Sun Tzu made me think about W... uh oh... (Part 1)
So as I was reading through Sun Tzu on the Art of War, I kept coming across things which are still as valid now as they were when the treatise was written... in the sixth century BC.
First, from Book I (Laying Plans)...
"3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and Discipline
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.
10. By Method and Discipline are the be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail."
He then gives 7 considerations on which decisions should be reached:
"13. (I) which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral Law? (II) Which of the two generals has most ability? (III) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth. (IV) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? (V) Which army is the stronger? (VI) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? (VII) In which army is there the greatest reward both in reward and in punishment?
14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat."
I wonder what he would have forecast in the case of Iraq, especially taking into account I. 26 "The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all!"
Now, our general (read Commander in Chief) by all accounts made few calculations, if any, before launching us on this perilous course in Iraq, thus I feel that Sun Tzu would not have forecast victory for us, even in the beginning, when it was army against army. When it began, one could answer that the United States had the advantage in four of his seven considerations, I, V, VI, and VII (I omit two as I am reading Commander in Chief for general, and Saddam was a better soldier than W, by all accounts.) II and III go to the Iraqis, obviously. IV only because punishment was more brutally enforced in Iraq's army.
But now, come on! The quote that launched me on this entire digression actually comes from book two: "There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare." (II.6) I think this is certainly true, for the longer this has dragged on, the fewer the advantages retained by the U.S.
Consider each now.
I) As for Moral Law, the more rigorous of our war hawks would argue that we still retain that particular advantage, as it is clearly our moral duty to apply democracy to those poor souls who do not have it (or in many cases ever sought it.) But if we take Sun Tzu's definition of the Moral Law, even those war hawks cannont deny that our advantage in Moral Law is almost completely lacking, as 'accord' with our ruler has dwindled increasingly in the years he has led, so that very few want to follow him at all, let alone "regardless of their lives."
Granted, there is no ruler (or even generals (II), in the organized way we would think of them) as such in Iraq at present, but one could make the argument that these 'insurgent leaders' certainly possess the advantage over Bush. They have small forces, passionately devout, and willing to lay down their lives with their own hands when called on to do. Advantage Iraqis, I think.
II) The argument could be made, I think, that this particular question has been rendered moot by the change in the nature of the war in Iraq. While our generals may have the most ability, the most training, etc, this kind of guerilla war generally favors the resident. As to the decision making general here, he has little direct control over forces on the ground. Ability to the U.S., but the point is moot. I call it a push.
III) Now think on Heaven, as defined by Sun Tzu. This was an advantage to the home team in the beginning, and still is today. Residents of a place have a far more intimate relation with those things than alien forces. Advantage Iraqis.
Earth has become an even more obvious advantage to the Iraqis. These is a parallel here with the Afghan soldiers who fought off the Soviets so successfully in another long drawn out campaign in the seventies and eighties. They know the terrain, intimately. Moreso now than before, as urban warfare nearly always gives an advantage to smaller, hidden forces. You can't destroy what you can't find. Big advantage Iraqis.
IV) The question of discipline has altered on our side significantly with the well-publicized breaches of conduct, while an already rigorous discipline has fractured into a large number of smaller bu equally rigorous disciplines. Taking into consideration the level of fervor present in some of those smaller groups, one could say that discipline has increased on their side. Anyone disciplined enough to flip a switch and explode themselves gets the nod here. Also, consider the other portions of the definition in Sun Tzu. The roadside bombs continue to hamper supply lines, our spending is out of control, and getting worse, and the morale of those forced to return time and again to a war less and less popular at home takes a hit. I have to call this one as I see it. Advantage Iraqis.
(V) Which army is the stronger? Our army is definitely stronger. When we find an army to fight. See the aforementioned reference to the Soviet/Afghan struggle, and you will see the end to which this progresses. I think our advantage here is nullified. Push.
VI) Training is a U.S. advantage, I don't think there can be doubt. That being said, the influence of Syria and Iran could have an impact the longer this drags on. Advantage United States.
VII) What reward do our soldiers get out of this? Where the punishment in military terms is constant, the joys of missing limbs and constant danger can in no way be classified as a reward. Whereas the Iraqi 'insurgents' face many of those same danger with a devout faith in a reward that seems very rewarding indeed. I cannot but call this one as an advantage to the home team again. Advantage Iraqis.
(Please do not in any way read the above as a lack of support for our troops in Iraq. I support them with all my heart and hope that they return whole. It is their 'mission' and those in command at home that I take umbrage with.)
By my count, that reads four advantages to Iraq, one to the United States, and two so muddled as to be neutral overall. I have to believe that Sun Tzu would have never gotten into this in the first place, and certainly would not stay. Thus I look to November '08 with this in mind
"The general [read Commander in Chief] that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it will conquer:- let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:- let such a one be dismissed!" (I.15)
Our general needs to be and will be dismissed, and none like him be ushered in in his place. Hopefully whomever succeeds will remember their Sun Tzu and the forthcoming ideas.
