Стенограмма Нюрнбергского процесса. Том XVIII.
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST DAY
Thursday, 18 July 1946
DR. SERVATIUS: (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): … The objection that Marshal Pétain's Government was not a constitutional government is invalid,for it was the legitimate successor to the provisional foreign governments is of decisive consideration in international relations. This authority of representation was confirmed by the United States by its keeping an ambassador in Vichy even after its own entry into the war. Great Britain also negotiated the terms of an armistice with a general of the Vichy Government in Syria in 1941.
This Government once recognized could not be deprived of its legality by the simple declaration of an oppositional government, even though the latter might have been recognized by the Allies. A government loses its international position only if it is forced to transfer its actual power to the oppositional government. Up to that moment it retains authority within its sphere of influence. The other objection that the Government of Marshal Pétain was not free to act as it wished and that consequently agreements with Germany in the field of utilization of manpower were reached by coercive measures and are therefore invalid, is not justified from the point of view of international law. Armistice and peace treaties are always concluded under great pressure. That this does not curtail the validity of such treaties is an obvious point of international law. This has constantly been emphasized when refusing German demands for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles.
Agreements which are reached in periods between the armistice and the peace treaty are subject to the same conditions. This also applies to the agreement with France with respect to the utilization of manpower. Thus, if-contrary to the statement of the Defendant Sauckel-negotiations about the utilization of manpower were conducted in the form of an ultimatum, there could from the point of view of international law still be no reason for an objection. Besides, Sauckel's influence surely cannot have been so great that he could have exerted an excessive amount of pressure.
The validity of such agreements is open to doubt only under very special conditions, such as would mean that excessive obligations were to be assumed which obviously violate principles of humanity; for instance, if the agreements contain a clause stating that work must be performed under slave-like conditions.
The motive for these agreements was, however, to offer, especially to the French workers, favorable working conditions and salaries for their obligatory labor in Germany, thus to attract the workers.
Military reasons too can command the evacuation of an occupied territory by part of the population and thereby cause a displacement of manpower. This may happen when the population participates in partisan warfare or is active in resistance groups and thus endangers security instead of behaving obediently and partisan territories to be drawn upon even against its will for the support of the partisans. That such conditions were organized by Germany's enemies as combat measures in an increasing degree, first in the East and later in the West, is today looked upon as a patriotic achievement. In view of this one must not forget that the resulting displacement of workers was precisely the consequence of their activities and that such action was permitted by international law. Evacuation had to be carried out in the interest of security, and assignment of labor elsewhere was necessary if only to maintain order. It is the privilege of the occupying power to utilize this labor within a regulated state economy in the manner deemed most appropriate under the prevailing conditions. Similar measures might also be imposed in areas of retreat after it had been ascertained that the male population illegally took part in hostilities during the retreat, as it had been called upon to do by the enemy, sometimes even being supplied with weapons.
Evacuation measures for the security of combat troops are equally permissible under international law. To engage persons evacuated from the combat zone in new work is not only legal but is actually the duty of the occupation administration. The state which calls upon its subjects to fight and thereby intensifies combat, bears the guilt for such evacuation. The necessary retaliatory measures therefore must be legal.
...This administrative duty may also call for a displacement of labor in order to avoid unemployment and famine. This, for example, occurred when the industrial areas of the Soviet Union were occupied, where there were no more working possibilities after the population became unemployed following the scorched earth policy adopted by the Soviet Union, and supplies failed to arrive because of transport difficulties.
...It has repeatedly been stressed by all concerned that in this war our existence was at stake. This became evident for Germany after the fatal battles on the Eastern Front in the winter 1941-42. Whereas up to that time no wholesale employment of foreign labor had been necessary, new equipment now had to be produced immediately. The German labor reserves. were depleted due to the drafting of 2 million workers for service at the front. The employment of unskilled women and young people could not immediately relieve the situation. During the later stages of the war, especially through aerial warfare, armament demands increased to such an extent that, in spite of the increased employment of women and young people, the level could no longer be maintained. The means were exhausted.
...The Charter fails to define the concept of humanity. As far as international law is concerned, the term can only be transposed from the practice of the nations. In endeavoring to establish the limit for actions permissible under international law, we must, for the sake of comparison, mention the bombing of large cities and the use of the atomic bomb, as well as deportations and evacuations as still in progress today. These are all incidents which have occurred before the eyes of the world and were regarded as permissible by the executing countries.
...If fundamental laws are no longer deemed to be valid when a state of siege is declared within a state, surely this will apply all the more to a power occupying another country in wartime. Anyone who refuses to carry out the orders of the occupying power knowingly participates in the fight to which he is not entitled and has to accept the consequences. Obedience is the primary duty toward the occupying power; and where patriotism and obedience are conflicting issues, the law decides against patriotism. The punishment meted out is, as such, not subject to any limitation; and the threats of punishment by an occupation power are, for purposes of intimidation, usually extremely severe. The question is whether there exists a limit, from the standpoint of humanity, which prohibits punishment in excess of the legitimate purpose which may be considered unwarranted.
