Ethnic Approach Jeopardizes Decentralization
Manco Mitevski, Utrinski Vesnik
The public in the Republic of Macedonia has recently become a hostage of the debate on devolution in a strange way. This debate is stressed as one of the key social reforms and a condition for accelerating the process of the country's EU integration. The problem is not in the declared importance of this reform, but that the government political partners have imposed two other subjects, rather than debating the essence of devolution as a process of decentralizing power and finances to everyday life, in municipalities, and among citizens. The first subject that it imposed is unsuitable, whereas the second is hasty. First, by using the debates on territorial -- or, as some call it, geographic -- organization as part of the devolution process, they have successfully wrapped up and imposed a political debate on the redrawing of the country's local borders. What is especially indicative is that this is being done on ethnic grounds, as the alleged implementation of the Framework Agreement's provisions. Second, in the background of this debate, before the time is right for the legal procedures, they have begun to cross swords over one of the crucial issues in the country, the use of the minority communities' languages, mostly Albanian, both at the state and local levels.
Although the decentralization of power is a significant part of the reforms in Macedonia, as well as a commitment under the Ohrid peace agreement, which means that it has reforming and relaxing features, it is now reduced to sheer political pragmatism in the interest of the key factors in the ruling political group. Judging by the current political situation and the topical political news, it is all reduced to drawing the geographic-ethnic borders of Skopje, Struga, and Kicevo, whether Skopje will become bilingual, and, finally, whether the new local political-geographic map of Macedonia will help the governing parties win in the local election this fall. Regardless of whether the standstill in negotiations on territorial division and the accompanying elements are a result of blackmail or the coalition partners' political bluff, it is obvious that all current developments, even the announced compromise, look transparent and naive. However, a model of an acceptable geographic organization will certainly not be found easily and with cunning moves, because the debate does not show the objectives that should be fulfilled with the current option of territorial division, and it also does not have a prepared strategy. The arguments that were used to elaborate this problem in the beginning have nothing to do with the present events.
If we review the current situation in Macedonia, it is very interesting that some past events and statements coincide and are currently being repeated, although under much different circumstances. At the end of 1999, when elements that preceded the 2001 war crisis began to accumulate, including the fraud in the presidential election, with the DPA's [Democratic Party of Albanians -- PDSh in Albanian] great help, DPA leader [Arben] Xhaferi made his famous statement that [former FYROM Prime Minister Ljubco] Georgievski did not owe him, but Macedonia owed him for being stable, all thanks to Albanians. We then interpreted Xhaferi's statement as "peace in return for concessions." Then came 2001, when inexplicable things happened, although there are numerous reports that unless that was a fully rigged conflict, then at least conditions were created for its escalation. The crisis ended by defining the actual situation at that time with the Ohrid peace agreement. It was agreed outside the institutions and with the participation of the leaders of the major Macedonian and Albanian political parties and with the international facilitators' mediation. Now although the present situation is much different than the situation at that time, the actual relations of political forces are being defined once again and the Ohrid agreement is deepened in peacetime, with an option of a Mavrovo agreement by the so-called request for a compromise over the contentious issues in the country's territorial division and the debate on the use of the ethnic communities' languages. The case with Xhaferi is being repeated. The leader of the Albanian governing party, [Democratic Union for Integration leader] Ali Ahmeti, said that Macedonians must not underestimate the current peace and stability, most likely because he was nervous. The novelty here is that the debate on finding solutions for the territorial division is held outside the institutions and between the political parties that form the government coalition, whereas the international representatives only act as monitors. If Ahmeti also thinks that the Albanian ethnic community's rights should be used to impose conditions and a type of "concessions in return for peace," but also some hesitating gestures by the coalition partners, then his democratic capacity is at stake. His honesty, in terms of all the expressed views on internal integration processes in Macedonia, its unity, and the EU integration process, is also threatened.
Such an approach by the DUI [Democratic Union for Integration -- BDI in Albanian], which has been moderate to date, and especially its leader, Ahmeti, is rather surprising. Bearing in mind that everything that has happened in Macedonia since 2001 is viewed through the prism of the implementation of the Ohrid agreement and that the international community evaluates Macedonia according to this criterion, the DUI's radical and rigid attitude toward territorial division is rather unexpected. This is so because it greatly undermines the moderate and normal approach that has been used so far in implementing his solutions on everything, including the Albanian community's rights. What is even more surprising is that these processes are radicalized and accelerated at a time when the Ohrid agreement and its provisions are accepted and becoming a normal thing for most Macedonians and members of the other communities. They are also treated as an objective Macedonian reality, which is also a big step ahead. Furthermore, the DUI seems to have forgotten that only two months ago, in the presidential election, it defeated its political rival, the DPA, with the thesis that the implementation of the Ohrid agreement was progressing well and that although the results were not spectacular, they had still begun to be felt in everyday life.