Thanks for sticking with this, ye who have come this far. There will be others forthcoming.
First, from Book I (Laying Plans)...
"3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and Discipline
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.
10. By Method and Discipline are the be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail."
He then gives 7 considerations on which decisions should be reached:
"13. (I) which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral Law? (II) Which of the two generals has most ability? (III) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth. (IV) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? (V) Which army is the stronger? (VI) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? (VII) In which army is there the greatest reward both in reward and in punishment?
14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat."
I wonder what he would have forecast in the case of Iraq, especially taking into account I. 26 "The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all!"
Now, our general (read Commander in Chief) by all accounts made few calculations, if any, before launching us on this perilous course in Iraq, thus I feel that Sun Tzu would not have forecast victory for us, even in the beginning, when it was army against army. When it began, one could answer that the United States had the advantage in four of his seven considerations, I, V, VI, and VII (I omit two as I am reading Commander in Chief for general, and Saddam was a better soldier than W, by all accounts.) II and III go to the Iraqis, obviously. IV only because punishment was more brutally enforced in Iraq's army.
But now, come on! The quote that launched me on this entire digression actually comes from book two: "There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare." (II.6) I think this is certainly true, for the longer this has dragged on, the fewer the advantages retained by the U.S.
Consider each now.
I) As for Moral Law, the more rigorous of our war hawks would argue that we still retain that particular advantage, as it is clearly our moral duty to apply democracy to those poor souls who do not have it (or in many cases ever sought it.) But if we take Sun Tzu's definition of the Moral Law, even those war hawks cannont deny that our advantage in Moral Law is almost completely lacking, as 'accord' with our ruler has dwindled increasingly in the years he has led, so that very few want to follow him at all, let alone "regardless of their lives."
Granted, there is no ruler (or even generals (II), in the organized way we would think of them) as such in Iraq at present, but one could make the argument that these 'insurgent leaders' certainly possess the advantage over Bush. They have small forces, passionately devout, and willing to lay down their lives with their own hands when called on to do. Advantage Iraqis, I think.
II) The argument could be made, I think, that this particular question has been rendered moot by the change in the nature of the war in Iraq. While our generals may have the most ability, the most training, etc, this kind of guerilla war generally favors the resident. As to the decision making general here, he has little direct control over forces on the ground. Ability to the U.S., but the point is moot. I call it a push.
III) Now think on Heaven, as defined by Sun Tzu. This was an advantage to the home team in the beginning, and still is today. Residents of a place have a far more intimate relation with those things than alien forces. Advantage Iraqis.
Earth has become an even more obvious advantage to the Iraqis. These is a parallel here with the Afghan soldiers who fought off the Soviets so successfully in another long drawn out campaign in the seventies and eighties. They know the terrain, intimately. Moreso now than before, as urban warfare nearly always gives an advantage to smaller, hidden forces. You can't destroy what you can't find. Big advantage Iraqis.
IV) The question of discipline has altered on our side significantly with the well-publicized breaches of conduct, while an already rigorous discipline has fractured into a large number of smaller bu equally rigorous disciplines. Taking into consideration the level of fervor present in some of those smaller groups, one could say that discipline has increased on their side. Anyone disciplined enough to flip a switch and explode themselves gets the nod here. Also, consider the other portions of the definition in Sun Tzu. The roadside bombs continue to hamper supply lines, our spending is out of control, and getting worse, and the morale of those forced to return time and again to a war less and less popular at home takes a hit. I have to call this one as I see it. Advantage Iraqis.
(V) Which army is the stronger? Our army is definitely stronger. When we find an army to fight. See the aforementioned reference to the Soviet/Afghan struggle, and you will see the end to which this progresses. I think our advantage here is nullified. Push.
VI) Training is a U.S. advantage, I don't think there can be doubt. That being said, the influence of Syria and Iran could have an impact the longer this drags on. Advantage United States.
VII) What reward do our soldiers get out of this? Where the punishment in military terms is constant, the joys of missing limbs and constant danger can in no way be classified as a reward. Whereas the Iraqi 'insurgents' face many of those same danger with a devout faith in a reward that seems very rewarding indeed. I cannot but call this one as an advantage to the home team again. Advantage Iraqis.
(Please do not in any way read the above as a lack of support for our troops in Iraq. I support them with all my heart and hope that they return whole. It is their 'mission' and those in command at home that I take umbrage with.)
By my count, that reads four advantages to Iraq, one to the United States, and two so muddled as to be neutral overall. I have to believe that Sun Tzu would have never gotten into this in the first place, and certainly would not stay. Thus I look to November '08 with this in mind
"The general [read Commander in Chief] that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it will conquer:- let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:- let such a one be dismissed!" (I.15)
Our general needs to be and will be dismissed, and none like him be ushered in in his place. Hopefully whomever succeeds will remember their Sun Tzu and the forthcoming ideas.
Thanks for sticking with this, ye who have come this far. There will be others forthcoming.