explain in layman's terms...?

[ljusastjarnan]

On the risk of sounding stupid and incurring the contempt of you all, I'd like to ask a rookie's question about the distinction between a-priori and posteriori - namely, what is it? And does have anything to do with the varying levels simulacra, the signifier/signified - both concepts of which I only have rudimentary knowledge of

Comments

[zentiger]

Well, my contempt-ray is in the shop, so I guess I'll have to say something useful.

The a priori is that realm of knowledge which can be obtained without making any specific observation. The a posteriori is everything else.

Kant's great insight was to decouple the a priori from the "analytic" and the a posteriori from the "synthetic" truths, though this didn't really reach fruition until Kripke, who did it wrong. (But now my prejudices are showing.)

Honestly, felephant is better-suited to explain what's going on in Art-World than am I.

For Kant, Henry Allison or Huaping Lu-Adler are basically the authorities to which I turn; if you don't have institutional access, let me know and I'll see what they'll let me send you.

[ljusastjarnan]

Thanks, it came to me after reading the explanation a few times. /dunce

But what's the difference between an analytic a-priori, and synthetic a-priori truths, when they both seem to describe truths that that are known "by virtue of their meaning"?

and I'll check them out, thanks. I've got access to jstor and the usual, if I don't find anything, that'll be very useful.

[zentiger]

Well, the classic example is from the first Critique: analytic a priori truths are things that are true in virtue of the meanings of the parts of the utterance, like "Hesperus is Hesperus". Not very interesting, for the most part. Kant's example of a synthetic a priori truth is "7+5=12"; the idea of twelve is nowhere in the left-hand side of that equation, but you still don't need to make any particular observation to figure it out.

Structuralists about mathematics think Kant was wrong here, for what it's worth; there, I'd start with Shapiro, though I don't off the top of my head remember a good paper. If you're interested, let me know and I'll poke through the syllabus I used last time I taught phil math.

[ljusastjarnan]

So synthetic a-priori truths require another jump in logic whereas analytic a-priori truths still remain true just by it's definition? This distinction seems a bit arbitrary, but what do I know.

I would be, but I don't have the time to chew through very long dissertations on the topic - I'll definitely dig around though. Phil maths sounds really cool. I'd be quite interested in studying philosophy on a college level, if there wasn't a lack of apparent future prospects.

[zentiger]

Not exactly. Again, I'm not really a Kant scholar, so I might screw up some terminology here, but the idea is this: a truth is analytic if and only if, to borrow the math example, the meaning on the left-hand side of the equation is transparently the meaning on the right-hand side. It's synthetic if you have to do some, uh, math, I guess. so 1=1 is analytic a priori; 3+2=5 is synthetic.

It is perhaps worth noting that this distinction doesn't come up until Kant. Descartes spends a lot of time on math (Catesian coordinate systems, anyone?) and he doesn't touch it.

It is definitely worth noting that this all falls apart by the late 20th century. The star text there is Kripke's Naming and Necessity, which is a great read (even if Kripke was wrong about nearly everything, and if you buy me a few drinks, I'll give you a very entertaining lecture with lots of swearing). The Kripke is a pretty easy read; it's basically an edited transcription of a series of three lectures he gave in, iirc, 1970. Brilliant stuff, even if he's wrong

[ljusastjarnan]

Sorry for the late reply; it's appreciated - I just didn't get the time to read until now.

Thanks for the elaboration. As with the comment below, I was getting to that idea, though perhaps logical jumps isn't the right way to call it.

Brilliant stuff, even if he's wrong.
You seem to have very mixed feelings on this topic. I'd love to look through it whenever I'm free for more than half an hour, maybe take you up on the drinks. HAH.

atm, I'm more interested in the philosophy of art, but this all sounds very interesting. c':

[zentiger]

You seem to have very mixed feelings on this topic. I'd love to look through it whenever I'm free for more than half an hour, maybe take you up on the drinks. HAH.

Oh, no, my feelings are not mixed here. Kripke is absolutely wrong about names. But that he was wrong does not mean that he was unintellgent! Kripke is a genius and has contributed more to the study of logic and language than I ever will. But he was still wrong about names.(Seriously, this guy was offered a position in the philosophy department at Princeton when he was sixteen. Yikes.)

As for philosophy of art, I still recommend talking to felephant. I'm not really up on aesthetics.

[ljusastjarnan]

How is he wrong exactly? And I guess you could acknowledge someone's intelligence and influence whilst still thinking they are wrong, but if that's not mixed feelings then I don't know what is.

Seriously, this guy was offered a position in the philosophy department at Princeton when he was sixteen
Golly well then, that makes me feel splendid of my own achievements.

And I will ask him if he appears, thanks. c':

[zentiger]

How is he wrong exactly?

Well, if you haven't read N&N, here's the quick rundown: Kripke offers three arguments against Russellian descriptivism about names, which is also wrong, but the "rigid designation" model that he builds in lecture 2 still can't deal with Frege's puzzle.

(He's also wrong about artifacts in footnotes 56 and 57; their identity conditions are way more complicated.)

Golly well then, that makes me feel splendid of my own achievements.
And Hume had, by 26, written the Treatise, the twelve-volume History of England, and possibly fucked a third of the women in France. Kripke proved the completeness of modal logic and provided a semantics for same, and his mom said that he couldn't work at Princeton until he'd finished high school. Also, dude's nuttier than squirrel turds, so if you're not, that's an advantage you have.

[ljusastjarnan]

The descriptivist theory makes sense, (and I'd be more or less stumped in trying to find an counterargument, except that commonly known truths aren't necessarily true, but then again I'm neither philosopher nor genius). This, however, makes about as much sense to me as Greek would. Are you sure Kripke is light reading?

and possibly fucked a third of the women in France
The whore.

Also, dude's nuttier than squirrel turds, so if you're not, that's an advantage you have.
Seems to be a running trend for geniuses. I've also heard Nietzsche was a particularly squishy man, but who knows.

EDIT: Right, so I went to N&N's wiki site and things make much more sense now. Though this seems like a weak example.

[zentiger]

If that's too heavy for you, I'm afraid you need some background reading. Fortunately, there's not much worthwhile between the Cratylus and Mill... but Mill, unusually, is here pretty difficult, and Frege's depressingly German, which is not really his fault.

Seriously, read the whole thing. The linked bit is the six criteria that a descriptivist theory (at least according to Kripke) must fulfill, and is the foundation of what's called the "epistemic argument" against descriptivism.

[ljusastjarnan]

That's a very comprehensive and delightfully straightforward explanation, thanks!

[anfalicious]

Naw. It's so good to see you play nice :)

[zentiger]

I always play by the rules. These days, it's mostly half-court playground ball, unless there's an Objectivist, in which case full-court jungle ball applies.

[ljusastjarnan]

There are rules?