Christmas spirit, part 5
The subject says that this is about Christmas, but really this is about relevant maybe-philosophical shit:
So we have:
simulacrum: a symbol (sign?) without a referent.
(Although it probably has sense.
I may be mixing dangerous philosophical chemicals here irresponsibly by make this old distinction between two different types of meaning, but I have since childhood admired the mad scientist archetype (see future post) and this is my chemistry set.
For introduction/review,
Consider: "The morning star"
It has reference (Bedeutung, to Germans who like to talk about this stuff). The referent is the planet Venus.
It also has sense (Sinn) is something like "that thing in the sky that appears in the morning." It is the "cognitive significance" of the referent, according to the Wikipedia article.
Disclaimer: I actually know nothing about sense and reference.)
Now consider:
"One application Frege saw for the distinction concerns what are called nonreferring, nondenoting, or empty, expressions. These expressions do not have a reference, for example "the greatest integer" [2]. Since there is not a greatest integer, the expression doesn't refer to anything. But it seems perfectly meaningful, since we seem to understand claims like "The greatest integer is larger than one million". Employing the sense-reference distinction, we can say that the expression has a sense but lacks a reference."
Question for Hal, or anyone who knows anything about simulacra: What distinguishes simulacra from non-denoting expressions?
(Is there a difference between symbols and expressions?)
For now, I'm going to assume that a simulacrum is a non-denoting symbol.
(Although I should be specific: Simulacra as a subset (not necessarily a proper subset) of the set of non-denoting symbols. So, there may be, under this assumption, properties of simulacrum that distinguish them from other non-denoting symbols)
Great. Now, the curve ball:
Nominalism. What is it? Wikipedia says: "Nominalism is the position in metaphysics that there exist no universals outside of the mind," with the helpful hyperlink to the article on universals, which is tagged by the diligent Wikipedia community for informality. We don't mind! It defines universals as "either properties, relations, or types." That almost certainly isn't helpful, but this is--here's the most informative paragraph of the article, in case you are lazy:
"Consider some examples of universals: there are types, like dog or "doghood"; properties, like red or redness; and relations, like betweenness or "being between"; those are all universals. Any particular dog, particular red thing, or particular object that is between other objects is not a universal, but a particular, and instances of universals (or objects that somehow bear universals). Doghood, redness, and betweenness are common to many different things. So a universal is something that can have instances; but it does not make sense to talk about an instance of a particular."
Got it?
Now consider: "Realists invite us to think of universals as the referents of general terms. In other words, they are what we refer to, when we use general words like "doghood," "redness," and "betweenness.""
Nominalism is, like, the evil black ninja to the good white ninja of realism. Suggestion: To the nominalist, who has, despite his surly demeanor, a pretty tight backing argument and distinguished yet intriguing pedigree (dating at least as far back as the more nihilistic origins of Buddhism--see the chariot argument from the Milindapanha)...
long parenthetical again. I'll start again:
Suggestion: To the nominalist, who you should take seriously, no general expression has a referent.
So, maybe (depending on what qualifies non-refering/denoting terms as simulacra) all general symbols are simulacra.
Once you have general expressions ("dogness") by the balls, you can start to wail away at things that you normally thing of as particulars ("my dog Fido") by doing all sorts of things to Fido like removing limbs, hairs, etc., simulating Fido on a computer perfectly, etc.--discover exactly how flexible particulars are, how general particulars are--how much "Fido" is a mere apellation, and account of particular components....
And our world turns out to be, not real, but (unless simulacra not equated with nondenoting signs) the hyperreal! Maybe. In, like, a metaphysical sense.
So...I'm murdering the intended meaning of the hyperreal, as a social commentary or whatever, which I have been struggling with since Christmas. I bought new pants today and confronted the hyperreal--it is terrifying. I can't celebrate it.
But I'm bringing this up because I need to rebuild the idea of the hyperreal on a foundation that doesn't have an implicit correspondence theory of truth. Here, I'm speculating: In a correspondence theory of truth, the truth of a proposition depends on the proposition's referent's being in the relationships referred to by the proposition. Structural isomorphism, says Wittgenstein--his project (in the pretentiously titled Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) failed because the conclusions it drew were profoundly dumb and intractable--that's too harsh. The conclusions it drew were pragmatically untenable--like skepticism, say. I'm at this point, until being convinced otherwise, committed to nominalism, but believe in the real (making the hyperreal a useful concept, entitling me to say or think things like "Stop being so hyperreal, you flake! Authentically age your own fucking blue jeans!"). There's a way out, I think, through degree theory and pragmatism. (There's always a way out through pragmatism.)
I babble. (I dabble...) All this by way of introduction (?)-- I make the mistake of putting all the philosophy together; by now, you aren't even reading, most cherished folks. But I say all this because it ties in to the personally important things that polls suggest are what you actually want to read about, if you want to read about anything.
