Стенограмма Нюрнбергского процесса. Том XV.
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH DAY
Tuesday, 4 June 1946
DR. EXNER: Did the signatory powers in Munich at the end of September know of Germany's military preparations? Did the statesmen there know that we were militarily prepared?
JODL: The Prosecution gave me the distinct impression that that had become known only today, and that it was unknown in the autumn of 1938 at Munich. But that is quite impossible. All the world knew of the calling up of the eight age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The whole world knew of the total mobilization on 23 September. A political correspondent of The Times wrote an article on 28 September against this Czechoslovakian mobilization. Nobody was surprised that immediately after the signing of the Munich Pact, on 1 October, we marched into.. .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner ...
DR. EXNER: Well, that ends this subject.
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH DAY
Wednesday, 5 June 1946
DR. EXNER: … We now come to the time when you were recalled from Vienna to Berlin in 1939. What state of affairs did you find in Berlin on your arrival?
JODL: I found a completely incomprehensible state of affairs in Berlin-at least it was incomprehensible to me. Nobody knew what was really 'true or what was bluff. The pact with Russia sustained all our hopes for the preservation of peace, hopes which were immensely increased and strengthened by the surprise cancellation of the attack ordered for 26 August. None of the soldiers to whom I spoke expected a war with the Western Powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared except the operations for the attack on Poland.
There was only a defensive deployment of troops on the West Wall. The forces stationed there were so weak that we could not even man all the pillboxes. The actual efforts for the preservation of peace, however, efforts I have heard about here from the Reich Marshal, the name of Dahlerus-all these negotiations remained unknown to me insofar as they were not published in the press. But there is one thing I can say in conclusion. When the declaration of war was received from England and France it was like a blow from a cudgel for us soldiers who had fought in the first World War. And I heard in confidence from General Stapf-today the matter is no longer confidential-that the Reich Marshal reacted in exactly the same way.
…
DR. EXNER: Do you remember the meeting in the Führer's special train on 9 September 1939, described here by General Lahousen? Can you remember that?
JODL: Yes, I remember that meeting perfectly.
DR. EXNER: What was the subject of conversation during that meeting while you were on the Führer's train?
JODL: I met the Führer in the so-called command car, in the chartroom, where Field Marshal Keitel, Canaris, and Lahousen were; and then Canaris made a brief report on the information he had received from the West and expressed the opinion that a French attack in the Saarbrücken sector was imminent. The Führer contradicted this, and so did I. Apart from that nothing else was discussed.
…
JODL: The Prosecution has thereby placed a purely operational problem on the level of soldierly or human honor. Until now that has never been the custom in this world. I can only
say that I neither attacked Norwegians, nor did I resort to lies or excuses. But I did use all my strength to contribute to the success of an operation which I considered absolutely necessary in order to forestall a similar action on the part of the English. If the seals of the archives are ever broken, the rightness of my attitude will then be clearly shown. But even if it were wrong, the honesty of my own subjective opinion at that time cannot for that reason be changed in any way.
…
JODL: … And the decisive factor was that owing to the many reports which reached us, the Führer and we ourselves, the soldiers, were definitely under the impression that the neutrality of Belgium and Holland was really only pretended and deceptive.
DR.EXNER: How did you arrive at that conclusion?
JODL: Individually the reports are not of great interest. There was, however, an endless number of reports from Canaris. They were supplemented and confirmed by letters from the Duce, Mussolini. But what was absolutely proved and completely certain, which I could see for myself on the maps every day, were the nightly flights to and fro of the Royal Air Force, completely unconcerned about neutral Dutch and Belgian territory. This necessarily strengthened the conviction in us that even if the two countries wished to-and perhaps in the beginning they did so wish-they could not possibly remain neutral in the long run.
…
JODL: … And if the Prosecution today is in a position to indict German officers here at all, it owes this only to the ethical concept of obedience of its own brave soldiers.
…
DR. EXNER: In your diary--the so-called diary-Document 1809-PS, Volume I of my document book, Page 83, you write on 24 May: "Situation in the East becomes precarious due to the Russian menace against Bessarabia." That is on 24 May 1940. That is what you wrote in your diary. How did you come to this conclusion?
JODL: The reason was a dispatch from Canaris reporting the concentration of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the note expressing anxiety originated with me, or whether it was an idea of the Führer's which I jotted down, I can no longer say today.
…
DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Führer's fears that Russia might prove hostile to us?
JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden.
DR. EXNER: In what connection?
JODL: The Führer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might occupy still more territory in Romania before the winter and that the Romanian oil region, which was the conditio sine qua non for our war strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false.
