Стенограмма Нюрнбергского процесса. Том XII.
ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH DAY
Thursday, 25 April 1946
DR DIX: Who won Von Witzleben over?
GISEVIUS: Schacht did.
DR. DIX: Who did?
GISEVIUS: Schacht won Witzleben over. Oster visited Witzleben and told him everything that had happened. Thereupon Witzleben sent for me, and I told him that in my opinion the police situation was such that he, as commanding general of the Berlin Army Corps, could confidently risk a revolt. Witzleben asked me the question which every general put to us at that time: Whether a diplomatic incident in the East would really lead to war or whether it was not true, as Hitler and Ribbentrop had repeatedly told the generals in confidence, that there was a tacit agreement with the Western Powers giving Germany a free hand in the East. Witzleben said that if such an agreement really existed, then, of course, he could not revolt. I told Witzleben that Schacht with his excellent knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon mentality could no doubt give him comprehensive information about that.
…
DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war?
GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of 1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to plan, was to start the revolt in the East.
…
DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you have always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and supported by Schacht, Goerdeler, et cetera, as a revolt movement, that is, a group which wanted to overthrow the government. Did you not now more and more aim at an assassination?
GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again deserted us, we realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on we took all the steps we could to instigate an assassination.
…
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr. Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made, and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators.
I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had deserted the conspiracy group.
…
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through?
GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme military command in Berlin.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler?
Thursday, 25 April 1946
DR DIX: Who won Von Witzleben over?
GISEVIUS: Schacht did.
DR. DIX: Who did?
GISEVIUS: Schacht won Witzleben over. Oster visited Witzleben and told him everything that had happened. Thereupon Witzleben sent for me, and I told him that in my opinion the police situation was such that he, as commanding general of the Berlin Army Corps, could confidently risk a revolt. Witzleben asked me the question which every general put to us at that time: Whether a diplomatic incident in the East would really lead to war or whether it was not true, as Hitler and Ribbentrop had repeatedly told the generals in confidence, that there was a tacit agreement with the Western Powers giving Germany a free hand in the East. Witzleben said that if such an agreement really existed, then, of course, he could not revolt. I told Witzleben that Schacht with his excellent knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon mentality could no doubt give him comprehensive information about that.
…
DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war?
GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of 1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to plan, was to start the revolt in the East.
…
DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you have always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and supported by Schacht, Goerdeler, et cetera, as a revolt movement, that is, a group which wanted to overthrow the government. Did you not now more and more aim at an assassination?
GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again deserted us, we realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on we took all the steps we could to instigate an assassination.
…
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr. Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made, and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators.
I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had deserted the conspiracy group.
…
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through?
GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme military command in Berlin.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler?