The Importance of Authenticity
In studying Existentialism, it becomes clear that one of the most important (if not the most important) tasks one is faced with is authenticity. Existential philosophers such as Soren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Martin Heidegger all refer to the importance of authenticity and honesty in studying an individual’s own existence. In examining the idea of authenticity, it is important to first define the word in general terms as well as understand why it is existentially relevant. In addition, while examining each viewpoint, it is equally important to characterize inauthenticity in contrast to authenticity. While each philosopher gives an individual viewpoint regarding the meaning and path to authenticity, each argument is closely related to the other. There is no doubt that each philosopher has strong arguments (some more convincing than others) on the subject of authenticity and is deserving of contemplation; the viewpoints also may very well aid an individual by leading him in the correct direction toward authenticity. However, Martin Heidegger has the most compelling argument for authenticity. His view of authenticity is in part influenced by the other two philosophers I am discussing, but his argument has strength where each of the others’ show weakness.
Before I examine each philosopher’s comments on authenticity, it is important to first grasp what it generally means to be authentic. Authenticity is defined as “not false or copied; genuine; real” (http://www.dictionary.reference.com). From this follows that anything genuine or real cannot come from dishonesty because this would contradict the very meaning of the authenticity. Thus, we can conclude that something authentic is inextricably coupled with honesty. This is without a doubt a very general characterization of authenticity, but it is nonetheless helpful as a starting point.
Why, then, is authenticity existentially relevant? To be existentially authentic means to be “genuine and real” with oneself when it comes to his or her existence. In a sense, no stone is left unturned and the individual is aware of and admits to both positive and negative features he or she finds in exploration of individual existence. In addition, the individual must be “not false or copied” in the sense that he or she does not use general terms or kinds to define or understand the self; if one is defined only by general terms or kind, it would suggest that it is “copied” and far from individual or authentic. Authenticity, then, is existentially relevant because it is authenticity that helps create the individual qua individual and also assures that the ultimate subject matter (the existing individual) is honestly approached and contemplated. It would be detrimental to the self and the process of studying existentialism to lie to oneself about existence.
Part I: Kierkegaard on Subjective Truth and the Three Movements of Faith
According to Soren Kierkegaard, the idea of authenticity rests on two major tenets: subjective truth and faith. I will first explore the difference between objective and subjective truth, and will then discuss what Kierkegaard believes to be the path to authenticity. While Kierkegaard suggests some legitimate points regarding authenticity, I believe his argument to be the weakest among the philosophers I will be discussing throughout this paper.
Kierkegaard suggests a dichotomy of truth: objective truth and subjective truth. Objective truth is characterized by upheld facts about “what is believed” (Oaklander 27). Attempting to understand one’s individual existence in terms of objective truths is detrimental to an individual because he is observing existence through a window - any objective knowledge that is acquired is existentially irrelevant because it does not change the way an individual acts, makes decisions, and lives his life. Kierkegaard notes the importance of an individual’s participation in his or her existence as opposed to observation of it.
Take for example the phrase, “God exists.” Supposing that there existed a set of facts that scientifically proved the existence of God, the phrase would be an objective truth. Belief in an objective truth means nothing to individual existence as it does not require any sort of individual personal relation to the fact; belief in the objective truth of the existence of God is merely adherence to a rule, existentially irrelevant, and deserves no merit. It would suffice to say that even if the existence of God was proven, it would mean nothing to Kierkegaard. I believe this can be characterized as Kierkegaard’s first description of inauthenticity.
The other half of the dichotomy - subjective truth - is Kierkegaard’s first attempt to explain authenticity. Kierkegaard’s emphasis was on the individual qua individual. This is to say that while we are all of the same kind, and while there are general truths that blanket the entire population, there is something distinguishable about each and every individual’s existence. Thus existential thought requires subjective knowledge that would lead each individual to his or her own reality - a reality free of general abstractions and objective truths about the world: an authentic reality based solely on the self as an existing individual.
Take again the phrase, “God exists.” A subjective decision on the basis of this phrase would require no objective truths whatsoever, and in fact, no justification is possible nor is it necessary according to Kierkegaard. A subjective belief in God requires a “personal, passionate decision and commitment to believe” (Oaklander 17). While objective belief would be suspended in the absence of the facticity of a claim, subjective truth according to Kierkegaard can be characterized by the belief in God despite the lack of a rational basis for His existence. Belief despite the paradox of the existence of God is called faith, and is the sole way to achieve inwardness and authenticity.
