Alexander, Samuel (1859-1938) Space, Time and Deity:
The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916-1918, Vol II.
Book III. The Order and Problems of Empirical Existence
Chapter VIII. Illusion and Ideas
...Thus memories and expectations are equally with perceptions revelations of the thing to which they refer,and the thing synthesises and accounts for them, both in actual reality and in our experiencing of that reality. Such synthesis is also rejection of what is false in imagination or sensation. Now it is in this inter-play between sensation and idea that the distinction of images and perceptions comes to be established. When images fail to fit in within the one portion of space-time with veridical sensations, they are distinguished as being only images. If they were wholly veridical, the distinction would perhaps not be made. The image would be a perfect substitute for the sensory appearance. As it is they are subject to the introduction of illusory elements and are in part rejected by the thing. Thus we get to know the real characters of things in two ways ; first by actual handling of them in sense, secondly because our images of them are limited or checked or even annihilated by contact with sensory experience, and with ideas as faithful to that experience. Success and disappointment are thus the two means by which the mind is led into the truth of things ; and this means from the other side that things on the one hand contain or account for certain partial objects, and reject others as not belonging within their contour of space-time.
Book III. The Order and Problems of Empirical Existence
Chapter VIII. Illusion and Ideas
...Thus memories and expectations are equally with perceptions revelations of the thing to which they refer,and the thing synthesises and accounts for them, both in actual reality and in our experiencing of that reality. Such synthesis is also rejection of what is false in imagination or sensation. Now it is in this inter-play between sensation and idea that the distinction of images and perceptions comes to be established. When images fail to fit in within the one portion of space-time with veridical sensations, they are distinguished as being only images. If they were wholly veridical, the distinction would perhaps not be made. The image would be a perfect substitute for the sensory appearance. As it is they are subject to the introduction of illusory elements and are in part rejected by the thing. Thus we get to know the real characters of things in two ways ; first by actual handling of them in sense, secondly because our images of them are limited or checked or even annihilated by contact with sensory experience, and with ideas as faithful to that experience. Success and disappointment are thus the two means by which the mind is led into the truth of things ; and this means from the other side that things on the one hand contain or account for certain partial objects, and reject others as not belonging within their contour of space-time.