Увага конкурс ...
Зьнешнія інфармацыйныя рэсурсы, фрэнд-стужка і нават самое паветра поўніцца весткамі ды спэкуляцыямі з нагоды сканьчэньня палітычнай адлігі, падзеяў у Тыбэце, людзі па саёй волі і па ўказцы рэдактараў (унутраных і вонкавых) абмяркоўваюцца байкот Алімпіяды, расьпякаюць "змагарскую апазыцыю", заклікаюць у NATO, прапангандуюць нэа-ліцьвінства, шмат увагі таксама надаецца творчасьці, вясноваму настрою, кламбурам і асабістым успаміна-узьлёта-падзеньням. І гэта ЦУДОЎНА! Усё вышэйназванае мяне таксама шчыра хвалюе. Але ж адбываецца яшчэ нешта, што знову у трэці раз прымушае мяне выгукнуць: "Людзі, спяшайцеся бачыць!" [ першы і другі раз]. Гаворка пра тое, што цяпер з'явіўся ўнікальны шанец угледзецца ў самыя вантробы рухавіка таго, што Гі Дэбор назваў СПЭКТАКЛЕМ. Пры гэтым у патрэбным кірунку вымушаныя ўглядацца і людзі, якія раней на гэтую тэму НІКОЛІ б не загаварылі ... Рэалістычна ацэньваю сваю ЖЖ-вагу, разумею, што пад кат зазірнуць адзінкі. Таму каб падвысіць матывацыю абвяшчаю Конкурс: любы, хто знойдзе ў мэйнстрымаўскіх крыніцах згадкі пра рэчы, якія абмяркоўваюцца пад катам атрымае ад мяне ... г-м, вядро бульбы! Прыводжу камэнтары з адмысловага форуму Financial Times , на якім абмяркоўвалі адказ Алана Грынспэна крытыкам яго артыкулу. Камэнтатары дагаварыліся да вельмі цікавых рэчаў, напрыклад:
1.) Willem Buiter, formerly an influential Monetary Policy Committee member at the Bank of England: Mr Greenspan’s apologia pro vita sua in the Financial Times of Monday, April 7 2008 fails to convince. The Greenspan Fed (August 1987 - January 2006) did contribute, through excessively lax monetary policy, to the US housing boom that has now turned to bust ... This is the aggressive response of the official monetary policy rate to a sharp decline in asset prices (especially stock prices), even though the asset price declines (a) are unlikely to cause future economic activity to decline by more than was required to meet the Fed’s triple mandate and (b) do not convey new information about future economic activity or inflation that would warrant interest rate cuts of this magnitude ... To me, this indicates that the Fed has been co-opted by Wall Street - the Fed has internalised the objectives, concerns, world view and fears of the financial community to an excessive degree. This socialisation into a partial and often highly distorted perception of reality is unhealthy and dangerous.
The Greenspan Fed failed to appreciate the downside of rapid securitisation during the first half of this decade and acted exclusively as a cheerleader for the undoubted virtues of securitisation.
The Greenspan Fed displayed a naive faith in the self-regulating and self-policing properties of financial markets and private financial institutions.
The Greenspan Fed, by enabling the rescue of Long-term capital management in 1998, acted as a moral hazard incubator. Both before and after LTCM, the Greenspan Fed failed to press for a special insolvency resolution regime with prompt corrective action features for all highly leveraged private financial institutions that were likely to be deemed too big and too systemically important to fail ... During his years as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan’s statements reflected a partial (in every sense of the world) understanding of how free competitive markets based on private ownership work ... Mr Greenspan consistently saw but half the picture when it came to what makes competitive market capitalism work. He recognised the central roles of greed, self-interest and competition. He failed to appreciate the complementary roles of non-strategic/opportunistic forms of altruism, honesty, trustworthiness, solidarity and cooperation ... Alan Greenspan’s period as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System represents to me the nadir of central banking in advanced economic-financial systems during modern times. While monetary policy was only mildly incompetent, the regulatory failures were horrendous. The US and the world economy will pay the price for Mr Greenspan’s misjudgements and errors for years, perhaps decades, to come ...
