ahousekeeper
in
nkr
On the Road to International Recognition
Andrei ARESHEV
The Political Culture of the People of Nagorno-Karabakh:
On the Road to International Recognition
The July 19 presidential elections in Nagorno Karabakh met with quite a wide international response. It should be mentioned that the holding of referendums and elections at different levels have long become part of the political culture of the small state of Karabakh. 2 nation-wide referendums were held here in the past 16 years (December 10, 1991 - on the issue of proclaiming independence, held in the hardest conditions of the war with Azerbaijan, and on December 10,2006 - on the adoption of the Constitution) as well as 4 election cycles of the presidential and parliamentary elections and the elections to local bodies of authority.
The latest elections were unusual in their turn-up. People began to queue up long before the polling stations were opened. Each station had complete polling lists presented well in advance; transparent ballot boxes were used. There were no special polling stations for servicemen who now voted according to the additional polling lists at regular polling stations. Nothing suggestive of any falsification or discrepancies between the results of the voting and the genuine expression of the people’s will was registered.
Observers from Russia (including State Duma delegates and the Auditing Chamber officials as well as a number of people from other states and NGOs were unanimous in their assessment of the good preparation of the elections and their unconditional correspondence to democratic standards. Nevertheless, statements made by people from a number of international organisations were of a somewhat different character. Representatives of the EU Parliamentary Assembly and some other bodies emphasised the lack of the international recognition of the status of the Nagorno Karabakh republic, stressing that the events during and after the election could allegedly negatively affect the negotiation process over the problem of Nagorno Karabakh.. However, formulation of the terms of recognition of an individual state in many respects has a conditional character.
As for the negotiations process, the main obstacle to its progress is the irreconcilable stance taken by the official Baku. It appears that officials in the Azerbaijani capital are not too eager to see the settlement of the conflict, probably in belief that nothing should be sacrificed at present if everything can be gained at once later.
Unfortunately, the recent visit of Armenian and Azeri cultural workers to Stepanakert, Shusha,Yerevan and Baku was not an exception to the rule. The trip ended in a long speech delivered by Ilham Aliev on the theme of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity (even though it was strange how the Azeri president failed to speak on the restoration of the Soviet Union, of which the Azerbaijanian Soviet Republic and the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous region in its administrative jurisdiction once was). No matter what, all this did not significantly affect the organisation and the course of voting. Neither it could affect those. An entire new generation has grown up in the Nagorno Karabakh, and it does not occur to it them that a return to the past is ever possible. The plaques carrying the portraits of their deceased relations and neighbours can be found in every city or village; they are a tangible reminder of what the “cultural autonomy” within the borders of the Azerbaihanian Soviet Socialist Republic meant for them.
The traces of war are still seen not only in Shusha (whose restoration only began a short while ago) but also in remote settlements in the Mardakert and Gadrut districts, where there still are houses with the walls peppered by bullets and submachine guns fire. So it is not accidental that the programmes of the candidates for the presidency at the polls of July 19,2007 chiefly focused on the socio-economic issues.
The residents of Nagorno Karabakh are primarily concerned over the solution of the unemployment problem and creation of new jobs, building new enterprises and attraction of investments, increasing pensions and wages. The programmes of the presidential candidates were oriented precisely on this. For example, the social programme of the winner of the elections Bako Saakian suggests increasing pensions in the coming three years two and a half times and ensure the growth of the average wages in the coming five years by 200 per cent. A serious attention will also be given to the development of the agricultural sector, and raising the degree of authority of local bodies of power, among other things.
* * *
Traces of a certain intrigue were seen through the entire election campaign in Nagorno Karabakh. The pre-election struggle meant many things. At the same time, there exists in the republic the concord on key issues it faces, so the emergence of an alternative “government” of say, the like of the one in South Ossetia, that would declare its consent to be dependent on Baku, is out of the question. The foreign policies positions shared by the two principal co-runners for presidency (including former head of the republic’s National Security Service Bako Saakian and Deputy Foreign Minister Masis Mailian) had no significant differences. Outside observers might view this as an inalienable attribute of the “fortress state” or the “garrison state” as some liberal columnists like to refer to Nagorno Karabakh. But the issues of security are of supreme importance to the local residents as their future depends on their selection of this or that version of their solution.
