The (non-)Problem of (robotic) Evil
-Reasoning is based upon internal and external observations, and any "reasons" would be those that humans think up based upon their perceptions
-A part of Chrisitian faith is believing that God acts outside of human reason as what observed events can possibly produce good and what can possibly mean good and yet still ultimately produce good
-The "reasons" that is being spoken of in rational arguments (i.e. "Problem of Evil") are human ones and are dependent upon empirical observations and sensory experiences, both of which are subject to limitations
-As far as I'm concerned the physical evidence is only successful in showing how it is probable that "the devil" or "a mean/whimsical deity" exists (detrimental symptoms being "proof" of malign entity) and not how it is improbable that the Christian God does (detrimental symptoms being what they are- symptoms)
-All rational arguments both for and against God are thus suspect when it comes to the presentation of "evidence"
Stop playing the perception game and the game ends right then and there
To me faith isn't a matter of evidence
(Translation into formal argument curtesy of i_am_lane. Disclaimer: He is not a theist)
1. There is evil/suffering in the world.
2. God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient.
3. Therefore, God knows about all the evil (and probably all evil that is to come), he is powerful enough to prevent all of it, and since he loves us unconditionally, should not want us to suffer.
4. However, there is a conflict between 3 and 1. The God of 3 seems like he would not allow 1 to take place, but we know from 1 that it does.
5. Instead of rejecting 2 (problem of evil argument) we instead reject 3 as containing the invalid premise that God should not want us to suffer.
6. While this may be true (that he does not want us to suffer) he may have some reason for allowing it.
7. By 2, God is omniscient and therefore his mind is infinite.
8. Being human, our minds are finite, and therefore, not omniscient.
9. Therefore, our characterization of God in 3 is unfair, because we possess none of the properties of 2, and cannot speculate as to the precise nature of God. Even if we accept that God has the properties of 2, the implications of these in the larger scheme of things is beyond us.
"In other words, there is a tacit step 2.5 where we deduce the traits of 3 from the properties of 2. This is what you reject, saying that God isn't necessarily the way 3 describes him, given the properties of 2."
Original argument posted in apologetics, 3/19/2005
-A part of Chrisitian faith is believing that God acts outside of human reason as what observed events can possibly produce good and what can possibly mean good and yet still ultimately produce good
-The "reasons" that is being spoken of in rational arguments (i.e. "Problem of Evil") are human ones and are dependent upon empirical observations and sensory experiences, both of which are subject to limitations
-As far as I'm concerned the physical evidence is only successful in showing how it is probable that "the devil" or "a mean/whimsical deity" exists (detrimental symptoms being "proof" of malign entity) and not how it is improbable that the Christian God does (detrimental symptoms being what they are- symptoms)
-All rational arguments both for and against God are thus suspect when it comes to the presentation of "evidence"
Stop playing the perception game and the game ends right then and there
To me faith isn't a matter of evidence
(Translation into formal argument curtesy of i_am_lane. Disclaimer: He is not a theist)
1. There is evil/suffering in the world.
2. God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient.
3. Therefore, God knows about all the evil (and probably all evil that is to come), he is powerful enough to prevent all of it, and since he loves us unconditionally, should not want us to suffer.
4. However, there is a conflict between 3 and 1. The God of 3 seems like he would not allow 1 to take place, but we know from 1 that it does.
5. Instead of rejecting 2 (problem of evil argument) we instead reject 3 as containing the invalid premise that God should not want us to suffer.
6. While this may be true (that he does not want us to suffer) he may have some reason for allowing it.
7. By 2, God is omniscient and therefore his mind is infinite.
8. Being human, our minds are finite, and therefore, not omniscient.
9. Therefore, our characterization of God in 3 is unfair, because we possess none of the properties of 2, and cannot speculate as to the precise nature of God. Even if we accept that God has the properties of 2, the implications of these in the larger scheme of things is beyond us.
"In other words, there is a tacit step 2.5 where we deduce the traits of 3 from the properties of 2. This is what you reject, saying that God isn't necessarily the way 3 describes him, given the properties of 2."
Original argument posted in apologetics, 3/19/2005