This is one of the major new threats to Macedonia. If the debate on devolution resumes in the same direction, then radicalization will stress the ethnic aspect, rather than the civil aspect, of this process. This will cause the unsurpassable negative effects, cooling down of interethnic relations and deterioration of stability, and will take us back on the road toward EU integration. What is most important the repeated domination of the ethnic component will jeopardize the idea of decentralization, which means handing down power and money at a local level, in everyday life, and in order to meet the needs of the citizens living in the local units.
The ruling parties in Macedonia have debated the decentralization of power, which is one of the vital reforms in Macedonian society with far-reaching consequences, in a rather vague manner, whereby they have risked being blamed for the prospective bad solutions. This comes from the fact that instead of discussing this problem in the institutions, they are doing this outside of them and are putting priority on the narrow party, and even personal, interests. It is obvious that the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and the DUI will have problems emerging from the vicious circle now that their heads are hot and the weather is getting hotter, so it hits them directly in the head. It appears that Nicholas White, the director of the International Crisis Group's European Program, has made a reasonable analysis from an appropriate distance by saying that, as much as geographic division is important for the devolution process, it is not that urgent. Along these lines, he made a rational proposal to extend the terms of office of the current mayors and municipal councils for six more months and find the best solution peacefully and without any rush.
His proposal is very logical and reasonable, because although this is an important issue, no one requires that it be resolved immediately. First, we have submitted the application for our EU membership, and we have received a positive signal from the NATO summit in Istanbul. In the fall, we are supposed to receive the European Commission's questionnaires. Therefore, we do not need to hurry and make impetuous moves. Things should progress normally. We must prepare the territorial organization well and elaborate on the offered solutions with facts. This issue must pass the institutions' filters, that is, first go through the government, then the parties and the opposition, experts, and eventually the Assembly. The law on the use of ethnic communities' languages should be adopted in the same way. The public will thus not always get the impression that territorial organization is aimed at ethnic division as the last stage of the country's destruction. On the contrary, decentralization will be interpreted properly, as a reform, as delivering power to the citizens' everyday life, and as a new and useful function that benefits the country.
The public in the Republic of Macedonia has recently become a hostage of the debate on devolution in a strange way. This debate is stressed as one of the key social reforms and a condition for accelerating the process of the country's EU integration. The problem is not in the declared importance of this reform, but that the government political partners have imposed two other subjects, rather than debating the essence of devolution as a process of decentralizing power and finances to everyday life, in municipalities, and among citizens. The first subject that it imposed is unsuitable, whereas the second is hasty. First, by using the debates on territorial -- or, as some call it, geographic -- organization as part of the devolution process, they have successfully wrapped up and imposed a political debate on the redrawing of the country's local borders. What is especially indicative is that this is being done on ethnic grounds, as the alleged implementation of the Framework Agreement's provisions. Second, in the background of this debate, before the time is right for the legal procedures, they have begun to cross swords over one of the crucial issues in the country, the use of the minority communities' languages, mostly Albanian, both at the state and local levels.
Although the decentralization of power is a significant part of the reforms in Macedonia, as well as a commitment under the Ohrid peace agreement, which means that it has reforming and relaxing features, it is now reduced to sheer political pragmatism in the interest of the key factors in the ruling political group. Judging by the current political situation and the topical political news, it is all reduced to drawing the geographic-ethnic borders of Skopje, Struga, and Kicevo, whether Skopje will become bilingual, and, finally, whether the new local political-geographic map of Macedonia will help the governing parties win in the local election this fall. Regardless of whether the standstill in negotiations on territorial division and the accompanying elements are a result of blackmail or the coalition partners' political bluff, it is obvious that all current developments, even the announced compromise, look transparent and naive. However, a model of an acceptable geographic organization will certainly not be found easily and with cunning moves, because the debate does not show the objectives that should be fulfilled with the current option of territorial division, and it also does not have a prepared strategy. The arguments that were used to elaborate this problem in the beginning have nothing to do with the present events.
