Chapter VII: The Year of Six Emperors, and Philip the Arab.
Read it here, here or here.
1) Good quotes
On the younger Gordian: Twenty-two acknowledged concubines, and a library of sixty-two thousand volumes, attested the variety of his inclinations, and from the productions which he left behind him, it appears that the former as well as the latter were designed for use rather than ostentation. 19
19 By each of his concubines, the younger Gordian left three or four children. His literary productions, though less numerous, were by no means contemptible.
2) Summary
Alexander Severus is murdered by soldiers loyal to Maximin, who is portrayed here as a barbarian and a thug. After a couple of years, the elder and younger Gordians rebel in Africa (=Tunisia); the Senate endorses their rule, but by then they have already been killed; the Senate then chooses a couple more emperors, Balbinus and Maximus, and adds Gordian III to ensure popular support; Balbinus and Maximus are killed by rebellious troops, and Gordian III rules alone, until his death in mysterious circumstances campaigning in the east, after which he is succeeded by Philip the Arab, a competent soldier and administrator who organises spectacular games to celebrate the thousandth anniversary of the foundation of the city of Rome.
3) Questions arising
Most of this is an entertaining account of slaughter of the various imperial claimants, without much analytical content. But we start with a long section on the benefits of hereditary monarchy; Gibbon's attitude seems rather like that of Winston Churchill's line that "democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time". It's a bit lengthy but shows Gibbon's eloquence and prejudice equally so I'm going to quote most of the first three paras (nb I got the wee sidebars in place by typing text ): The
apparent
ridiculeOf the various forms of government which have prevailed in the world, an hereditary monarchy seems to present the fairest scope for ridicule. Is it possible to relate, without an indignant smile, that, on the father's decease, the property of a nation, like that of a drove of oxen, descends to his infant son, as yet unknown to mankind and to himself; and that the bravest warriors and the wisest statesmen, relinquishing their natural right to empire, approach the royal cradle with bended knees and protestations of inviolable fidelity? Satire and declamation may paint these obvious topics in the most dazzling colours, but our more serious thoughts will respect a useful prejudice, that establishes a rule of succession, independent of the passions of mankind; and we shall cheerfully acquiesce in any expedient which deprives the multitude of the dangerous, and indeed the ideal, power of giving themselves a master.
and solid
advantages
of hereditary
succession.In the cool shade of retirement, we may easily devise imaginary forms of government, in which the sceptre shall be constantly bestowed on the most worthy, by the free and incorrupt suffrage of the whole community. Experience overturns these airy fabrics, and teaches us that, in a large society, the election of a monarch can never devolve to the wisest, or to the most numerous, part of the people. The army is the only order of men sufficiently united to concur in the same sentiments, and powerful enough to impose them on the rest of their fellow-citizens: but the temper of soldiers, habituated at once to violence and to slavery, renders them very unfit guardians of a legal or even a civil, constitution. Justice, humanity, or political wisdom, are qualities they are too little acquainted with in themselves, to appreciate them in others. Valour will acquire their esteem, and liberality will purchase their suffrage; but the first of these merits is often lodged in the most savage breasts; the latter can only exert itself at the expense of the public; and both may be turned against the possessor of the throne, by the ambition of a daring rival.
Want of it
in the Roman
Empire
productive of
the greatest
calamitiesThe superior prerogative of birth, when it has obtained the sanction of time and popular opinion, is the plainest and least invidious of all distinctions among mankind. The acknowledged right extinguishes the hopes of faction, and the conscious security disarms the cruelty of the monarch. To the firm establishment of this idea, we owe the peaceful succession, and mild administration, of European monarchies. To the defect of it, we must attribute the frequent civil wars, through which an Asiatic despot is obliged to cut his way to the throne of his fathers. Yet, even in the East, the sphere of contention is usually limited to the princes of the reigning house, and as soon as the more fortunate competitor has removed his brethren, by the sword and the bowstring, he no longer entertains any jealousy of his meaner subjects. But the Roman empire, after the authority of the senate had sunk into contempt, was a vast scene of confusion. The royal, and even noble, families of the provinces, had long since been led in triumph before the car of the haughty republicans. The ancient families of Rome had successively fallen beneath the tyranny of the Caesars, and whilst those princes were shackled by the forms of a commonwealth, and disappointed by the repeated failure of their posterity, it was impossible that any idea of hereditary succession should have taken root in the minds of their subjects. The right to the throne, which none could claim from birth, every one assumed from merit. The daring hopes of ambition were set loose from the salutary restraints of law and prejudice; and the meanest of mankind might, without folly, entertain a hope of being raised by valour and fortune to a rank in the army, in which a single crime would enable him to wrest the sceptre of the world from his feeble and unpopular master.
