Те же и там же

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Под шум и треск других скандалов осталось без должного внимания вчерашнее заседание в комиссии Сената по вооруженным силам на тему Worldwide Threats. Показания давали руководители разведки.
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/18-03-06-worldwide-threats

В подготовленном докладе директора национальной разведки Коутса говорится о том, что от России в 2018 не ожидается ничего хорошего.

Influence operations, especially through cyber means, will remain a significant threat to US interests as they are low-cost, relatively low-risk, and deniable ways to retaliate against adversaries, to shape foreign perceptions, and to influence populations. Russia probably will be the most capable and aggressive source of this threat in 2018, although many countries and some nonstate actors are exploring ways to use influence operations, both domestically and abroad.
We assess that the Russian intelligence services will continue their efforts to disseminate false information via Russian state-controlled media and covert online personas about US activities to encourage anti-US political views. Moscow seeks to create wedges that reduce trust and confidence in democratic processes, degrade democratization efforts, weaken US partnerships with European allies, undermine Western sanctions, encourage anti-US political views, and counter efforts to bring Ukraine and other former Soviet states into European institutions.
- Foreign elections are critical inflection points that offer opportunities for Russia to advance its interests both overtly and covertly. The 2018 US mid-term elections are a potential target for Russian influence operations.
- At a minimum, we expect Russia to continue using propaganda, social media, false-flag personas, sympathetic spokespeople, and other means of influence to try to exacerbate social and political fissures in the United States.
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Coats_03-06-18.pdf

При ответах на вопросы Коутс, однако не мог дать вразумительного ответа о том, что администрация Трампа собирается по этому поводу делать. Вопрос о санкциях он отфутболил к Минфину и заикнулся про 13 человек с фабрики троллей, обвиненных Мюллером.



Джим Клеппер, предшественник Коутса, рассказывал, как обсуждался вопрос о санкциях, принятых Обамой в декабре 2016. После многочисленных дискуссий они решили ограничиться высылкой всего 35 из многочисленных российских шпионов, потому что опасались ответных мер Путина.

We had a lot of, obviously, a lot of discussion about taking the action we ultimately took, which was PNG'ing 35 of the top intelligence operatives of the Russians. Make no mistake, that’s what they were. They were not diplomats. And, of course, closing the two dachas and sanctioning individual people, I don’t know that there was a conscious discussion so much about whether to do it before or after the election, but just getting a consensus among the interagency about what to do. <...> I, as others did, found that strange that they didn’t retaliate. In fact, that’s one of the factors that bore on the discussion: Well, how many Russian operatives should we PNG? We could have PNG’d a lot more. They had many more than 35 intelligence operatives in this country. The Russians probably have more spies present in our country than any other country, to include China. So that was a tempering factor, because we were figuring that, for every one that we PNG’d, there would be a reciprocal action on the part of the Russians.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/james-clapper/



Закон о финансировании Пентагона на 2017 год, подписанный Обамой в декабре 2016, включал в себя две меры, которые могли бы помочь с подготовкой к российскому вмешательству в выборы 2018:

1. Требование к министру обороны и президенту в течении 180 дней предоставить отчет о стратегии устрашения противника, замеченного в кибератаках.

SEC. 1654. REPORTS ON DETERRENCE OF ADVERSARIES IN CYBERSPACE.
(a) Report of the Secretary of Defense.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall submit to the President and the congressional defense committees a report on the military and nonmilitary options available to the United States for deterring and responding to imminent threats in cyberspace and malicious cyber activities carried out against the United States by foreign governments and terrorist organizations.
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of the military and nonmilitary options described in paragraph (1), including citations to relevant provisions of law, regulation, or directives or other policy documents of the Federal Government.
(B) Descriptions of relevant authorities, rules of engagement, command and control structures, and response plans relating to such options, including--
(i) authorities that have been delegated by the President to the Secretary of Defense for the conduct of cyber operations;
(ii) operational authorities delegated by the Secretary to the Commander of the United States Cyber Command for military cyber operations;
(iii) identification of how the law of war applies to cyber operations of the Department of Defense;
(iv) an assessment of the effectiveness of each such option; and
(v) an integrated priorities list for cyber deterrence capabilities of the Department of Defense that identifies, at a minimum, high priority capability needs prioritized by armed force, function, risk areas, and long-term strategic planning issues.
(b) Report of the President.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits the report under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report describing the types of actions carried out in cyberspace against the United States that may warrant a military response.
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) Discussion of the types of actions carried out in cyberspace that may warrant a military response or operation.
(B) A description of the role of the military in responding to acts of aggression in cyberspace against the United States.
(C) A description of the circumstances required for a military response to a cyber attack against the United States.
(D) A plan for articulating a declaratory policy on the use of cyber weapons by the United States.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2943/text

Прошло 440 дней вместо положенных по закону 180. До сих пор никаким отчетом не пахнет.

Другой мерой было создание Global Engagement Center (GEC) под эгидой Госдепа, с перечислением туда средств Пентагона, для борьбы с пропагандой, в первую очередь российской.

SEC. 1287. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.
(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall establish within the Department of State a Global Engagement Center (in this section referred to as the ``Center'').
(2) Purpose.--The purpose of the Center shall be to lead, synchronize, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining United States national security interests.
(b) Functions.--The Center shall carry out the following functions:(1) Integrate interagency and international efforts to track and evaluate counterfactual narratives abroad that threaten the national security interests of the United States and United States allies and partner nations.
(2) Analyze relevant information, data, analysis, and analytics from United States Government agencies, United States allies and partner nations, think tanks, academic institutions, civil society groups, and other nongovernmental organizations.
(3) As needed, support the development and dissemination of fact-based narratives and analysis to counter propaganda and disinformation directed at the United States and United States allies and partner nations.
(4) Identify current and emerging trends in foreign propaganda and disinformation in order to coordinate and shape the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures to expose and refute foreign misinformation and disinformation and proactively promote fact-based narratives and policies to audiences outside the United States.
(5) Facilitate the use of a wide range of technologies and techniques by sharing expertise among Federal departments and agencies, seeking expertise from external sources, and implementing best practices.
(6) Identify gaps in United States capabilities in areas relevant to the purpose of the Center and recommend necessary enhancements or changes.
(7) Identify the countries and populations most susceptible to propaganda and disinformation based on information provided by appropriate interagency entities.
(8) Administer the information access fund established pursuant to subsection (f).
(9) Coordinate with United States allies and partner nations in order to amplify the Center's efforts and avoid duplication.
(10) Maintain, collect, use, and disseminate records (as such term is defined in section 552a(a)(4) of title 5, United States Code) for research and data analysis of foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts and communications related to public diplomacy efforts intended for foreign audiences. Such research and data analysis shall be reasonably tailored to meet the purposes of this paragraph and shall be carried out with due regard for privacy and civil liberties guidance and oversight.



Из выделенных Конгрессом $120 миллионов до сих пор не освоено ни цента. Директор Центра GEC по закону назначается президентом. До сих пор никого не назначено. Исполняющим обязанности работает Дэниэл Киммадж. В статье 2007 года о предстоящих в России выборах президента Киммадж писал:

The mercenary reality behind the Kremlin's electoral flimflam exposes the Putin regime's Achilles' heel. It's all about the money. Legitimate, effective mechanisms exist for sending Moscow the message that, while it may choose to disregard international norms, there are consequences. The only question is whether anyone in the West has the courage to use them.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-next-putintate/article/15417