Why Qualia are Not a Problem for Functionalism
It is an oft expressed opinion that qualia, those qualitative aspects of experience, constitute the major philosophical problem for functionalism. I'd like to offer a short argument for why this is not so.
Qualia are sometimes understood as those aspects of our experience over and above the functional relationships that obtain between our experience, inner states and our behaviour. The redness of red or the painfulness of pain are the most commonly cited examples of such qualia (as a side note, it is illuminating to consider why these two examples are so overwhelmingly chosen over all the other possible examples of qualia). Qualia, so understood, would appear to pose an insurmountable problem for functionalism, which holds (very roughly) that the mind is just a set of functional relationships between experience, inner states and behaviour. We could, it is supposed, imagine people as zombies, wandering around with no qualia whatsoever, but maintaining all the same functional relationships. Qualia, therefore, are apparently a big honking problem for functionalism. Not so.
To see why, consider for a moment someone with exactly the same functional organization as David Chalmers, except lacking qualia. We can imagine engaging in a debate with this Zombie Chalmers, and making no headway whatsoever.
ZC : But I have direct introspective knowledge, as epistemically sound as anything gets, of my own qualia. You cannot tell me I do not.
Me: But I created you for the purposes of this thought experiment. I know you have no qualia, despite what you may think.
ZC : Hogwash. I can feel this table. I can see the brilliant reds of a sunset. Of this I am sure. Your sophistry will not move me.
We could go on like this all day. Whenever Zombie Chalmers tries to introspectively examine his own experience, his functional organization will dictate that he will only become mroe sure that he has qualia. If it did not, he would not be functionally identical to the real David Chalmers.
Now, the question is: how do you know that you are not in the same position as Zombie Chalmers? If your qualia play no functional role whatsoever, they cannot possibly be the cause of your belief that you have qualia! The belief that you have qualia is a functional state.
Qualia are not something deduced from argument, but rather are supposed to be experienced directly, and so the belief that you have qualia must either have been caused by them, or be erroneous. Therefore if qualia play no functional role we have no reason to believe in them. In fact, we can conclude from this that we only have evidence for the existence of qualia insofar as they play functional roles.
Please note: I am not trying to prove that there are no such things as qualia. I am not trying to show that materialism is true, and dualism is false. Furthermore, I'm not even offering an argument for functionalism. The only conclusion I have tried to argue for is that qualia, insofar as we can possibly have evidence for their existence, are not necessarily a problem for functionalism.
Qualia are sometimes understood as those aspects of our experience over and above the functional relationships that obtain between our experience, inner states and our behaviour. The redness of red or the painfulness of pain are the most commonly cited examples of such qualia (as a side note, it is illuminating to consider why these two examples are so overwhelmingly chosen over all the other possible examples of qualia). Qualia, so understood, would appear to pose an insurmountable problem for functionalism, which holds (very roughly) that the mind is just a set of functional relationships between experience, inner states and behaviour. We could, it is supposed, imagine people as zombies, wandering around with no qualia whatsoever, but maintaining all the same functional relationships. Qualia, therefore, are apparently a big honking problem for functionalism. Not so.
To see why, consider for a moment someone with exactly the same functional organization as David Chalmers, except lacking qualia. We can imagine engaging in a debate with this Zombie Chalmers, and making no headway whatsoever.
ZC : But I have direct introspective knowledge, as epistemically sound as anything gets, of my own qualia. You cannot tell me I do not.
Me: But I created you for the purposes of this thought experiment. I know you have no qualia, despite what you may think.
ZC : Hogwash. I can feel this table. I can see the brilliant reds of a sunset. Of this I am sure. Your sophistry will not move me.
We could go on like this all day. Whenever Zombie Chalmers tries to introspectively examine his own experience, his functional organization will dictate that he will only become mroe sure that he has qualia. If it did not, he would not be functionally identical to the real David Chalmers.
Now, the question is: how do you know that you are not in the same position as Zombie Chalmers? If your qualia play no functional role whatsoever, they cannot possibly be the cause of your belief that you have qualia! The belief that you have qualia is a functional state.
Qualia are not something deduced from argument, but rather are supposed to be experienced directly, and so the belief that you have qualia must either have been caused by them, or be erroneous. Therefore if qualia play no functional role we have no reason to believe in them. In fact, we can conclude from this that we only have evidence for the existence of qualia insofar as they play functional roles.
Please note: I am not trying to prove that there are no such things as qualia. I am not trying to show that materialism is true, and dualism is false. Furthermore, I'm not even offering an argument for functionalism. The only conclusion I have tried to argue for is that qualia, insofar as we can possibly have evidence for their existence, are not necessarily a problem for functionalism.