The Unsentimental warrior
Op-Ed Contributor- New York Times, Inc.
The Unsentimental Warrior
By LUCIAN K. TRUSCOTT IV
Published: June 23, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/24/opinion/24truscott.html
Excerpt:
THERE’S one moment in the Rolling Stone article that led to Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s dismissal on Thursday that truly concerned me - and it’s not one of the reproachful comments about administration officials that have been clucked over by pundits and politicians. No, what stood out for me was the scene in which General McChrystal points to the members of his staff and says: “All these men, I’d die for them. And they’d die for me.”
General McChrystal got it entirely backward: generals definitely don’t die for their soldiers, and soldiers don’t die for generals. They die because generals order them into battle to accomplish a mission, and some are killed carrying out those orders. General McChrystal’s statement is that of a man who is sentimental about his job, and who has confused sentimentality with command.
For too long, the Army has been led by sentimental men, by peacocks in starched fatigues and strutting ascetics surrounded by public relations teams. But the Army doesn’t need sentimental generals; it needs generals who can give the kind of difficult and deadly orders that win wars.
This article, along with a number of commentaries I've heard over the last few days, jelled my various thoughts about this incident, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and our current defense strategy. One of the NPR interviewees today, an instructor at the National Defense University, said that the reason we were not managing to stabilize the government in Afghanistan was that we aren't earning the respect of the population. We might be bringing them aid and killing off or driving away insurgents, but we don't set up a truly stable government behind us when we withdraw. Her belief is that once we withdraw from an area, it swiftly converts back to Taliban or other control, as if we had never been there. The local government goes back into the control of those who fought for their cause, no matter what our leadership thought that cause should be.
Her reasoning was that the men in units and on the lines understood that insurgents were dying for a cause, and that Coalition command has to start paying attention to that, rather than concentrating on winning hearts and minds of non-combatants. (Yes, we are building infrastructure and setting up relief channels and training locals to police and govern themselves. Is that winning?) Folks in the US may think that we shouldn't send men and women out to die, but if we are actually in a war, that's exactly what will happen. If we aren't aware of that -- unsentimental about that truth -- we should come home. A holding action -- one that will cost 8-10K Coalition casualties over the next 5-8 years if we continue on our current path -- will leave Afghanistan and possibly Iraq to stagnate while Iran, Pakistan, and other neighbors to explode into full-fledged, all-out war with the Coalition wedged -or trapped- ineffectively in the middle.
Whoever the hell it is that is deciding our ultimate military goal -- and the fact that I am not certain who is actually formulating that goal and our path to it says a lot about how I feel about our role as evangelists for American-style democracy -- needs to decide what we are really doing. If we're out to stop terrorist attacks on the US and other western countries, we need to be doing more truly defensive things here in the US. The Taliban and Al Qaida are hydras -- bombing or killing one leader or cell just inflames the rest and more leaders and cells spring up.
Only co-religionists can actually stop jihaddi suicide bombings and other destructive acts: this really is a religious war, as were the Crusades -- and the Western nations didn't learn anything from them or manage to successfully meet our objectives there, either. We just lost thousands of warriors and created havoc in the emerging nations back home (altho we did establish some good trade routes and incorporate some really useful intellectual concepts into our civilization).
So General McChrystal has foot-in-mouth disease, and his boss gets to come back to the front line and continue with the anti-insurgency and draw down strategies. I just wonder what we think we're actually doing. I sure as hell don't know -- and unless our leadership has a clearer picture of what it means to "win" this war, we should all get the hell out of there and spend those resources taking care of our wounded warriors who've already come back. And perhaps all those other underfunded initiatives gasping for life-support back here at home.
The Unsentimental Warrior
By LUCIAN K. TRUSCOTT IV
Published: June 23, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/24/opinion/24truscott.html
Excerpt:
THERE’S one moment in the Rolling Stone article that led to Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s dismissal on Thursday that truly concerned me - and it’s not one of the reproachful comments about administration officials that have been clucked over by pundits and politicians. No, what stood out for me was the scene in which General McChrystal points to the members of his staff and says: “All these men, I’d die for them. And they’d die for me.”
General McChrystal got it entirely backward: generals definitely don’t die for their soldiers, and soldiers don’t die for generals. They die because generals order them into battle to accomplish a mission, and some are killed carrying out those orders. General McChrystal’s statement is that of a man who is sentimental about his job, and who has confused sentimentality with command.
For too long, the Army has been led by sentimental men, by peacocks in starched fatigues and strutting ascetics surrounded by public relations teams. But the Army doesn’t need sentimental generals; it needs generals who can give the kind of difficult and deadly orders that win wars.
This article, along with a number of commentaries I've heard over the last few days, jelled my various thoughts about this incident, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and our current defense strategy. One of the NPR interviewees today, an instructor at the National Defense University, said that the reason we were not managing to stabilize the government in Afghanistan was that we aren't earning the respect of the population. We might be bringing them aid and killing off or driving away insurgents, but we don't set up a truly stable government behind us when we withdraw. Her belief is that once we withdraw from an area, it swiftly converts back to Taliban or other control, as if we had never been there. The local government goes back into the control of those who fought for their cause, no matter what our leadership thought that cause should be.
Her reasoning was that the men in units and on the lines understood that insurgents were dying for a cause, and that Coalition command has to start paying attention to that, rather than concentrating on winning hearts and minds of non-combatants. (Yes, we are building infrastructure and setting up relief channels and training locals to police and govern themselves. Is that winning?) Folks in the US may think that we shouldn't send men and women out to die, but if we are actually in a war, that's exactly what will happen. If we aren't aware of that -- unsentimental about that truth -- we should come home. A holding action -- one that will cost 8-10K Coalition casualties over the next 5-8 years if we continue on our current path -- will leave Afghanistan and possibly Iraq to stagnate while Iran, Pakistan, and other neighbors to explode into full-fledged, all-out war with the Coalition wedged -or trapped- ineffectively in the middle.
Whoever the hell it is that is deciding our ultimate military goal -- and the fact that I am not certain who is actually formulating that goal and our path to it says a lot about how I feel about our role as evangelists for American-style democracy -- needs to decide what we are really doing. If we're out to stop terrorist attacks on the US and other western countries, we need to be doing more truly defensive things here in the US. The Taliban and Al Qaida are hydras -- bombing or killing one leader or cell just inflames the rest and more leaders and cells spring up.
Only co-religionists can actually stop jihaddi suicide bombings and other destructive acts: this really is a religious war, as were the Crusades -- and the Western nations didn't learn anything from them or manage to successfully meet our objectives there, either. We just lost thousands of warriors and created havoc in the emerging nations back home (altho we did establish some good trade routes and incorporate some really useful intellectual concepts into our civilization).
So General McChrystal has foot-in-mouth disease, and his boss gets to come back to the front line and continue with the anti-insurgency and draw down strategies. I just wonder what we think we're actually doing. I sure as hell don't know -- and unless our leadership has a clearer picture of what it means to "win" this war, we should all get the hell out of there and spend those resources taking care of our wounded warriors who've already come back. And perhaps all those other underfunded initiatives gasping for life-support back here at home.