Yes, and what is universal is unconditional AND, hence, imperative. In a neo-Kantian reading, certainly, 'the good' is contained in the 'act', but in the Groundwork Kant is very clear (and even Platonic) in his assertion that respect for the moral law -- framed as it is by the categorical imperative -- is the apprehension of the Good by reason which is willed (the good will) by doing one's duty free of any inclination to do so, i.e. autonomous.
As for the categorising of deontological - I agree that Kant is clearly situating autonomy as his centerpiece, but the only way he can charge the moral agent with their autonomy is to align "being autonomous" with "doing your duty" because you are free of intention. His 5 key examples in the Groundwork clearly show this, from the Grocer to the Philanthropist.
The gap between the moral law and duty is simply the gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal. While duty may well be noumenally driven, it is part of the action in the world of phenomena. The moral law, on the other hand, rests on the ability of Reason to apprehend it, it is not phenomenal, it is noumenal - even the black letter lawyer knows that the writ on the page relies on a minimum of ideation for it to be articulated.
I signaled 'respect' as the gap, because when I looked hard at what Kant was trying to articulate a propos duty (in the Groundwork) he really insists on respect as a kind of 'formal' condition, a gap that stops the subject from confusing duty for the Good or the moral law, i.e. his example of the good samaritan whose actions of helping people because s/he enjoys doing 'the right thing' have no moral worth.
And lastly, since when is any explication free of at least hidden criticism? I always flag that what I have here is a schematisation, simply a tool for demonstration which they are more than welcome to disagree with. As any honest academician would do.
As for the categorising of deontological - I agree that Kant is clearly situating autonomy as his centerpiece, but the only way he can charge the moral agent with their autonomy is to align "being autonomous" with "doing your duty" because you are free of intention. His 5 key examples in the Groundwork clearly show this, from the Grocer to the Philanthropist.
The gap between the moral law and duty is simply the gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal. While duty may well be noumenally driven, it is part of the action in the world of phenomena. The moral law, on the other hand, rests on the ability of Reason to apprehend it, it is not phenomenal, it is noumenal - even the black letter lawyer knows that the writ on the page relies on a minimum of ideation for it to be articulated.
I signaled 'respect' as the gap, because when I looked hard at what Kant was trying to articulate a propos duty (in the Groundwork) he really insists on respect as a kind of 'formal' condition, a gap that stops the subject from confusing duty for the Good or the moral law, i.e. his example of the good samaritan whose actions of helping people because s/he enjoys doing 'the right thing' have no moral worth.
And lastly, since when is any explication free of at least hidden criticism? I always flag that what I have here is a schematisation, simply a tool for demonstration which they are more than welcome to disagree with. As any honest academician would do.
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