The second tenet on which Kierkegaard’s authenticity rests is faith and the Three Movements of Faith. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard outlines the three steps toward achieving authentic, genuine faith. I will turn to the story of Abraham (who Kierkegaard considers a Knight of Faith) to explain these three movements toward authenticity. The first stage is “Commitment” in which the individual 1) commits himself to a finite goal and 2) realizes that it is impossible to achieve. Using the story of Abraham, his commitment was to his only son Isaac whom he loved very much. Abraham realized that he embodied this commitment, but at the same time believed that God’s will would surpass any commitment that he had to his son, Isaac. The second stage is “Infinite Resignation” in which an individual separates and “renounces” (Oaklander 21) the finite commitment from Stage One. Abraham was willing to set aside his love for his son because he knew that it was impossible for him to achieve his finite goal in his lifetime; there was also a larger issue at hand - his relationship with God. The third and final stage is “Faith” in which by a belief in God, one believes that “one will receive what one has renounced” (Oaklander 22). For Abraham, this meant a willingness to sacrifice his son as an offering to God. Abraham subjectively believed that God would not “ask” him to sacrifice his son if he were not to receive at a later time equal or perhaps greater satisfaction than that which Isaac would bring him if Isaac were to stay alive.
I believe this last stage deserves a bit more depth. Most people, if not all, would find the final stage problematic. One might ask, “Why would God permit Abraham to sacrifice his son if it is simultaneously defying the 6th Commandment (“Thou Shalt Not Kill”)?” Kierkegaard would respond to this question with, “The particular is higher than the universal” (Oaklander 24). Recall that objective truths are general truths that can be universalized. Thus, the 6th Commandment is an objective truth about God’s rules, and is irrelevant in Abraham’s case. In the final stage of faith, one is suspending the ethical judgments that he or she usually lives by and no longer has any objective justification for his or her actions; it would be safe to say that objective justification would be impossible to find in Abraham’s situation, but it would also be completely irrelevant. However, Kierkegaard argues that Abraham was justified in his willingness to sacrifice Isaac because he “gives rise to self-awareness: a sense of what it means to exist as an individual and not as a universal” (Oaklander 24-25). In this way, because Abraham 1) characterized himself as an individual and made his decision purely by faith and subjective knowledge, and 2) was “entirely responsible for his faith and…was alone [with his faith],” Kierkegaard believed him to be a “knight of faith” and a prime example of authenticity (Oaklander 18).
I find two major problems with Kierkegaard’s argument regarding authenticity and faith. The first of these problems rests in Kierkegaard’s claim that belief despite paradoxes constitutes faith. In his work, he outlines both the paradox of the existence of God and the paradox of the teleological suspension of the ethical and applauds those who have subjective strength and maintain a relationship with God despite these paradoxes. While for Kierkegaard, subjective strength, faith, and authenticity of an individual come from belief despite major inconsistencies, it has been my personal experience that it is very problematic to believe anything that seems to contradict itself. Even with the suspension of objective truths, I do not agree with Kierkegaard’s connection between faith and paradoxes constituting authenticity. I doubt my finding this problematic is a result of my inability to think subjectively (which is what I think Kierkegaard would suggest is my problem), but merely a product of my subjective truths and honesty about my existence.
The second major problem with Kierkegaard’s depiction of authenticity is his lack of consideration for honesty. True, Kierkegaard believed Abraham was being authentic, and thus honest, in his decision to sacrifice Isaac. However, what if Abraham honestly and authentically did not believe it was right to kill his son? This belief would not be based on the 6th Commandment, but could likely be based on what the individual believed to be right or wrong. Without using objective truths, it is easy to conceive of subjective reasons why one would not want to sacrifice his son, and I do not believe one would be wrong (or inauthentic) for following this reasoning. If one is honest and authentic with oneself in making decisions, there is a good chance that an authentic decision would be one of non-belief. Thus, unlike Kierkegaard suggests, it is possible to be authentic with regard to existence despite a lack of subjective belief in God.
Part II: Sartre on Consciousness and Bad Faith
In contrast to Kierkegaard’s argument regarding authenticity is Sartre’s account of “bad faith” or “mauvaise foi.” Before understanding bad faith, it is crucial to explain Sartre’s characterization of consciousness because bad faith is centered upon this characterization. I thoroughly enjoyed Sartre’s selection and partly believe in the possibility of bad faith, but I feel his characterization of bad faith makes it possible for one to be in good faith but simultaneously be inauthentic.