2)Christopher Whalen, co-founder of Institutional Risk Analytics, a Los Angeles unit of Lord, Whalen LLC that provides customized financial analysis and valuation tools:
In particular, in the two decades of Greenspan’s tenure, the Fed’s Washington staff, other regulators and the Congress allowed and enabled Wall Street to migrate more and more of the investment world off exchange and into the opaque world of over-the-counter instruments. This change is described by people like Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson as “innovation,” but my old friend Martin Mayer rightly calls it “retrograde.” ...
In a market comprised primarily of exchange-traded instruments, there is little or no counterparty risk. OTC trades that reference exchange-traded benchmarks are likewise far more stable. By replacing exchange-traded securities with ersatz OTC instruments, Greenspan and the quant economists who dominate the Fed’s Washington staff have created vast systemic risk that need not exist at all and that now threatens our entire financial system ....
BSC failed not because it had too little capital or too little liquidity, but because the thousands upon thousands of OTC trades which flow through the firm’s books are bilateral rather than exchange traded. It was the understandable fear of counterparty risk, not a lack of capital or liquidity, which killed BSC. The irony is that the “financial innovation” of OTC derivatives and structured assets takes us backward in time to the chaotic situation that existed in the US prior to the crash of 1929 ...
If all federally commercial banks and funds subject to ERISA were required by law to invest only in SEC registered, exchange-traded instruments, the threat of further systemic risk could be eliminated tomorrow. What a shame that neither Chairman Bernanke nor FRBNY President Timothy Geithner said that last week when they appeared before the Senate Banking Committee ...
3) Michael Hudson, distinguished professor of economics at University of Missouri (Kansas City),and chief economic adviser to Dennis Kucinich:
By spring of 2006, bankers knew there was a bubble. The public knew it. In May, I published a cover story in Harpers on the topic. In June, I addressed a bank annual meeting and met with a number of bank presidents. They said that they knew that the loans they were making had no foreseeable way of being repaid. But if they didn’t make the loans, they explained, other bankers would do so. And making a bad loan was cost-free. They would turn around and sell it to a packager as quickly as possible, to get it off their own books ...
There was no regulator for these packagers. And under Mr. Paulson’s recent proposals, the Securities and Exchange Commission will be folded up, its regulatory powers taken away - and given to a Fed that does not believe in applying whatever regulatory powers it has (as Mr Crook pointed out so clearly in yesterday’s FT) ...
The financial system is now at a turning point. Bankers have shown that they can’t regulate themselves when they’re making so much money by feeding the bubble ...
і яшчэ адзін - (4)Alex_w wrote (The Economist's web-site):
The concept of an institution who's failure represents 'systemmic' risk and is 'too big to fail' stands outside a competitive financial market. It is only through failure that there is discipline. The problem with LTCM, and now Bear Stearns is not the losses of the shareholders or senior executives. They were always gambling with other peoples money. It is the fact that the Fed acts to protect the investors who lent to Bear Stearns and everybody else and who need to learn the hard way that lending money like a Martingale gambler is a dumb plan ...
1.) Willem Buiter, formerly an influential Monetary Policy Committee member at the Bank of England: Mr Greenspan’s apologia pro vita sua in the Financial Times of Monday, April 7 2008 fails to convince. The Greenspan Fed (August 1987 - January 2006) did contribute, through excessively lax monetary policy, to the US housing boom that has now turned to bust ... This is the aggressive response of the official monetary policy rate to a sharp decline in asset prices (especially stock prices), even though the asset price declines (a) are unlikely to cause future economic activity to decline by more than was required to meet the Fed’s triple mandate and (b) do not convey new information about future economic activity or inflation that would warrant interest rate cuts of this magnitude ... To me, this indicates that the Fed has been co-opted by Wall Street - the Fed has internalised the objectives, concerns, world view and fears of the financial community to an excessive degree. This socialisation into a partial and often highly distorted perception of reality is unhealthy and dangerous.
The Greenspan Fed failed to appreciate the downside of rapid securitisation during the first half of this decade and acted exclusively as a cheerleader for the undoubted virtues of securitisation.
