My reaction to the LibDems going with the Conservatives rather than Labour. To be honest, as a Labour Party member, I am not happy with them having done so, but I think it was effectively determined by the parliamentary arithmetic. While, on the basis of the weekend, it looks almost certain that a Labour-LibDem arrangement would have got enough Northern Irish and Nationalist votes to pass the queen's speech, enough Labour (and probably LibDem) MPs would have been sufficiently unenthusiastic about varying elements of the agreed programme that much of it would not have passed (particularly as these too would have required some outside support) - almost certainly leading to another general election later this year. With, say, 325 seats between them, it might have been manageable - with 315, it wasn't.
Next, while I am not at all happy with the LibDems going for a full coalition with the Conservatives rather than just a "confidence and supply" arrangement, I can understand that too. The LibDems got some major concessions - for instance, the referendum on AV - in return for coalition that they certainly wouldn't have in return for confidence and supply. And their negotiations with Labour on Monday acted very nicely for them in getting the Tories to up their bid to the point where the LibDems can probably sell the coalition (at least for now) to most of their membership.
Turning to some areas of policy:
On civil liberties - the Conservatives had promised to get rid of ID cards and some of Labour's other more authoritarian measures, and I was fully prepared to believe that this attitude would last, rather selectively, for between six and eighteen months. The same applied to Blair after 1997 - for instance, the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into British law (which the Tories were proposing to reverse). As with New Labour, I would have expected Cameron to get more authoritarian as he remained in power. Now? Well, perhaps double those timescales, but I'd still expect the same general pattern.
One matter that I've observed with cynical amusement is Cameron's rapid U-turn on fixed-term parliaments. Less than two weeks ago, he was proposing that if a government replaced its prime minister say two years into a parliament (as Brown replaced Blair in 2007), they would be compelled to call an election within six months. Now, they are to be forbidden to do so without the approval of 55% of the House of Commons.
Why the Damascene conversion? Compare matters, not with 2007 but with 1990. Thatcher would pretty certainly not have been brought down if the Conservatives had then had to call a probably disastrous election within six months. And, in two years time, Cameron may well be as unpopular with the country and the Conservative Party as Thatcher was then. This was primarily a measure to protect Cameron's own position against his backbenchers. However, what the five-year fixed term, combined with the coalition agreement, does is to do this another way. It will mean that any internal Tory move against Cameron has to get LibDem backing - and, as such a move would be coming from the Tory right, the LibDems would be very unlikely to back it.
Another interesting point is - once the necessary legislation has been passed, what happens if the LibDems drop out of the coalition and vote against Cameron on a vote of confidence? He then can't continue his government past the very short term, so he still has to agree to resign. However, parliament can still not be dissolved, so a new government has to be agreed upon. However, Cameron presumably still remains in office (with some restrictions) while this happens - just as Brown did over the weekend.
Back on more general matters:
What about the longer-term effect on the LibDems? Crudely - after the coalition, however long it lasts, it will be part of LibDem history, and voters will judge them on it. Unless the coalition collapses quickly, we can expect much of the LibDem left to drop away and any new recruits to be happy with a predominantly (but not exclusively) Conservative government. Like the German FDP, they can expect to be seen as, and will in practice be, a rather right-of-centre party. The Labour Party will now have no competition as the predominant party of the British left (or nearest equivalent) unless and until the Greens or some other party can build themselves up massively - and that is likely to take some while.
This may well have an effect on the alternative vote referendum. Until Tuesday, the alternative vote was something that had definite advantages for the Labour Party, as there was still an anti-Tory majority in Britain but one that was also largely disaffected with Labour. Now, the largest anti-Tory alternative is no longer anti-Tory. It's going to be very tempting for previous supporters of AV (or indeed more proportional systems) in the Labour Party to campaign for a "No" vote in the referendum and leave the LibDems swinging in the wind. (Personally, I rather like AV - so I may still go for it.)
However, this doesn't mean that the Labour Party can now assume that they can just wait for the coalition to muck up, in one, five or ten years, and then pick up the pieces. Standing around saying that the last 13 years were all great and that we should just return to them is not going to be very attractive to voters - who are likely then to look for alternatives, even if they can't agree on them. However, an attempted insistence on an anti-New Labour purge, with a prerequisite of detailed recantations for any Labour MP wanting to continue their career, will be less attractive still.
The Labour Party needs to rethink what it means to be on the left in the 2010s - but also to accept that Blair and Brown did do much that was valuable, even if they also missed other opportunities and did some things that were the opposite of valuable. If the Labour Party looks to the future rather than the past, it will come back. If it does not, the British left could face decades of misery until another standard-bearer comes forward.