Too much tape! Way too much.
Thanks for the Snowflakes, sapote and anonymous! They are full of good nondenominational cheer.
I have now handed in all of my term papers and anticipate exams. ...sadly. The less said the better.
However, when I was researching for this one paper on WWII and radio and cryptography (aka I love Alan Turing and therefore gravitate when it comes to topics) I had this absolute moment of awareness of how much things have changed in a short time. Exhibit, a 1967 history of cryptography. The author has just introduced the Mauborgne unbreakable cipher system. He explains how it is theoretically and practically the best thing ever, omg. But there is always a dark side. In this case, the practicality.
The answers [to this cipher] again evade the cryptanalyst. Formless, endless, the random one-time tape vanquishes him by dissolving in chaos on the one hand and infinity on the other. Here indeed the cryptanalyst gropes through caverns measureless to man. His quest is Faustian; who would dare it would know more than can be known.
Why, then, is this ultimate cipher not in universal use? Because of the stupendous quantities of key required. The problems of producing, registering, distributing and canceling the keys mat seem slight to an individual who has not had experience with military communications, but in wartime the volumes of traffic stagger even the signal staffs. Hundreds of thousands of words may be enciphered in a day; simply to generate the millions of key characters required would e enormously expensive and time-consuming. Since each message must have its unique key, application of the ideal system would require shipping out on tape at the very least the equivalent of the total communications volume of a war. In fact, however, considerable extra key material would have to be supplied. A group of subordinate units may possess some tape in common for intercommunication, but once one unit uses a roll of keytape, the others must cancel their identical rolls. In practice, this step is the most difficult. It is virtually impossible in the hubbub of battle to monitor the messages of a dozen other units to determine what keytapes they have used.
We couldn't possibly use this, can you imagine how much tape we would need? Imagine the shipping cost. And keeping track of it. Intense, man.
This entry was originally posted at http://phnelt.dreamwidth.org/23187.html. Please comment there using OpenID.
I have now handed in all of my term papers and anticipate exams. ...sadly. The less said the better.
However, when I was researching for this one paper on WWII and radio and cryptography (aka I love Alan Turing and therefore gravitate when it comes to topics) I had this absolute moment of awareness of how much things have changed in a short time. Exhibit, a 1967 history of cryptography. The author has just introduced the Mauborgne unbreakable cipher system. He explains how it is theoretically and practically the best thing ever, omg. But there is always a dark side. In this case, the practicality.
The answers [to this cipher] again evade the cryptanalyst. Formless, endless, the random one-time tape vanquishes him by dissolving in chaos on the one hand and infinity on the other. Here indeed the cryptanalyst gropes through caverns measureless to man. His quest is Faustian; who would dare it would know more than can be known.
Why, then, is this ultimate cipher not in universal use? Because of the stupendous quantities of key required. The problems of producing, registering, distributing and canceling the keys mat seem slight to an individual who has not had experience with military communications, but in wartime the volumes of traffic stagger even the signal staffs. Hundreds of thousands of words may be enciphered in a day; simply to generate the millions of key characters required would e enormously expensive and time-consuming. Since each message must have its unique key, application of the ideal system would require shipping out on tape at the very least the equivalent of the total communications volume of a war. In fact, however, considerable extra key material would have to be supplied. A group of subordinate units may possess some tape in common for intercommunication, but once one unit uses a roll of keytape, the others must cancel their identical rolls. In practice, this step is the most difficult. It is virtually impossible in the hubbub of battle to monitor the messages of a dozen other units to determine what keytapes they have used.
We couldn't possibly use this, can you imagine how much tape we would need? Imagine the shipping cost. And keeping track of it. Intense, man.
This entry was originally posted at http://phnelt.dreamwidth.org/23187.html. Please comment there using OpenID.