The View from 1936
I found this interesting column called Front and Center about military history. I think it will be interesting to my regular readers (who, I am firmly convinced, do exist). My favorite so far is the three part article (1,2,3) on the Italy-Ethiopia war of 1936. The author's thesis is that this war is unfairly overlooked and seen as the incompetent fighting the uncivilized when, a) this was not how it was seen at the time and b) this was not the case.
By the sound of it the Italians had a similar problem to the Japanese. Their armies were, in several respects, very forward-looking with regards to new technology and tactics. They were able to arm themselves effectively in the 1930s with very modern weapons and perform credibly and quickly against second-tier opponents.
However, technology moved very quickly in the 1930s and 1940s. That light tank that was great for flushing out Chinese troops or that open-cockpit, fixed landing gear fighter that was perfect for strafing Ethiopians in 1936 was a death trap against real opponents by 1940. Anything that was hot stuff in 1940 was probably a death trap by 1943.
Neither the Italians nor the Japanese had anything like the industrial capacity needed to keep up with this pace of development. Even the Germans had trouble; the majority of their tanks and aircraft produced throughout the war were updated versions of designs from the 1930s. Their clean sheet designs, which were at least as good and sometimes better than the Allies' were produced in relatively small quantities.
The only countries that could keep up were the United States or countries substantially supplied by the United States.
Or, in other words, in a war of materiel and materiel attrition, you probably don't want to get into a fight with the nation that has the majority of the world's manufacturing capacity that also happens to be protected by two oceans.
By the sound of it the Italians had a similar problem to the Japanese. Their armies were, in several respects, very forward-looking with regards to new technology and tactics. They were able to arm themselves effectively in the 1930s with very modern weapons and perform credibly and quickly against second-tier opponents.
However, technology moved very quickly in the 1930s and 1940s. That light tank that was great for flushing out Chinese troops or that open-cockpit, fixed landing gear fighter that was perfect for strafing Ethiopians in 1936 was a death trap against real opponents by 1940. Anything that was hot stuff in 1940 was probably a death trap by 1943.
Neither the Italians nor the Japanese had anything like the industrial capacity needed to keep up with this pace of development. Even the Germans had trouble; the majority of their tanks and aircraft produced throughout the war were updated versions of designs from the 1930s. Their clean sheet designs, which were at least as good and sometimes better than the Allies' were produced in relatively small quantities.
The only countries that could keep up were the United States or countries substantially supplied by the United States.
Or, in other words, in a war of materiel and materiel attrition, you probably don't want to get into a fight with the nation that has the majority of the world's manufacturing capacity that also happens to be protected by two oceans.