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Craig-Harris debate at U. of Notre Dame
Last night at the University of Notre Dame a debate was held entitled “Does Good come from God? Are the foundations for moral values natural or supernatural?” Christian philosopher and apologist William Lane Craig and “New Atheist” neuroscientist Sam Harris, author of the recent book The Moral Landscape, were the participants in this debate.
Travis (ebric) has helpfully collected the 9-part YouTube series recording the debate (just over two hours if you count the Q&A at the end). You can find them here on his blog, where he gives what I take to be a generally fair assessment of the debate. (My main disagreement with Travis is his statement that “Dr. Craig established that theism is the only grounds on which the moral values which they both hold to be objective can actually be objective.” For although I agree that Craig gave good arguments for the superiority of classical theism to atheist naturalism vis-à-vis providing an ontological ground for morality, that doesn’t make theism superior to all other possible contenders-even if it indeed it is, and can be established on the basis of independent arguments.)
It seems to me Craig could strengthen his argument by showing why God must be essentially good and loving, so as to avoid 1) Harris’s hypothesis that God could be evil, 2) Harris’s charge of arbitrariness in our choice of God, and 3) the notorious Euthyprho dilemma of which Harris makes mention toward the end. Certainly the classical theist’s concept of God is one of a perfectly good Creator, but on what is this understanding of God as perfectly good grounded? Craig references Anselm and alludes to the ontological argument, but as a Thomist I don’t think this is the “greatest conceivable” way (both puns intended) to arrive at a purely philosophical basis for God’s perfection. I would instead propose something like the following:
Also, Harris’s apparent conflation of value-bearing with being a value in the third video (10:54-12:28) seems noteworthy. Sure, H20 will only be understood as such if a person embraces certain “scientific values”-the value of logic and evidence, for example. But the fact-value distinction doesn’t imply otherwise. For facts to have value is not for facts to reduce to value. Nota bene: This applies no less unequivocally to facts concerning the intersubjective apprehension of human well-being.
In any case, I invite discussion of any strengths and weaknesses of either speaker’s arguments, as well as ways their arguments might be improved upon-the search for which is, I think, an all-important philosophical exercise in logic and charity.
Travis (ebric) has helpfully collected the 9-part YouTube series recording the debate (just over two hours if you count the Q&A at the end). You can find them here on his blog, where he gives what I take to be a generally fair assessment of the debate. (My main disagreement with Travis is his statement that “Dr. Craig established that theism is the only grounds on which the moral values which they both hold to be objective can actually be objective.” For although I agree that Craig gave good arguments for the superiority of classical theism to atheist naturalism vis-à-vis providing an ontological ground for morality, that doesn’t make theism superior to all other possible contenders-even if it indeed it is, and can be established on the basis of independent arguments.)
It seems to me Craig could strengthen his argument by showing why God must be essentially good and loving, so as to avoid 1) Harris’s hypothesis that God could be evil, 2) Harris’s charge of arbitrariness in our choice of God, and 3) the notorious Euthyprho dilemma of which Harris makes mention toward the end. Certainly the classical theist’s concept of God is one of a perfectly good Creator, but on what is this understanding of God as perfectly good grounded? Craig references Anselm and alludes to the ontological argument, but as a Thomist I don’t think this is the “greatest conceivable” way (both puns intended) to arrive at a purely philosophical basis for God’s perfection. I would instead propose something like the following:
- Now God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection. (Aquinas, ST I.4.1c)
Also, Harris’s apparent conflation of value-bearing with being a value in the third video (10:54-12:28) seems noteworthy. Sure, H20 will only be understood as such if a person embraces certain “scientific values”-the value of logic and evidence, for example. But the fact-value distinction doesn’t imply otherwise. For facts to have value is not for facts to reduce to value. Nota bene: This applies no less unequivocally to facts concerning the intersubjective apprehension of human well-being.
In any case, I invite discussion of any strengths and weaknesses of either speaker’s arguments, as well as ways their arguments might be improved upon-the search for which is, I think, an all-important philosophical exercise in logic and charity.