Some fascinating use of language here - what does Gibbon mean by "ideal" in the phrase "the dangerous, and indeed the ideal, power of giving themselves [the multitude] a master"? And "prejudice" is clearly presented as a positive concept in the line about "the salutary restraints of law and prejudice". The dig at "imaginary forms of government, in which the sceptre shall be constantly bestowed on the most worthy, by the free and incorrupt suffrage of the whole community" almost seems a riposte to Thomas Paine's Common Sense, but that was only published in January 1776, so I guess Gibbon is just having a go at naive democrats in general.
Considering he had spent so much time in Geneva, his rejection of republicanism is rather surprising. And Commodus and Caracalla, the two most recent examples at this point, are hardly convincing evidence for the hereditary principle. (Gordian III doesn't really count as his uncle and grandfather were barely in power for five minutes, and anyway we find out very little about him.) Gibbon would no doubt argue in response that the problem was precisely that the hereditary principle was not firmly enough established, but I am not sure that his heart would be in it.
He concludes the chapter with further reflections on the cause of the decline, linking the empire's survival after the point of no return (which let's not forget is in Gibbon's view the [hereditary!] accession of Commodus) to the army: The discipline of the legions, which alone, after the extinction of every other virtue, had propped the greatness of the state, was corrupted by the ambition, or relaxed by the weakness, of the emperors.
Which is all very well, except that he is arguing that the emperors were both too weak and too strong. Really the problem was that state institutions were not robust enough to cope with poor leadership.
gratuitous dig at his sources: Footnote 55 has a go at the Augustan History: "This well-chosen expression is probably stolen from some better writer."
gratuitous dig at the Syrians: The problem with Philip is that he was obviously not as effete as the other easterners who Gibbon has been slagging off in previous chapters. But never fear - he "was an Arab by birth, and consequently, in the earlier part of his life, a robber by profession."
4) Coming next
Chapter VIII, Of the State of Persia after the Restoration of the Monarchy by Artaxerxes. Read it here, here or here.
1) Good quotes
On the younger Gordian: Twenty-two acknowledged concubines, and a library of sixty-two thousand volumes, attested the variety of his inclinations, and from the productions which he left behind him, it appears that the former as well as the latter were designed for use rather than ostentation. 19
19 By each of his concubines, the younger Gordian left three or four children. His literary productions, though less numerous, were by no means contemptible.
2) Summary
Alexander Severus is murdered by soldiers loyal to Maximin, who is portrayed here as a barbarian and a thug. After a couple of years, the elder and younger Gordians rebel in Africa (=Tunisia); the Senate endorses their rule, but by then they have already been killed; the Senate then chooses a couple more emperors, Balbinus and Maximus, and adds Gordian III to ensure popular support; Balbinus and Maximus are killed by rebellious troops, and Gordian III rules alone, until his death in mysterious circumstances campaigning in the east, after which he is succeeded by Philip the Arab, a competent soldier and administrator who organises spectacular games to celebrate the thousandth anniversary of the foundation of the city of Rome.
3) Questions arising
Most of this is an entertaining account of slaughter of the various imperial claimants, without much analytical content. But we start with a long section on the benefits of hereditary monarchy; Gibbon's attitude seems rather like that of Winston Churchill's line that "democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time". It's a bit lengthy but shows Gibbon's eloquence and prejudice equally so I'm going to quote most of the first three paras (nb I got the wee sidebars in place by typing text ): The
apparent
ridiculeOf the various forms of government which have prevailed in the world, an hereditary monarchy seems to present the fairest scope for ridicule. Is it possible to relate, without an indignant smile, that, on the father's decease, the property of a nation, like that of a drove of oxen, descends to his infant son, as yet unknown to mankind and to himself; and that the bravest warriors and the wisest statesmen, relinquishing their natural right to empire, approach the royal cradle with bended knees and protestations of inviolable fidelity? Satire and declamation may paint these obvious topics in the most dazzling colours, but our more serious thoughts will respect a useful prejudice, that establishes a rule of succession, independent of the passions of mankind; and we shall cheerfully acquiesce in any expedient which deprives the multitude of the dangerous, and indeed the ideal, power of giving themselves a master.