If we review the current situation in Macedonia, it is very interesting that some past events and statements coincide and are currently being repeated, although under much different circumstances. At the end of 1999, when elements that preceded the 2001 war crisis began to accumulate, including the fraud in the presidential election, with the DPA's [Democratic Party of Albanians -- PDSh in Albanian] great help, DPA leader [Arben] Xhaferi made his famous statement that [former FYROM Prime Minister Ljubco] Georgievski did not owe him, but Macedonia owed him for being stable, all thanks to Albanians. We then interpreted Xhaferi's statement as "peace in return for concessions." Then came 2001, when inexplicable things happened, although there are numerous reports that unless that was a fully rigged conflict, then at least conditions were created for its escalation. The crisis ended by defining the actual situation at that time with the Ohrid peace agreement. It was agreed outside the institutions and with the participation of the leaders of the major Macedonian and Albanian political parties and with the international facilitators' mediation. Now although the present situation is much different than the situation at that time, the actual relations of political forces are being defined once again and the Ohrid agreement is deepened in peacetime, with an option of a Mavrovo agreement by the so-called request for a compromise over the contentious issues in the country's territorial division and the debate on the use of the ethnic communities' languages. The case with Xhaferi is being repeated. The leader of the Albanian governing party, [Democratic Union for Integration leader] Ali Ahmeti, said that Macedonians must not underestimate the current peace and stability, most likely because he was nervous. The novelty here is that the debate on finding solutions for the territorial division is held outside the institutions and between the political parties that form the government coalition, whereas the international representatives only act as monitors. If Ahmeti also thinks that the Albanian ethnic community's rights should be used to impose conditions and a type of "concessions in return for peace," but also some hesitating gestures by the coalition partners, then his democratic capacity is at stake. His honesty, in terms of all the expressed views on internal integration processes in Macedonia, its unity, and the EU integration process, is also threatened.
Such an approach by the DUI [Democratic Union for Integration -- BDI in Albanian], which has been moderate to date, and especially its leader, Ahmeti, is rather surprising. Bearing in mind that everything that has happened in Macedonia since 2001 is viewed through the prism of the implementation of the Ohrid agreement and that the international community evaluates Macedonia according to this criterion, the DUI's radical and rigid attitude toward territorial division is rather unexpected. This is so because it greatly undermines the moderate and normal approach that has been used so far in implementing his solutions on everything, including the Albanian community's rights. What is even more surprising is that these processes are radicalized and accelerated at a time when the Ohrid agreement and its provisions are accepted and becoming a normal thing for most Macedonians and members of the other communities. They are also treated as an objective Macedonian reality, which is also a big step ahead. Furthermore, the DUI seems to have forgotten that only two months ago, in the presidential election, it defeated its political rival, the DPA, with the thesis that the implementation of the Ohrid agreement was progressing well and that although the results were not spectacular, they had still begun to be felt in everyday life.
This is one of the major new threats to Macedonia. If the debate on devolution resumes in the same direction, then radicalization will stress the ethnic aspect, rather than the civil aspect, of this process. This will cause the unsurpassable negative effects, cooling down of interethnic relations and deterioration of stability, and will take us back on the road toward EU integration. What is most important the repeated domination of the ethnic component will jeopardize the idea of decentralization, which means handing down power and money at a local level, in everyday life, and in order to meet the needs of the citizens living in the local units.
The ruling parties in Macedonia have debated the decentralization of power, which is one of the vital reforms in Macedonian society with far-reaching consequences, in a rather vague manner, whereby they have risked being blamed for the prospective bad solutions. This comes from the fact that instead of discussing this problem in the institutions, they are doing this outside of them and are putting priority on the narrow party, and even personal, interests. It is obvious that the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and the DUI will have problems emerging from the vicious circle now that their heads are hot and the weather is getting hotter, so it hits them directly in the head. It appears that Nicholas White, the director of the International Crisis Group's European Program, has made a reasonable analysis from an appropriate distance by saying that, as much as geographic division is important for the devolution process, it is not that urgent. Along these lines, he made a rational proposal to extend the terms of office of the current mayors and municipal councils for six more months and find the best solution peacefully and without any rush.
His proposal is very logical and reasonable, because although this is an important issue, no one requires that it be resolved immediately. First, we have submitted the application for our EU membership, and we have received a positive signal from the NATO summit in Istanbul. In the fall, we are supposed to receive the European Commission's questionnaires. Therefore, we do not need to hurry and make impetuous moves. Things should progress normally. We must prepare the territorial organization well and elaborate on the offered solutions with facts. This issue must pass the institutions' filters, that is, first go through the government, then the parties and the opposition, experts, and eventually the Assembly. The law on the use of ethnic communities' languages should be adopted in the same way. The public will thus not always get the impression that territorial organization is aimed at ethnic division as the last stage of the country's destruction. On the contrary, decentralization will be interpreted properly, as a reform, as delivering power to the citizens' everyday life, and as a new and useful function that benefits the country.