Sartre, unlike many other philosophers, created a dichotomy of consciousness. The first part of consciousness is being. This is what Sartre calls en-soi, meaning a being in itself. En-soi is characterized by that which is a fact about you and thus partly defines you; in short, it is an individual’s relationship to the world. To define it in terms of Kierkegaard’s terminology, it could be said that en-soi is made up of objective truths about the self: “I am a waitress,” or “I am a student at Cal Poly Pomona.” This facticity, Sartre believed, is all we can know about other individuals. In addition, this facticity is our essence that has been created by our decisions made in the past.
The second part of consciousness is what Sartre calls nothingness. In contrast to en-soi, this part of consciousness is called pour-soi meaning a being for itself. This other half of consciousness is considered to have the ability to make decisions and will and desire things. Pour-soi is considered nothingness because “in virtue of my future I do not have an essence, but rather I create my essence by continuing to make decisions” (Oaklander 224). Pour-soi, then, cannot be characterized by facticity because it is pour-soi that has the ability to change the en-soi in every passing moment. It may be easier to think of pour-soi as a blank slate on which anything can be written.
This characterization of consciousness may be difficult to understand because one consciousness is made up of two polar opposites. This paradox concludes that there is a “distinction between our facticity and transcendence, but there is no difference” (Oaklander 227).
Now with these definitions in place, it will be much easier to explain Sartre’s account of bad faith, or for our purposes, inauthenticity. He characterizes bad faith as the “falling apart of one consciousness into two poles and oscillation between them” (Richards 2/6 Lecture). To clarify this state of bad faith, Sartre uses the example of a waiter. Imagine you are sitting at a restaurant and you observe your waiter as he brings you your food. He seems to be in a very foul mood, and you ask him what is wrong. The waiter replies, “I am so tired of this. I am not a waiter, I’m a free being and I can decide on a new job whenever I feel like it.” Sartre considers the waiter to be in bad faith because the waiter is being dishonest with himself about his essence and attributing his nothingness (the fact that he can choose any job he so desires) to his being. This waiter’s en-soi or essence in the world is that he is in fact a waiter. In relation to the world, he is a waiter although he is denying it and claiming to be only transcendence and nothingness.
Imagine this situation from the opposite perspective. Again, you ask the waiter what is wrong, but this time he replies, “I am just a waiter. I can never do anything else because this is what defines me.” This would also be an example of bad faith according to Sartre because the waiter is attributing his facticity to his transcendence; being a waiter is “not a fixed quality that determines his behavior” although he claims it to be (Oaklander 228). Because transcendence can will and decide things, nobody is just a waiter and cannot escape responsibility because of a fact about his being. The waiter, in this case, is denying the fact that he is able to make decisions that will make him a different essence than he is today.
How then, according to Sartre, is one able to be authentic? From what I gather from his characterization of bad faith, I assume to be in good faith would be to acknowledge both poles of consciousness without completely claiming to be being or nothingness. For example, perhaps the waiter would be in good faith if he replied, “I am tired of being a waiter (my essence). Maybe it’s time for me to broaden my horizons and choose (transcendence) a new job that will change that essence.” In this case, the waiter would arguably be in good faith because of his honesty with regard to his essence and his nothingness.
One of the main problems with Sartre’s argument on authenticity and bad faith comes when questioning the very nature of authenticity. Recall that Sartre’s characterization splits consciousness into two parts: facticity (what we are in the world and what people think of us) and transcendence (the ability choose and originate). Imagine a friend commented to an individual, “You are inauthentic.” Logically, the friend would be commenting only on the individual’s facticity because Sartre claims this is all others can know; it is impossible to know another’s transcendence. If the individual were to accept his friend’s comment as truth, he would arguably be in bad faith because he would be accepting inauthenticity as a fact that defines him. The individual would be denying that he could in fact, even in his next action, be authentic, but would refuse to do so because he believes this definition of himself.
Also, from a different angle, imagine a friend told the individual, “You are authentic.” In this case, belief in this statement would also be in bad faith. Despite the positive connotation of the statement, the individual would still be in bad faith because he would be denying that in the next moment he could choose an action that would make him inauthentic.