The most acute problem is that of the so-called “occupied” territories (to use the terms employed by the Azeri side). Stepanakert views the situation unlike people in Brussels and Strasburg. The districts that in the early 1990s were under the control of Azeri armed units are at astone’s throw from the windows of even not the highest buildings in the Nagorno Karabakh capital. Not only Shusha, from which Stepanakert was shelled in deadly attacks. They include the present-day suburb of the capital of Nagorno Karabakh, Kirkijan, and settlements Djamillu, Djangasan and Hodjalu where intensive construction was going on during the period of the government of the Organisational Committee for the republic of Nagorno Karabakh headed by V.Polyanichko, that was later turned into a major military base (presently the settlement of Ivanian). Other districts that are now known as “the safety belt” (along with their entrance infrastructure) also have strategic significance. Not only the Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert main road, but also the Mardakert-Kelbadjar road that was heavily used in the early 1990s to boost the Azeri military units in the Kelbadjar district that borders on Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.(where there are now refugees from the Shaumian district of the Nagorno Karabakh republic that was captured in the summer of 1992). Other asphalt roads (as was typical of the Soviet times) interconnected Armenian settlements almost exclusively via the adjacent Azeri districts.
That means that the return to the political, and consequently, the military control over the territories within the administrative borders of the former Republic of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan, or in the adjacent territories without some sort of firm guarantees would inevitably mean the return to the situation of 1991-1992, when the residents of Nagorno Karabakh found themselves in a virtually all-round siege and faced the prospects of total expulsion or even a physical destruction. The best guarantee to prevent the tragic events of the past in the conditions of the present-day erosion of international law from returning is to have modern armed forces. The Nagorno Karabakh Army of Defence has a firm control of the line of contact with Azernaijan.
* * *
The elections held in Nagorno Karabakh will provide a significant impetus for the continuation of the negotiations process that is now in the state of half-consciousness. But to render the negotiations constructive would only become possible after Stepanakert begins to participate. There are signs of another stage of restoration of the activities of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group. Braiza visited Yerevan on July 30th, 2007. The plans of the tireless American include a visit to Moscow on August 2, for a regular round of consultations with the c-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk group (Russia, France and the United States). A visit to Azerbaijan is slated as a follow-up to that. But by and large Braiza does not believe that any shifts in the process of the Karabbakh settlement could be expected in the near future. True, it is hard to expect any progress, given the continued attempts to solve the Karabakh problem without taking into account the ideas its residents have on that score.
Russia’s stance on the non-recognised states on the post-Soviet space is also very important.. Observers have long registered the absence of the response of the Russian Foreign Ministry concerning the elections in Karabakh. This can be assessed as a move in a right direction. Nevertheless, Russia’s ties with Nagorno Kaarabakh need to be intensified regardless of the present-day objective and subjective limitations. The objective factors (clearly understood by Stepanakert) include, primarily, the absence of a common frontier, whereas the subjective ones include Moscow’s wariness over causing new complications in its relations with Azerbaijan.
Political problems continue to make the life of ordinary people seriously harder. Telephone and mail connections between Moscow and Karabakh have been hard to establish for many years. There is no aviation links despite the availability of an airport, so transportation costs are outrageous. This situation can hardly be called normal, as there are quite comfortable conditions for doing business, and a high degree of social safety. Despite being almost totally sealed by the siege, the republic builds modern new enterprises, cattle breeding farms and agricultural processing companies along with state-of-the-art hotels and recreation zones; natural gas pipelines are connecting remote settlements and villages with the centre. Still Nagorno Karabakh remains chiefly an untapped area. Its significant resources (the power sector in particular) are enormous in terms of the regional scope, while its transport and tourist infrastructures are in need of serious investments.
Hesitation of politicians should not be in the way of developing the Russian-Karabakh cooperation in the cultural and humanitarian areas, as well as at the level of parliaments and NGOs. The problem of establishing in Stepanakert of the Russian cultural centre, new schools and classes for the speakers of Russian, etc, has not been settled yet. It should be recalled that people born in Nagorno Karabakh whose total number is about 1 million (with only 14% now living in Nagorno Karabakh) are in their preponderance people of both Armenian and Russian cultures. Many have long been living in Russia; they could significantly contribute to the strengthening of Russia’s political, economic and cultural positions in both Karabakh and Armenia, and in the whole of the Caucasian region.
