll appreciate that criterion) without having to deal with or talk about metaphysical entities at all. What's more, no one has ever seen or experienced a metaphysical object. No one can give an example of what one would be. So let's sum up: you're talking about a functionally useless idea, which explains nothing, and for which no evidence exists at all. As a theory it fails the very most basic tests we put to it, and under any other circumstances you'd be right next to me screaming about how unscientific it is. But because it's your pet project, it's getting special treatment, and seems to be able to survive the mistakes that any other theory would treat as mortal wounds.
in fact, you've ignored both catachrestic's and my point that our success in navigating the world of experience can only be explained by the postulation, if it needs to come to that, that the world beyond experience is pretty much as we think it is. that's the simplest, most plausibly coherent possibility. if you've got another one, please share.
I didn't ignore it. I asked you to justify it, and you didn't. Personally, I think it's pretty rude to blame your mistakes on someone else. I asked you plainly, and I'll ask you again, why success in navigating the world of experience has anything at all to do with a metaphysical realm. It doesn't seem to have anything to do with any of the points you want to justify. Therefore, you need to spell out some kind of relationship between these two things.
In fact, I'll do you one better: I'll use your "evidence" against you, just to show you how vague it is. We are organisms that have evolved to function well in our environment and to navigate it properly. How do we do that? All organisms navigate their environments by experience -- by sensing it. Rumors of magic and telepathy aside, there are no cases of human beings or any other organism we're aware of that survives by having access to some "metaphysical reality", and indeed all the functions we and other animals perform can be explained purely in terms of responses to a concrete world of empirical objects, without reference to a "metaphysical reality" at all.
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