I'm going to think something through hard, and I want you to know what I'm talking about: Some time soon, I will try to figure out if love is real.
So we have:
simulacrum: a symbol (sign?) without a referent.
(Although it probably has sense.
I may be mixing dangerous philosophical chemicals here irresponsibly by make this old distinction between two different types of meaning, but I have since childhood admired the mad scientist archetype (see future post) and this is my chemistry set.
For introduction/review,
Consider: "The morning star"
It has reference (Bedeutung, to Germans who like to talk about this stuff). The referent is the planet Venus.
It also has sense (Sinn) is something like "that thing in the sky that appears in the morning." It is the "cognitive significance" of the referent, according to the Wikipedia article.
Disclaimer: I actually know nothing about sense and reference.)
Now consider:
"One application Frege saw for the distinction concerns what are called nonreferring, nondenoting, or empty, expressions. These expressions do not have a reference, for example "the greatest integer" [2]. Since there is not a greatest integer, the expression doesn't refer to anything. But it seems perfectly meaningful, since we seem to understand claims like "The greatest integer is larger than one million". Employing the sense-reference distinction, we can say that the expression has a sense but lacks a reference."
Question for Hal, or anyone who knows anything about simulacra: What distinguishes simulacra from non-denoting expressions?
(Is there a difference between symbols and expressions?)
For now, I'm going to assume that a simulacrum is a non-denoting symbol.
(Although I should be specific: Simulacra as a subset (not necessarily a proper subset) of the set of non-denoting symbols. So, there may be, under this assumption, properties of simulacrum that distinguish them from other non-denoting symbols)
Great. Now, the curve ball:
Nominalism. What is it? Wikipedia says: "Nominalism is the position in metaphysics that there exist no universals outside of the mind," with the helpful hyperlink to the article on universals, which is tagged by the diligent Wikipedia community for informality. We don't mind! It defines universals as "either properties, relations, or types." That almost certainly isn't helpful, but this is--here's the most informative paragraph of the article, in case you are lazy:
"Consider some examples of universals: there are types, like dog or "doghood"; properties, like red or redness; and relations, like betweenness or "being between"; those are all universals. Any particular dog, particular red thing, or particular object that is between other objects is not a universal, but a particular, and instances of universals (or objects that somehow bear universals). Doghood, redness, and betweenness are common to many different things. So a universal is something that can have instances; but it does not make sense to talk about an instance of a particular."
Got it?
Now consider: "Realists invite us to think of universals as the referents of general terms. In other words, they are what we refer to, when we use general words like "doghood," "redness," and "betweenness.""
Nominalism is, like, the evil black ninja to the good white ninja of realism. Suggestion: To the nominalist, who has, despite his surly demeanor, a pretty tight backing argument and distinguished yet intriguing pedigree (dating at least as far back as the more nihilistic origins of Buddhism--see the chariot argument from the Milindapanha)...
long parenthetical again. I'll start again:
Suggestion: To the nominalist, who you should take seriously, no general expression has a referent.
So, maybe (depending on what qualifies non-refering/denoting terms as simulacra) all general symbols are simulacra.
Once you have general expressions ("dogness") by the balls, you can start to wail away at things that you normally thing of as particulars ("my dog Fido") by doing all sorts of things to Fido like removing limbs, hairs, etc., simulating Fido on a computer perfectly, etc.--discover exactly how flexible particulars are, how general particulars are--how much "Fido" is a mere apellation, and account of particular components....
And our world turns out to be, not real, but (unless simulacra not equated with nondenoting signs) the hyperreal! Maybe. In, like, a metaphysical sense.
So...I'm murdering the intended meaning of the hyperreal, as a social commentary or whatever, which I have been struggling with since Christmas. I bought new pants today and confronted the hyperreal--it is terrifying. I can't celebrate it.
But I'm bringing this up because I need to rebuild the idea of the hyperreal on a foundation that doesn't have an implicit correspondence theory of truth. Here, I'm speculating: In a correspondence theory of truth, the truth of a proposition depends on the proposition's referent's being in the relationships referred to by the proposition. Structural isomorphism, says Wittgenstein--his project (in the pretentiously titled Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) failed because the conclusions it drew were profoundly dumb and intractable--that's too harsh. The conclusions it drew were pragmatically untenable--like skepticism, say. I'm at this point, until being convinced otherwise, committed to nominalism, but believe in the real (making the hyperreal a useful concept, entitling me to say or think things like "Stop being so hyperreal, you flake! Authentically age your own fucking blue jeans!"). There's a way out, I think, through degree theory and pragmatism. (There's always a way out through pragmatism.)
I babble. (I dabble...) All this by way of introduction (?)-- I make the mistake of putting all the philosophy together; by now, you aren't even reading, most cherished folks. But I say all this because it ties in to the personally important things that polls suggest are what you actually want to read about, if you want to read about anything.
I'm going to think something through hard, and I want you to know what I'm talking about: Some time soon, I will try to figure out if love is real.