and solid
advantages
of hereditary
succession.In the cool shade of retirement, we may easily devise imaginary forms of government, in which the sceptre shall be constantly bestowed on the most worthy, by the free and incorrupt suffrage of the whole community. Experience overturns these airy fabrics, and teaches us that, in a large society, the election of a monarch can never devolve to the wisest, or to the most numerous, part of the people. The army is the only order of men sufficiently united to concur in the same sentiments, and powerful enough to impose them on the rest of their fellow-citizens: but the temper of soldiers, habituated at once to violence and to slavery, renders them very unfit guardians of a legal or even a civil, constitution. Justice, humanity, or political wisdom, are qualities they are too little acquainted with in themselves, to appreciate them in others. Valour will acquire their esteem, and liberality will purchase their suffrage; but the first of these merits is often lodged in the most savage breasts; the latter can only exert itself at the expense of the public; and both may be turned against the possessor of the throne, by the ambition of a daring rival.
Want of it
in the Roman
Empire
productive of
the greatest
calamitiesThe superior prerogative of birth, when it has obtained the sanction of time and popular opinion, is the plainest and least invidious of all distinctions among mankind. The acknowledged right extinguishes the hopes of faction, and the conscious security disarms the cruelty of the monarch. To the firm establishment of this idea, we owe the peaceful succession, and mild administration, of European monarchies. To the defect of it, we must attribute the frequent civil wars, through which an Asiatic despot is obliged to cut his way to the throne of his fathers. Yet, even in the East, the sphere of contention is usually limited to the princes of the reigning house, and as soon as the more fortunate competitor has removed his brethren, by the sword and the bowstring, he no longer entertains any jealousy of his meaner subjects. But the Roman empire, after the authority of the senate had sunk into contempt, was a vast scene of confusion. The royal, and even noble, families of the provinces, had long since been led in triumph before the car of the haughty republicans. The ancient families of Rome had successively fallen beneath the tyranny of the Caesars, and whilst those princes were shackled by the forms of a commonwealth, and disappointed by the repeated failure of their posterity, it was impossible that any idea of hereditary succession should have taken root in the minds of their subjects. The right to the throne, which none could claim from birth, every one assumed from merit. The daring hopes of ambition were set loose from the salutary restraints of law and prejudice; and the meanest of mankind might, without folly, entertain a hope of being raised by valour and fortune to a rank in the army, in which a single crime would enable him to wrest the sceptre of the world from his feeble and unpopular master.
Some fascinating use of language here - what does Gibbon mean by "ideal" in the phrase "the dangerous, and indeed the ideal, power of giving themselves [the multitude] a master"? And "prejudice" is clearly presented as a positive concept in the line about "the salutary restraints of law and prejudice". The dig at "imaginary forms of government, in which the sceptre shall be constantly bestowed on the most worthy, by the free and incorrupt suffrage of the whole community" almost seems a riposte to Thomas Paine's Common Sense, but that was only published in January 1776, so I guess Gibbon is just having a go at naive democrats in general.
Considering he had spent so much time in Geneva, his rejection of republicanism is rather surprising. And Commodus and Caracalla, the two most recent examples at this point, are hardly convincing evidence for the hereditary principle. (Gordian III doesn't really count as his uncle and grandfather were barely in power for five minutes, and anyway we find out very little about him.) Gibbon would no doubt argue in response that the problem was precisely that the hereditary principle was not firmly enough established, but I am not sure that his heart would be in it.
He concludes the chapter with further reflections on the cause of the decline, linking the empire's survival after the point of no return (which let's not forget is in Gibbon's view the [hereditary!] accession of Commodus) to the army: The discipline of the legions, which alone, after the extinction of every other virtue, had propped the greatness of the state, was corrupted by the ambition, or relaxed by the weakness, of the emperors.
Which is all very well, except that he is arguing that the emperors were both too weak and too strong. Really the problem was that state institutions were not robust enough to cope with poor leadership.
gratuitous dig at his sources: Footnote 55 has a go at the Augustan History: "This well-chosen expression is probably stolen from some better writer."
gratuitous dig at the Syrians: The problem with Philip is that he was obviously not as effete as the other easterners who Gibbon has been slagging off in previous chapters. But never fear - he "was an Arab by birth, and consequently, in the earlier part of his life, a robber by profession."
4) Coming next
Chapter VIII, Of the State of Persia after the Restoration of the Monarchy by Artaxerxes. Read it here, here or here.