о моральности бомбардировок Хиросимы и Нагасаки, часть 2
Первая часть -- здесь.
Теперь посмотрим, каковы были бы последствия, если бы атомная бомба не была применена против Хиросимы и Нагасаки.
Прежде всего, непосредственно военные последствия для общего хода боевых действий. Хороший современный обзор можно найти напр. в D. M. Giangreco, "Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945- ( Read more... )
THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB
On June 1, after its discussions with the Scientific Panel, the Interim Committee unanimously adopted the following recommendations:
(1) The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.
(2) It should be used on a dual target plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage, and
(3) It should be used without prior warning [of the nature of the weapon]. One member of the committee, Mr. Bard, later changed his view and dissented from recommendation.
In reaching these conclusions the Interim Committee carefully considered such alternatives as a detailed advance warning or a demonstration in some uninhabited area. Both of these suggestions were discarded as impractical. They were not regarded as likely to be effective in compelling a surrender of Japan, and both of them involved serious risks. Even the New Mexico test would not give final proof that any given bomb was certain to explode when dropped from an airplane. Quite apart from the generally unfamiliar nature of atomic explosives, there was the whole problem of exploding a bomb at a predetermined height in the air by a complicated mechanism which could not be tested in the static test of New Mexico. Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort to obtain surrender than a warning or a demonstration followed by a dud -- and this was a real possibility [плутониевая бомба не была испытана, атомная использовала новый взрыватель и не испытывалась при сбросе с бомбардировщика]. Furthermore, we had no bombs to waste. It was vital that a sufficient effect be quickly obtained with the few we had.
The Interim Committee and the Scientific Panel also served as a channel through which suggestions from other scientists working on the project were forwarded to me and to the President. Among the suggestions thus forwarded was one memorandum which questioned using the bomb at all against the enemy. On June 16, 1945, after consideration of that memorandum, the Scientific Panel made a report, from which I quote the following paragraphs:
The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designated to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this special weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use. [Italics mine]
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