Common Sense, Science and Analytic Metaphysics
So, Ted Sider's very good Four Dimensionalism has a nice introduction where he lays out his methodological assumptions and presuppositions. At the most general level, he has this to say :
One approaches metaphysical inquiry with a number of beliefs... One then develops a theory preserving as many of these ordinary beliefs as possible, while remaining consistent with science. There is a familiar give and take : one must be prepared to sacrifice some beliefs one initially held in order to develop a satisfying theoretical account. But a theoretical account should take ordinary belief as a whole seriously, for only ordinary beliefs tie down the inquiry.
Now, I think something like this underwrites most of analytic metaphysics. It seems very much in the same vein as David Lewis' view from Counterfactuals :
One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify these pre-existing opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways of expanding them into an orderly system. It succeeds to the extent that (1) it is systematic, and (2) it respects those of our pre-philosophical opinions to which we are firmly attached. In so far as it does both better than any alternative we have thought of, we give it credence.
Now, I think something like all this is broadly right. The problem, though, is I'm having a hard time seeing how to justify it. It certainly seems right to say that we should seriously respect both common sense and science (taken in its broadest sense : we can surely include mathematics, logic, and indeed any discipline that we take to have well-grounded, if incomplete, things to say with regards to whatever we are philosophizing about). It also certainly seems right to say that we should aim for comprehensive, simple philosophical theories. So my question to everyone is : is this picture something that is just obvious, and something we should just accept to get our philosophical inquiry off the ground; is it just wrong, and a misguided approach from the start; or are there some independently plausible grounds that would serve to justify this approach to metaphysics, or indeed philosophy generally?
One approaches metaphysical inquiry with a number of beliefs... One then develops a theory preserving as many of these ordinary beliefs as possible, while remaining consistent with science. There is a familiar give and take : one must be prepared to sacrifice some beliefs one initially held in order to develop a satisfying theoretical account. But a theoretical account should take ordinary belief as a whole seriously, for only ordinary beliefs tie down the inquiry.
Now, I think something like this underwrites most of analytic metaphysics. It seems very much in the same vein as David Lewis' view from Counterfactuals :
One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify these pre-existing opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways of expanding them into an orderly system. It succeeds to the extent that (1) it is systematic, and (2) it respects those of our pre-philosophical opinions to which we are firmly attached. In so far as it does both better than any alternative we have thought of, we give it credence.
Now, I think something like all this is broadly right. The problem, though, is I'm having a hard time seeing how to justify it. It certainly seems right to say that we should seriously respect both common sense and science (taken in its broadest sense : we can surely include mathematics, logic, and indeed any discipline that we take to have well-grounded, if incomplete, things to say with regards to whatever we are philosophizing about). It also certainly seems right to say that we should aim for comprehensive, simple philosophical theories. So my question to everyone is : is this picture something that is just obvious, and something we should just accept to get our philosophical inquiry off the ground; is it just wrong, and a misguided approach from the start; or are there some independently plausible grounds that would serve to justify this approach to metaphysics, or indeed philosophy generally?