Source (Click for more photos)
The Political Culture of the People of Nagorno-Karabakh:
On the Road to International Recognition
The July 19 presidential elections in Nagorno Karabakh met with quite a wide international response. It should be mentioned that the holding of referendums and elections at different levels have long become part of the political culture of the small state of Karabakh. 2 nation-wide referendums were held here in the past 16 years (December 10, 1991 - on the issue of proclaiming independence, held in the hardest conditions of the war with Azerbaijan, and on December 10,2006 - on the adoption of the Constitution) as well as 4 election cycles of the presidential and parliamentary elections and the elections to local bodies of authority.
The latest elections were unusual in their turn-up. People began to queue up long before the polling stations were opened. Each station had complete polling lists presented well in advance; transparent ballot boxes were used. There were no special polling stations for servicemen who now voted according to the additional polling lists at regular polling stations. Nothing suggestive of any falsification or discrepancies between the results of the voting and the genuine expression of the people’s will was registered.
Observers from Russia (including State Duma delegates and the Auditing Chamber officials as well as a number of people from other states and NGOs were unanimous in their assessment of the good preparation of the elections and their unconditional correspondence to democratic standards. Nevertheless, statements made by people from a number of international organisations were of a somewhat different character. Representatives of the EU Parliamentary Assembly and some other bodies emphasised the lack of the international recognition of the status of the Nagorno Karabakh republic, stressing that the events during and after the election could allegedly negatively affect the negotiation process over the problem of Nagorno Karabakh.. However, formulation of the terms of recognition of an individual state in many respects has a conditional character.
As for the negotiations process, the main obstacle to its progress is the irreconcilable stance taken by the official Baku. It appears that officials in the Azerbaijani capital are not too eager to see the settlement of the conflict, probably in belief that nothing should be sacrificed at present if everything can be gained at once later.
Unfortunately, the recent visit of Armenian and Azeri cultural workers to Stepanakert, Shusha,Yerevan and Baku was not an exception to the rule. The trip ended in a long speech delivered by Ilham Aliev on the theme of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity (even though it was strange how the Azeri president failed to speak on the restoration of the Soviet Union, of which the Azerbaijanian Soviet Republic and the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous region in its administrative jurisdiction once was). No matter what, all this did not significantly affect the organisation and the course of voting. Neither it could affect those. An entire new generation has grown up in the Nagorno Karabakh, and it does not occur to it them that a return to the past is ever possible. The plaques carrying the portraits of their deceased relations and neighbours can be found in every city or village; they are a tangible reminder of what the “cultural autonomy” within the borders of the Azerbaihanian Soviet Socialist Republic meant for them.
The traces of war are still seen not only in Shusha (whose restoration only began a short while ago) but also in remote settlements in the Mardakert and Gadrut districts, where there still are houses with the walls peppered by bullets and submachine guns fire. So it is not accidental that the programmes of the candidates for the presidency at the polls of July 19,2007 chiefly focused on the socio-economic issues.
The residents of Nagorno Karabakh are primarily concerned over the solution of the unemployment problem and creation of new jobs, building new enterprises and attraction of investments, increasing pensions and wages. The programmes of the presidential candidates were oriented precisely on this. For example, the social programme of the winner of the elections Bako Saakian suggests increasing pensions in the coming three years two and a half times and ensure the growth of the average wages in the coming five years by 200 per cent. A serious attention will also be given to the development of the agricultural sector, and raising the degree of authority of local bodies of power, among other things.
* * *
Traces of a certain intrigue were seen through the entire election campaign in Nagorno Karabakh. The pre-election struggle meant many things. At the same time, there exists in the republic the concord on key issues it faces, so the emergence of an alternative “government” of say, the like of the one in South Ossetia, that would declare its consent to be dependent on Baku, is out of the question. The foreign policies positions shared by the two principal co-runners for presidency (including former head of the republic’s National Security Service Bako Saakian and Deputy Foreign Minister Masis Mailian) had no significant differences. Outside observers might view this as an inalienable attribute of the “fortress state” or the “garrison state” as some liberal columnists like to refer to Nagorno Karabakh. But the issues of security are of supreme importance to the local residents as their future depends on their selection of this or that version of their solution.
