In 1966 American president Lyndon Johnson gave a rather remarkable speech - this was during the Cold War - in which he said it was time that the scientists of the United States and the Soviet Union worked together on problems other than military and space matters, on problems that plagued all advanced societies, like energy, our oceans, the environment, health. And he called for a liaison between the scientists of East and West.
Johnson enlisted McGeorge Bundy to pursue the topic. Bundy had been an adviser to presidents Kennedy and Johnson, but before that had been Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard. Bundy knew me because I would go from department to department at Harvard, doing my decision thing.
One of the first things Bundy did was to commission a report from the Rand Corporation. Roger Levien, the second director of IIASA, wrote that report, and it was very positive. Unfortunately, it got lost in the shuffle, but it was a necessary step: it gave the United States a green light to go ahead.
Bundy met [the late] Jermen Gvishiani - Gvishiani was the deputy minister of the Soviet State Committee on Science and Technology - and he was delighted with the reaction.
Bundy and Gvishiani realized that if IIASA was going to be stable, it should be multilateral, not bilateral. Since it was to be multilateral, Gvishiani pushed for inclusion of the German Democratic Republic. This was embarrassing for the United States: the US didn’t recognize East Germany. Our first crisis. It was surmounted by deciding that the new institute would be nongovernmental. How lucky!
What that meant was not very clear, because the intention was that governments would finance the center. For the US it meant that the National Academy of Sciences got into the act. The money went from the National Science Foundation, which is governmental, to the academy, which is nongovernmental: they sort of laundered the money...
... The next meeting was June ’69 in Moscow. Nothing much was accomplished until Gvishiani, Bundy, and a few others went for a walk in the woods, and made three momentous decisions.
The first decision was that it should be an English-language institute; that was a suggestion by Gvishiani, which was remarkable. Second, they decided that the director would be an American and the chairman of the governing council would be from the Soviet Union; we sort of surmised that Gvishiani would take the job. Third, they agreed that the institute would be in the UK; Sir Solly Zuckerman was instrumental in that. The British Admiralty would move out of a place in Sussex and make it available.
это НЕ ТУСОВКА, а ТОРГОВЛЯ. И, судя по всему, поготовка "перестройки" - то есть уничтожения страны. А подпись - это уже фиксация договоренностей и реализация программы.
Johnson enlisted McGeorge Bundy to pursue the topic. Bundy had been an adviser to presidents Kennedy and Johnson, but before that had been Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard. Bundy knew me because I would go from department to department at Harvard, doing my decision thing.
One of the first things Bundy did was to commission a report from the Rand Corporation. Roger Levien, the second director of IIASA, wrote that report, and it was very positive. Unfortunately, it got lost in the shuffle, but it was a necessary step: it gave the United States a green light to go ahead.
Bundy met [the late] Jermen Gvishiani - Gvishiani was the deputy minister of the Soviet State Committee on Science and Technology - and he was delighted with the reaction.
Bundy and Gvishiani realized that if IIASA was going to be stable, it should be multilateral, not bilateral. Since it was to be multilateral, Gvishiani pushed for inclusion of the German Democratic Republic. This was embarrassing for the United States: the US didn’t recognize East Germany. Our first crisis. It was surmounted by deciding that the new institute would be nongovernmental. How lucky!
What that meant was not very clear, because the intention was that governments would finance the center. For the US it meant that the National Academy of Sciences got into the act. The money went from the National Science Foundation, which is governmental, to the academy, which is nongovernmental: they sort of laundered the money...
... The next meeting was June ’69 in Moscow. Nothing much was accomplished until Gvishiani, Bundy, and a few others went for a walk in the woods, and made three momentous decisions.
The first decision was that it should be an English-language institute; that was a suggestion by Gvishiani, which was remarkable. Second, they decided that the director would be an American and the chairman of the governing council would be from the Soviet Union; we sort of surmised that Gvishiani would take the job. Third, they agreed that the institute would be in the UK; Sir Solly Zuckerman was instrumental in that. The British Admiralty would move out of a place in Sussex and make it available.
это НЕ ТУСОВКА, а ТОРГОВЛЯ. И, судя по всему, поготовка "перестройки" - то есть уничтожения страны. А подпись - это уже фиксация договоренностей и реализация программы.
Reply
Leave a comment