о моральности бомбардировок Хиросимы и Нагасаки, ч. 5

[oboguev]

(предыдущая часть здесь)

D.M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945-46: Planning and Policy Implications" // Journal of Military History, 61 (July 1997): 521-82
http://web.archive.org/web/20011116024040/http://tigger.uic.edu/~rjensen/invade.htm
http://home.roadrunner.com/~casualties/

см. тж. его же "A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas: President Truman and Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan" // ed. R.J. Maddox, "Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism", University of Missouri Press, 2007, стр. 76-115
см. тж. его же "Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947", Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2009
The implied top-end figure of approximately 1,700,000 to 2,000,000 battle casualties built on the basis of the Saipan ratio was slashed down to a best-case scenario figure that was not so huge as to make the task ahead appear insurmountable...

The casualty estimates ran everything from a few hundred thousand to a million men to do the thing," and there was a good deal of opinion on how valid the higher numbers actually were. Paul H. Nitze, the director of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey in Japan immediately after World War II, believed that "these fellows were going to fight to the last man ... the estimate of 500,000 casualties was a gross underestimate,"...

Eisenhower met with Stimson during a break in the Potsdam Conference, and found that "he was still under the influence of a statement from military sources who figured it would cost 1,000,000 men to invade Japan successfully."...

In the first half of June, Stimson twice asked the Army planners to comment on outside estimates that the number of Americans killed could extend from 500,000 to 1,000,000, figures that imply total casualties running in the area of 2,000,000 to 4,000,000. While these numbers were not, in themselves, unimaginable if the intent had been to conquer all Japanese forces on the Home Islands by force of arms, such had never been the intent or desire of planners who firmly believed that effective "military control" of all Japan could be "obtained by the securing of a relatively few vital coastal areas" on Honshu, and that the opening invasion of Kyushu would only entail seizing enough land to serve as a base to launch the Honshu invasion toward Tokyo. Military leaders and planners believed that the Japanese, isolated and without allies, would surrender after their capital was taken and their cities destroyed, thus rendering a bloody mop-up of the mountainous, California-sized nation unnecessary.

By the end of July 1945, the ground forces in Japan had been increased to a basic strength of 30 line-combat divisions, 24 coastal-combat divisions, and 23 independent mixed brigades, 2 armored divisions, 7 tank brigades, and 3 infantry brigades.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v1/ch13.htm

During the last few months of the Pacific War ... the planes of the IJAAF in the Home Islands were also parked near their respective runways as well, being saved along with stocks of aviation gasoline for the anticipated Allied invasion of Kyushu.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/ijnaf.htm

OPERATION KETSU-GO
http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/arens/chap4.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ketsu_Go#Operation_Ketsug.C5.8D
см. тж. D.M. Giangreco, "Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947", Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2009
см. тж. Richard B. Frank, "Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire", Random House, 1999

* * *

Casualty estimates were based on the experience of the preceding campaigns, drawing different lessons:

• In a study done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April, the figures of 7.45 casualties/1,000 man-days and 1.78 fatalities/1,000 man-days were developed. This implied that a 90-day Olympic campaign would cost 456,000 casualties, including 109,000 dead or missing. If Coronet took another 90 days, the combined cost would be 1,200,000 casualties, with 267,000 fatalities.[40]
• A study done by Adm. Nimitz's staff in May estimated 49,000 U.S casualties in the first 30 days, including 5,000 at sea.[41] A study done by General MacArthur's staff in June estimated 23,000 U.S. casualties in the first 30 days and 125,000 after 120 days.[42] When these figures were questioned by General Marshall, MacArthur submitted a revised estimate of 105,000, in part by deducting wounded men able to return to duty.[43]
• In a conference with President Truman on June 18, Marshall, taking the Battle of Luzon as the best model for Olympic, thought the Americans would suffer 31,000 casualties in the first 30 days (and ultimately 20% of Japanese casualties, which implied a total of 70,000 casualties).[44] Adm. Leahy, more impressed by the Battle of Okinawa, thought the American forces would suffer a 35% casualty rate (implying an ultimate toll of 268,000).[45] Admiral King thought that casualties in the first 30 days would fall between Luzon and Okinawa, i.e., between 31,000 and 41,000.[45]

Of these estimates, only Nimitz's included losses of the forces at sea, though kamikazes had inflicted 1.78 fatalities per kamikaze pilot in the Battle of Okinawa,[46] and troop transports off Kyūshū would have been much more exposed.

• A study done for Secretary of War Henry Stimson's staff by William Shockley estimated that conquering Japan would cost 1.7 to 4 million American casualties, including 400,000 to 800,000 fatalities, and five to ten million Japanese fatalities. The key assumption was large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan.[1]

Outside the government, well-informed civilians were also making guesses. Kyle Palmer, war correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, said half a million to a million Americans would die by the end of the war. Herbert Hoover, in memorandums submitted to Truman and Stimson, also estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 fatalities, and were believed to be conservative estimates; but it is not known if Hoover discussed these specific figures in his meetings with Truman. The chief of the Army Operations division thought them "entirely too high" under "our present plan of campaign."[47]

Nearly 500,000 Purple Heart medals were manufactured in anticipation of the casualties resulting from the invasion of Japan. To the present date, all the American military casualties of the sixty years following the end of World War II-including the Korean and Vietnam Wars-have not exceeded that number. In 2003, there were still 120,000 of these Purple Heart medals in stock.[48] There are so many in surplus that combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan are able to keep Purple Hearts on-hand for immediate award to wounded soldiers on the field.[48]