Beiser on Restoring the Transcendental Subject
From German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801:
Cognitive scientists have claimed that Kant can only make claims about the subject through the categories (e.g. existence), and anything under the categories is not transcendental, so Kant ought to have abandoned the notion of a transcendental subject. However, Kant is not claiming knowledge of the transcendental subject’s existence (determined through categories), but claiming an obligation to think of the transcendental subject as existing (indeterminately through the categories). What does this mean?
To return to the chess analogy, Kant is saying that we might only be able to play to win by following the rules of the game, and the rules may only apply to chess moves, but that does not thereby make a chess win a mere determined chess move like a checkmate. A chess win is a regulatory idea by which chess players organize their determination of moves even when a checkmate is impossible. Players try to tie even if they can’t checkmate; you can capture a little bit of the other player’s victory without checkmating or even ending the game (an indeterminate stalemate, like when a king can run indefinitely). It isn’t violating the rules of chess (its constitutive categories) or cheating if you don’t play to win, but playing the game of chess obliges you to try to win, even when you can’t do so determinately. Similarly, if you are making sense of your sensations you are obliged to believe in the transcendental subject even though you can only make indeterminate sense of the transcendental subject.
Cognitive scientists have claimed that Kant can only make claims about the subject through the categories (e.g. existence), and anything under the categories is not transcendental, so Kant ought to have abandoned the notion of a transcendental subject. However, Kant is not claiming knowledge of the transcendental subject’s existence (determined through categories), but claiming an obligation to think of the transcendental subject as existing (indeterminately through the categories). What does this mean?
To return to the chess analogy, Kant is saying that we might only be able to play to win by following the rules of the game, and the rules may only apply to chess moves, but that does not thereby make a chess win a mere determined chess move like a checkmate. A chess win is a regulatory idea by which chess players organize their determination of moves even when a checkmate is impossible. Players try to tie even if they can’t checkmate; you can capture a little bit of the other player’s victory without checkmating or even ending the game (an indeterminate stalemate, like when a king can run indefinitely). It isn’t violating the rules of chess (its constitutive categories) or cheating if you don’t play to win, but playing the game of chess obliges you to try to win, even when you can’t do so determinately. Similarly, if you are making sense of your sensations you are obliged to believe in the transcendental subject even though you can only make indeterminate sense of the transcendental subject.