Thursday, 18 July 1946
DR. SERVATIUS: (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): … The objection that Marshal Pétain's Government was not a constitutional government is invalid,for it was the legitimate successor to the provisional foreign governments is of decisive consideration in international relations. This authority of representation was confirmed by the United States by its keeping an ambassador in Vichy even after its own entry into the war. Great Britain also negotiated the terms of an armistice with a general of the Vichy Government in Syria in 1941.
This Government once recognized could not be deprived of its legality by the simple declaration of an oppositional government, even though the latter might have been recognized by the Allies. A government loses its international position only if it is forced to transfer its actual power to the oppositional government. Up to that moment it retains authority within its sphere of influence. The other objection that the Government of Marshal Pétain was not free to act as it wished and that consequently agreements with Germany in the field of utilization of manpower were reached by coercive measures and are therefore invalid, is not justified from the point of view of international law. Armistice and peace treaties are always concluded under great pressure. That this does not curtail the validity of such treaties is an obvious point of international law. This has constantly been emphasized when refusing German demands for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles.
Agreements which are reached in periods between the armistice and the peace treaty are subject to the same conditions. This also applies to the agreement with France with respect to the utilization of manpower. Thus, if-contrary to the statement of the Defendant Sauckel-negotiations about the utilization of manpower were conducted in the form of an ultimatum, there could from the point of view of international law still be no reason for an objection. Besides, Sauckel's influence surely cannot have been so great that he could have exerted an excessive amount of pressure.
The validity of such agreements is open to doubt only under very special conditions, such as would mean that excessive obligations were to be assumed which obviously violate principles of humanity; for instance, if the agreements contain a clause stating that work must be performed under slave-like conditions.
The motive for these agreements was, however, to offer, especially to the French workers, favorable working conditions and salaries for their obligatory labor in Germany, thus to attract the workers.
Military reasons too can command the evacuation of an occupied territory by part of the population and thereby cause a displacement of manpower. This may happen when the population participates in partisan warfare or is active in resistance groups and thus endangers security instead of behaving obediently and partisan territories to be drawn upon even against its will for the support of the partisans. That such conditions were organized by Germany's enemies as combat measures in an increasing degree, first in the East and later in the West, is today looked upon as a patriotic achievement. In view of this one must not forget that the resulting displacement of workers was precisely the consequence of their activities and that such action was permitted by international law. Evacuation had to be carried out in the interest of security, and assignment of labor elsewhere was necessary if only to maintain order. It is the privilege of the occupying power to utilize this labor within a regulated state economy in the manner deemed most appropriate under the prevailing conditions. Similar measures might also be imposed in areas of retreat after it had been ascertained that the male population illegally took part in hostilities during the retreat, as it had been called upon to do by the enemy, sometimes even being supplied with weapons.
Evacuation measures for the security of combat troops are equally permissible under international law. To engage persons evacuated from the combat zone in new work is not only legal but is actually the duty of the occupation administration. The state which calls upon its subjects to fight and thereby intensifies combat, bears the guilt for such evacuation. The necessary retaliatory measures therefore must be legal.
...This administrative duty may also call for a displacement of labor in order to avoid unemployment and famine. This, for example, occurred when the industrial areas of the Soviet Union were occupied, where there were no more working possibilities after the population became unemployed following the scorched earth policy adopted by the Soviet Union, and supplies failed to arrive because of transport difficulties.
...It has repeatedly been stressed by all concerned that in this war our existence was at stake. This became evident for Germany after the fatal battles on the Eastern Front in the winter 1941-42. Whereas up to that time no wholesale employment of foreign labor had been necessary, new equipment now had to be produced immediately. The German labor reserves. were depleted due to the drafting of 2 million workers for service at the front. The employment of unskilled women and young people could not immediately relieve the situation. During the later stages of the war, especially through aerial warfare, armament demands increased to such an extent that, in spite of the increased employment of women and young people, the level could no longer be maintained. The means were exhausted.
...The Charter fails to define the concept of humanity. As far as international law is concerned, the term can only be transposed from the practice of the nations. In endeavoring to establish the limit for actions permissible under international law, we must, for the sake of comparison, mention the bombing of large cities and the use of the atomic bomb, as well as deportations and evacuations as still in progress today. These are all incidents which have occurred before the eyes of the world and were regarded as permissible by the executing countries.
...If fundamental laws are no longer deemed to be valid when a state of siege is declared within a state, surely this will apply all the more to a power occupying another country in wartime. Anyone who refuses to carry out the orders of the occupying power knowingly participates in the fight to which he is not entitled and has to accept the consequences. Obedience is the primary duty toward the occupying power; and where patriotism and obedience are conflicting issues, the law decides against patriotism. The punishment meted out is, as such, not subject to any limitation; and the threats of punishment by an occupation power are, for purposes of intimidation, usually extremely severe. The question is whether there exists a limit, from the standpoint of humanity, which prohibits punishment in excess of the legitimate purpose which may be considered unwarranted.