Potus Geeks Book Review: Presidents andTheir Generals by Matthew Moten
In his 2014 book entitled Presidents and Their Generals: An American History of Command in War, author Matthew Moten, a former head of the History Department at West Point, undertakes a thoughtful and considered review of the relationship between the Executive Branch and the US Military throughout the history of the United States, from the time of George Washington to the present. Moten explores the concept of civilian control of the military in all of its facets: what the relationship should look like in theory, how the relationship has evolved over time, times when the concept has operated effectively, and times when it has not. The product is a well articulated and well reasoned treatise that is informative, that seeks to educate the reader, and that is a pleasure to read for anyone with an interest in US history.
Moten takes as an ideal, the example of George Washington who, following the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, resisted the temptation of becoming a dictator and submitted control of the military to the elected representatives of the people. In the first section of the book, "Setting Precedents", he explores the challenging relationship between Washington and the Continental Congress in which sectional interests were forced to give way to national ones to bring about the collective defense of the nation. He next explores John Adams' attempts to address the need for and control of a standing army, James Madison effort to wage war in the nation's infancy, James K. Polk's difficult relationship with his generals, stemming from the collision of military and political goals, and Lincoln's efforts at finding the right general to lead the Union war effort.
In the next section, entitled "The Politics of Collaboration", Moten looks at examples of when Presidents and their generals were able to strike a reasonable balance between civilian control of policy and military control of the conduct of its operations. He explores the relationships between Lincoln and Grant (in one of the book's best chapters), Woodrow Wilson and John Pershing, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and George Marshall. The last-mentioned chapter is especially informative in explaining the evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an institution.
The final section of the book, entitled "The Perils of Partisanship", explores more recent relationships in which an imbalance has had adverse consequences for the nation. These include Harry Truman confronting the arrogance of General Douglas MacArthur, the minimization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in favor of the political goals of Lyndon Johnson and the power of Maxwell Taylor during the Vietnam War, the acquisition of disproportionate influence on the part of Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld's refusal to tolerate dissenting opinions from military advisors in favor of those that matched his own opinions during the second Iraq War.
Moten concludes with a considered analysis of the proper relationship between a President and his military advisors. He describes what he considers to be the ideal balance between the executive and the military (comparing it to the captain of a ship and his crew), adapting revered theories into modern times, and he makes some excellent proposals for reform which include replacing the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a National Military Council that is not beholden to its own branch of the service, but rather to the interests of the nation as a whole. He also makes a convincing case as to why retired generals should refrain from choosing sides in subsequent political contests unless they themselves are candidates. His conclusions draw from the lessons of history and are difficult to take issue with, in light of those lessons.
This is an excellent book that looks at both the trees and the forest that is civilian control of the military. It is a book that I had hoped someone would write, and it is written better than I had hoped. This book is very insightful and intelligent and is highly recommended for fellow history geeks.
Moten takes as an ideal, the example of George Washington who, following the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, resisted the temptation of becoming a dictator and submitted control of the military to the elected representatives of the people. In the first section of the book, "Setting Precedents", he explores the challenging relationship between Washington and the Continental Congress in which sectional interests were forced to give way to national ones to bring about the collective defense of the nation. He next explores John Adams' attempts to address the need for and control of a standing army, James Madison effort to wage war in the nation's infancy, James K. Polk's difficult relationship with his generals, stemming from the collision of military and political goals, and Lincoln's efforts at finding the right general to lead the Union war effort.
In the next section, entitled "The Politics of Collaboration", Moten looks at examples of when Presidents and their generals were able to strike a reasonable balance between civilian control of policy and military control of the conduct of its operations. He explores the relationships between Lincoln and Grant (in one of the book's best chapters), Woodrow Wilson and John Pershing, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and George Marshall. The last-mentioned chapter is especially informative in explaining the evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an institution.
The final section of the book, entitled "The Perils of Partisanship", explores more recent relationships in which an imbalance has had adverse consequences for the nation. These include Harry Truman confronting the arrogance of General Douglas MacArthur, the minimization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in favor of the political goals of Lyndon Johnson and the power of Maxwell Taylor during the Vietnam War, the acquisition of disproportionate influence on the part of Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld's refusal to tolerate dissenting opinions from military advisors in favor of those that matched his own opinions during the second Iraq War.
Moten concludes with a considered analysis of the proper relationship between a President and his military advisors. He describes what he considers to be the ideal balance between the executive and the military (comparing it to the captain of a ship and his crew), adapting revered theories into modern times, and he makes some excellent proposals for reform which include replacing the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a National Military Council that is not beholden to its own branch of the service, but rather to the interests of the nation as a whole. He also makes a convincing case as to why retired generals should refrain from choosing sides in subsequent political contests unless they themselves are candidates. His conclusions draw from the lessons of history and are difficult to take issue with, in light of those lessons.
This is an excellent book that looks at both the trees and the forest that is civilian control of the military. It is a book that I had hoped someone would write, and it is written better than I had hoped. This book is very insightful and intelligent and is highly recommended for fellow history geeks.