The Greenspan Fed displayed a naive faith in the self-regulating and self-policing properties of financial markets and private financial institutions.
The Greenspan Fed, by enabling the rescue of Long-term capital management in 1998, acted as a moral hazard incubator. Both before and after LTCM, the Greenspan Fed failed to press for a special insolvency resolution regime with prompt corrective action features for all highly leveraged private financial institutions that were likely to be deemed too big and too systemically important to fail ... During his years as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan’s statements reflected a partial (in every sense of the world) understanding of how free competitive markets based on private ownership work ... Mr Greenspan consistently saw but half the picture when it came to what makes competitive market capitalism work. He recognised the central roles of greed, self-interest and competition. He failed to appreciate the complementary roles of non-strategic/opportunistic forms of altruism, honesty, trustworthiness, solidarity and cooperation ... Alan Greenspan’s period as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System represents to me the nadir of central banking in advanced economic-financial systems during modern times. While monetary policy was only mildly incompetent, the regulatory failures were horrendous. The US and the world economy will pay the price for Mr Greenspan’s misjudgements and errors for years, perhaps decades, to come ...
2)Christopher Whalen, co-founder of Institutional Risk Analytics, a Los Angeles unit of Lord, Whalen LLC that provides customized financial analysis and valuation tools:
In particular, in the two decades of Greenspan’s tenure, the Fed’s Washington staff, other regulators and the Congress allowed and enabled Wall Street to migrate more and more of the investment world off exchange and into the opaque world of over-the-counter instruments. This change is described by people like Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson as “innovation,” but my old friend Martin Mayer rightly calls it “retrograde.” ...
In a market comprised primarily of exchange-traded instruments, there is little or no counterparty risk. OTC trades that reference exchange-traded benchmarks are likewise far more stable. By replacing exchange-traded securities with ersatz OTC instruments, Greenspan and the quant economists who dominate the Fed’s Washington staff have created vast systemic risk that need not exist at all and that now threatens our entire financial system ....
BSC failed not because it had too little capital or too little liquidity, but because the thousands upon thousands of OTC trades which flow through the firm’s books are bilateral rather than exchange traded. It was the understandable fear of counterparty risk, not a lack of capital or liquidity, which killed BSC. The irony is that the “financial innovation” of OTC derivatives and structured assets takes us backward in time to the chaotic situation that existed in the US prior to the crash of 1929 ...
If all federally commercial banks and funds subject to ERISA were required by law to invest only in SEC registered, exchange-traded instruments, the threat of further systemic risk could be eliminated tomorrow. What a shame that neither Chairman Bernanke nor FRBNY President Timothy Geithner said that last week when they appeared before the Senate Banking Committee ...
3) Michael Hudson, distinguished professor of economics at University of Missouri (Kansas City),and chief economic adviser to Dennis Kucinich:
By spring of 2006, bankers knew there was a bubble. The public knew it. In May, I published a cover story in Harpers on the topic. In June, I addressed a bank annual meeting and met with a number of bank presidents. They said that they knew that the loans they were making had no foreseeable way of being repaid. But if they didn’t make the loans, they explained, other bankers would do so. And making a bad loan was cost-free. They would turn around and sell it to a packager as quickly as possible, to get it off their own books ...
There was no regulator for these packagers. And under Mr. Paulson’s recent proposals, the Securities and Exchange Commission will be folded up, its regulatory powers taken away - and given to a Fed that does not believe in applying whatever regulatory powers it has (as Mr Crook pointed out so clearly in yesterday’s FT) ...
The financial system is now at a turning point. Bankers have shown that they can’t regulate themselves when they’re making so much money by feeding the bubble ...
і яшчэ адзін - (4)Alex_w wrote (The Economist's web-site):
The concept of an institution who's failure represents 'systemmic' risk and is 'too big to fail' stands outside a competitive financial market. It is only through failure that there is discipline. The problem with LTCM, and now Bear Stearns is not the losses of the shareholders or senior executives. They were always gambling with other peoples money. It is the fact that the Fed acts to protect the investors who lent to Bear Stearns and everybody else and who need to learn the hard way that lending money like a Martingale gambler is a dumb plan ...