The most acute problem is that of the so-called “occupied” territories (to use the terms employed by the Azeri side). Stepanakert views the situation unlike people in Brussels and Strasburg. The districts that in the early 1990s were under the control of Azeri armed units are at astone’s throw from the windows of even not the highest buildings in the Nagorno Karabakh capital. Not only Shusha, from which Stepanakert was shelled in deadly attacks. They include the present-day suburb of the capital of Nagorno Karabakh, Kirkijan, and settlements Djamillu, Djangasan and Hodjalu where intensive construction was going on during the period of the government of the Organisational Committee for the republic of Nagorno Karabakh headed by V.Polyanichko, that was later turned into a major military base (presently the settlement of Ivanian). Other districts that are now known as “the safety belt” (along with their entrance infrastructure) also have strategic significance. Not only the Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert main road, but also the Mardakert-Kelbadjar road that was heavily used in the early 1990s to boost the Azeri military units in the Kelbadjar district that borders on Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.(where there are now refugees from the Shaumian district of the Nagorno Karabakh republic that was captured in the summer of 1992). Other asphalt roads (as was typical of the Soviet times) interconnected Armenian settlements almost exclusively via the adjacent Azeri districts.
That means that the return to the political, and consequently, the military control over the territories within the administrative borders of the former Republic of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan, or in the adjacent territories without some sort of firm guarantees would inevitably mean the return to the situation of 1991-1992, when the residents of Nagorno Karabakh found themselves in a virtually all-round siege and faced the prospects of total expulsion or even a physical destruction. The best guarantee to prevent the tragic events of the past in the conditions of the present-day erosion of international law from returning is to have modern armed forces. The Nagorno Karabakh Army of Defence has a firm control of the line of contact with Azernaijan.
* * *
The elections held in Nagorno Karabakh will provide a significant impetus for the continuation of the negotiations process that is now in the state of half-consciousness. But to render the negotiations constructive would only become possible after Stepanakert begins to participate. There are signs of another stage of restoration of the activities of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group. Braiza visited Yerevan on July 30th, 2007. The plans of the tireless American include a visit to Moscow on August 2, for a regular round of consultations with the c-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk group (Russia, France and the United States). A visit to Azerbaijan is slated as a follow-up to that. But by and large Braiza does not believe that any shifts in the process of the Karabbakh settlement could be expected in the near future. True, it is hard to expect any progress, given the continued attempts to solve the Karabakh problem without taking into account the ideas its residents have on that score.
Russia’s stance on the non-recognised states on the post-Soviet space is also very important.. Observers have long registered the absence of the response of the Russian Foreign Ministry concerning the elections in Karabakh. This can be assessed as a move in a right direction. Nevertheless, Russia’s ties with Nagorno Kaarabakh need to be intensified regardless of the present-day objective and subjective limitations. The objective factors (clearly understood by Stepanakert) include, primarily, the absence of a common frontier, whereas the subjective ones include Moscow’s wariness over causing new complications in its relations with Azerbaijan.
Political problems continue to make the life of ordinary people seriously harder. Telephone and mail connections between Moscow and Karabakh have been hard to establish for many years. There is no aviation links despite the availability of an airport, so transportation costs are outrageous. This situation can hardly be called normal, as there are quite comfortable conditions for doing business, and a high degree of social safety. Despite being almost totally sealed by the siege, the republic builds modern new enterprises, cattle breeding farms and agricultural processing companies along with state-of-the-art hotels and recreation zones; natural gas pipelines are connecting remote settlements and villages with the centre. Still Nagorno Karabakh remains chiefly an untapped area. Its significant resources (the power sector in particular) are enormous in terms of the regional scope, while its transport and tourist infrastructures are in need of serious investments.
Hesitation of politicians should not be in the way of developing the Russian-Karabakh cooperation in the cultural and humanitarian areas, as well as at the level of parliaments and NGOs. The problem of establishing in Stepanakert of the Russian cultural centre, new schools and classes for the speakers of Russian, etc, has not been settled yet. It should be recalled that people born in Nagorno Karabakh whose total number is about 1 million (with only 14% now living in Nagorno Karabakh) are in their preponderance people of both Armenian and Russian cultures. Many have long been living in Russia; they could significantly contribute to the strengthening of Russia’s political, economic and cultural positions in both Karabakh and Armenia, and in the whole of the Caucasian region.
Source (Click for more photos)