Tuesday, 4 June 1946
DR. EXNER: Did the signatory powers in Munich at the end of September know of Germany's military preparations? Did the statesmen there know that we were militarily prepared?
JODL: The Prosecution gave me the distinct impression that that had become known only today, and that it was unknown in the autumn of 1938 at Munich. But that is quite impossible. All the world knew of the calling up of the eight age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The whole world knew of the total mobilization on 23 September. A political correspondent of The Times wrote an article on 28 September against this Czechoslovakian mobilization. Nobody was surprised that immediately after the signing of the Munich Pact, on 1 October, we marched into.. .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner ...
DR. EXNER: Well, that ends this subject.
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH DAY
Wednesday, 5 June 1946
DR. EXNER: … We now come to the time when you were recalled from Vienna to Berlin in 1939. What state of affairs did you find in Berlin on your arrival?
JODL: I found a completely incomprehensible state of affairs in Berlin-at least it was incomprehensible to me. Nobody knew what was really 'true or what was bluff. The pact with Russia sustained all our hopes for the preservation of peace, hopes which were immensely increased and strengthened by the surprise cancellation of the attack ordered for 26 August. None of the soldiers to whom I spoke expected a war with the Western Powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared except the operations for the attack on Poland.
There was only a defensive deployment of troops on the West Wall. The forces stationed there were so weak that we could not even man all the pillboxes. The actual efforts for the preservation of peace, however, efforts I have heard about here from the Reich Marshal, the name of Dahlerus-all these negotiations remained unknown to me insofar as they were not published in the press. But there is one thing I can say in conclusion. When the declaration of war was received from England and France it was like a blow from a cudgel for us soldiers who had fought in the first World War. And I heard in confidence from General Stapf-today the matter is no longer confidential-that the Reich Marshal reacted in exactly the same way.
…
DR. EXNER: Do you remember the meeting in the Führer's special train on 9 September 1939, described here by General Lahousen? Can you remember that?
JODL: Yes, I remember that meeting perfectly.
DR. EXNER: What was the subject of conversation during that meeting while you were on the Führer's train?
JODL: I met the Führer in the so-called command car, in the chartroom, where Field Marshal Keitel, Canaris, and Lahousen were; and then Canaris made a brief report on the information he had received from the West and expressed the opinion that a French attack in the Saarbrücken sector was imminent. The Führer contradicted this, and so did I. Apart from that nothing else was discussed.
…
JODL: The Prosecution has thereby placed a purely operational problem on the level of soldierly or human honor. Until now that has never been the custom in this world. I can only
say that I neither attacked Norwegians, nor did I resort to lies or excuses. But I did use all my strength to contribute to the success of an operation which I considered absolutely necessary in order to forestall a similar action on the part of the English. If the seals of the archives are ever broken, the rightness of my attitude will then be clearly shown. But even if it were wrong, the honesty of my own subjective opinion at that time cannot for that reason be changed in any way.
…
JODL: … And the decisive factor was that owing to the many reports which reached us, the Führer and we ourselves, the soldiers, were definitely under the impression that the neutrality of Belgium and Holland was really only pretended and deceptive.
DR.EXNER: How did you arrive at that conclusion?
JODL: Individually the reports are not of great interest. There was, however, an endless number of reports from Canaris. They were supplemented and confirmed by letters from the Duce, Mussolini. But what was absolutely proved and completely certain, which I could see for myself on the maps every day, were the nightly flights to and fro of the Royal Air Force, completely unconcerned about neutral Dutch and Belgian territory. This necessarily strengthened the conviction in us that even if the two countries wished to-and perhaps in the beginning they did so wish-they could not possibly remain neutral in the long run.
…
JODL: … And if the Prosecution today is in a position to indict German officers here at all, it owes this only to the ethical concept of obedience of its own brave soldiers.
…
DR. EXNER: In your diary--the so-called diary-Document 1809-PS, Volume I of my document book, Page 83, you write on 24 May: "Situation in the East becomes precarious due to the Russian menace against Bessarabia." That is on 24 May 1940. That is what you wrote in your diary. How did you come to this conclusion?
JODL: The reason was a dispatch from Canaris reporting the concentration of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the note expressing anxiety originated with me, or whether it was an idea of the Führer's which I jotted down, I can no longer say today.
…
DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Führer's fears that Russia might prove hostile to us?
JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden.
DR. EXNER: In what connection?
JODL: The Führer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might occupy still more territory in Romania before the winter and that the Romanian oil region, which was the conditio sine qua non for our war strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false.