Although Sartre poses a much stronger argument about authenticity than Kierkegaard’s Three Movements of Faith, I still find there is something missing with regard to honesty. If any kind of information is to be existentially relevant, then it should change the way a person lives. In Sartre’s case, I feel as though being honest with oneself about both facticity and transcendence simultaneously would not necessarily change the way a person lives for the better. There may even be a chance that this type of honesty would lead to stagnation. Recall my example of a waiter in good faith: “I am tired of being a waiter. Maybe it’s time for me to broaden my horizons and choose a new job that will change that essence.” Ten years pass, and he is still a waiter in the same restaurant. This waiter, then, would be in good faith even though he did not necessarily take action with respect to his transcendence. Thus, being in good faith does not make one authentic because it does not necessarily lead one to change his course of action and take advantage of his transcendence.
Part III: Heidegger on Authentic and Inauthentic Dasein
In contrast to Kierkegaard and Sartre, I feel that Martin Heidegger has the most convincing argument on the path to authenticity. Despite criticisms of being a nihilist and having a negative viewpoint, I agree with Heidegger when he says that one can only be authentic when he or she comes to terms with death, and it is only then that one can live authentically and make choices based upon the inevitability that one day he or she will no longer exist.
The term “Dasein” is Heidegger’s term for what Kierkegaard, Sartre, and other existential philosophers call “consciousness” or “human being.” It is made up of its essence and past decisions, but is also able to originate.
In contrast, Heidegger claims that “The One” or “das man” is an “inauthentic mode of existence in which w forget that we are existing individuals and become lost in the ‘one like many’” (Oaklander 161). For example, similar to Kierkegaard, Heidegger believed that being characterized by kind or general terms was to be inauthentic; it denied that there is something individual about each and every Dasein. In addition to being similar to Kierkegaard, Heidegger also seems to comment on the notion of Sartre’s account of bad faith. For Heidegger, fallenness is characterizing oneself in terms of the roles he or she plays, and he believes this to be a prime example of inauthenticity.
Heidegger claimed that the way one faces death determines his authenticity or lack thereof. Unlike the usual negative characterization of death, Heidegger says that “death individualizes or isolates us from all other individuals” (Oaklander 154). Death is what completes Dasein and what makes the individual unique in the world - a very important fact to the study of Existentialism. In addition, the importance of death is for the individual to realize that there is an inevitable time when he or she will no longer be able to choose a possible future; death’s significance comes from the halt of our ability to be choosing and free-minded Dasein.
Death can be approached in one of two ways. The first approach is what Heidegger calls “Inauthentic Dasein.” This individual believes death to be “distinct, abstract, and universal”; in other words, “it happens to everyone and has nothing to do with me personally” (Richards 2/22 Lecture). This is a problem for Heidegger because it is a refusal to believe that death plays an important role for each and every individual. The Inauthentic Dasein will flee from death and attempt to avoid it. This denial leads to “tranquillization” in which we tell others and also convince ourselves that we will escape death. The acceptance of this tranquillization is detrimental to Dasein because it keeps an individual from effectively choosing a future while he still has the chance.
On the other hand, we have what Heidegger calls “Authentic Dasein.” This individual is able to face one’s death by realizing that it is unique and not part of das man. This awareness and acceptance of death frees the individual and makes it possible for him to effectively choose his or her future and give rise to a higher level of self-understanding than is possible when one is inauthentic regarding death. The freedom that the acceptance of death brings is utterly crucial because it is only then that the self can create itself, change, and perhaps grow in positive directions (Richards 2/22 Lecture).
In being authentic towards death, one reaches conscience. “In conscience, one is in a state, when facing a decision, in which one recognizes that one is completely alone and on one’s own; nothing other than Dasein is regarded as relevant, no even or anything in Dasein’s past” (Oaklander 158). This should sound familiar because as stated earlier, Kierkgaard believed Abraham to be authentic because he was alone with his decision and thus completely responsible for it.
I believe Heidegger’s characterization of authenticity is the most convincing among the three philosophers I have discussed. While he takes some characteristics of authenticity from both Kierkegaard and Sartre, Heidegger’s characterization has strength where the other two showed weakness. Unlike Kierkegaard, Heidegger has shown that it is possible to be authentic without a personal relationship with God; unlike Sartre, Heidegger has shown that the realization of death will ultimately change how a person chooses and lives (as stated earlier, existentially relevant knowledge should and will change how a person lives). Heidegger, though criticized for his emphasis on death, has truly captured one of the most important realizations one must come to before making important decisions as an authentic being. