Стенограмма Нюрнбергского процесса. Том XVII.
ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST DAY
Thursday, 4 July 1946
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the main juridical and fundamental problem of this Trial concerns war as a function forbidden by international law; the breach of peace as treason perpetrated upon the world constitution.
This problem dwarfs all other juridical questions.
The four chief prosecutors have discussed the problem in their opening speeches, sometimes as the central theme of their presentation, sometimes as a fundamental matter, while indeed differ in their conceptions thereof.
...Secondly, in view of the correct conclusions drawn by the British Government and expressed in their note of 7 September 1939 to the League of Nations, it is no wonder that the Soviet Union treated the German-Polish conflict in accordance with the old rules of power politics. In the German-Russian Frontier and Friendship Pact of 28 September 1939 and in the declaration made on the same day in common with the Reich Government, the Moscow Government bases its stand on the conception of the debellatio of Poland, that is, the liquidation of Poland's government and armed forces; no mention is made of the Pact of Paris or the League of Nations Covenant. The Soviet Union takes note of the liquidation of the Polish state machinery by means of war, and from this fact, draws the conclusions which it deems right, agreeing with the Reich Government that the new order of things is exclusively a matter for the two powers.
...It was therefore only logical that in the Finnish conflict, during the winter of 1939-1940, the Soviet Union should have taken its stand on classical international law. It disregarded the reactions of the League of Nations when, without even considering the application of the machinery of sanctions and merely pretending to apply an article of the Covenant referring to quite different matters, that body resolved that the Soviet Union had, as an aggressor, placed itself outside the League. The report of the Swiss Federal Council of 30 January 1940 to the Federal Assembly endeavored to save the face of the League which was excluded from all political realities.
...After the discredit resulting from the failure of the policy of collective security in the case of Manchuria and Abyssinia the world had come to understand the now famous "quarantine" speech of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 5 October 1937 and his "Stop Hitler!" warnings before and after Munich to mean that the United States would act on the next occasion. The declaration of neutrality of 5 September 1939 could therefore only mean: Like Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the United States accepts as a fact the collapse of the system of collective security.
This declaration of neutrality has often been looked upon as the death blow to the system. The Washington Government would be entitled to reject such a reproach as unjustified. For the system had already been dead for years, provided one is prepared to believe that it was ever actually alive. But many did not realize the fact that it was no longer alive until it was brought into relief by the American declaration of neutrality.
...When the world came to know the notes exchanged during the preliminary negotiations with all their definitions, interpretations, qualifications, and reservations, it became manifest to what extent the opinions of the governments differed behind that wording. One saw the Soviet Government's frank-even scathing-criticism of the refusal of the Western Powers to disarm and thus create the essential precondition for an effective policy of peace and generally of the vagueness of the treaty;* but especially of the famous British reservation of a free hand in certain regions of the world, that reservation which has often been called the British Monroe Doctrine or the Chamberlain Doctrine; and one knew that in reality there existed only formal agreement behind the signatures and that no two powers were implying exactly the same thing by the treaty. Only on one thing did complete agreement exist: War in self-defense is permitted as an inalienable right to all states; without that right, sovereignty does not exist; and every state is sole judge of whether in a given case it is waging a war of self-defense.
No state in the world at that time was prepared to accept foreign jurisdiction concerning the question of whether its decisions on basic questions of its very existence were justified or not
* Note of the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs of 31 August 1928.
Thursday, 4 July 1946
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the main juridical and fundamental problem of this Trial concerns war as a function forbidden by international law; the breach of peace as treason perpetrated upon the world constitution.
This problem dwarfs all other juridical questions.
The four chief prosecutors have discussed the problem in their opening speeches, sometimes as the central theme of their presentation, sometimes as a fundamental matter, while indeed differ in their conceptions thereof.
...Secondly, in view of the correct conclusions drawn by the British Government and expressed in their note of 7 September 1939 to the League of Nations, it is no wonder that the Soviet Union treated the German-Polish conflict in accordance with the old rules of power politics. In the German-Russian Frontier and Friendship Pact of 28 September 1939 and in the declaration made on the same day in common with the Reich Government, the Moscow Government bases its stand on the conception of the debellatio of Poland, that is, the liquidation of Poland's government and armed forces; no mention is made of the Pact of Paris or the League of Nations Covenant. The Soviet Union takes note of the liquidation of the Polish state machinery by means of war, and from this fact, draws the conclusions which it deems right, agreeing with the Reich Government that the new order of things is exclusively a matter for the two powers.
...It was therefore only logical that in the Finnish conflict, during the winter of 1939-1940, the Soviet Union should have taken its stand on classical international law. It disregarded the reactions of the League of Nations when, without even considering the application of the machinery of sanctions and merely pretending to apply an article of the Covenant referring to quite different matters, that body resolved that the Soviet Union had, as an aggressor, placed itself outside the League. The report of the Swiss Federal Council of 30 January 1940 to the Federal Assembly endeavored to save the face of the League which was excluded from all political realities.
...After the discredit resulting from the failure of the policy of collective security in the case of Manchuria and Abyssinia the world had come to understand the now famous "quarantine" speech of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 5 October 1937 and his "Stop Hitler!" warnings before and after Munich to mean that the United States would act on the next occasion. The declaration of neutrality of 5 September 1939 could therefore only mean: Like Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the United States accepts as a fact the collapse of the system of collective security.
This declaration of neutrality has often been looked upon as the death blow to the system. The Washington Government would be entitled to reject such a reproach as unjustified. For the system had already been dead for years, provided one is prepared to believe that it was ever actually alive. But many did not realize the fact that it was no longer alive until it was brought into relief by the American declaration of neutrality.
...When the world came to know the notes exchanged during the preliminary negotiations with all their definitions, interpretations, qualifications, and reservations, it became manifest to what extent the opinions of the governments differed behind that wording. One saw the Soviet Government's frank-even scathing-criticism of the refusal of the Western Powers to disarm and thus create the essential precondition for an effective policy of peace and generally of the vagueness of the treaty;* but especially of the famous British reservation of a free hand in certain regions of the world, that reservation which has often been called the British Monroe Doctrine or the Chamberlain Doctrine; and one knew that in reality there existed only formal agreement behind the signatures and that no two powers were implying exactly the same thing by the treaty. Only on one thing did complete agreement exist: War in self-defense is permitted as an inalienable right to all states; without that right, sovereignty does not exist; and every state is sole judge of whether in a given case it is waging a war of self-defense.
No state in the world at that time was prepared to accept foreign jurisdiction concerning the question of whether its decisions on basic questions of its very existence were justified or not
* Note of the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs of 31 August 1928.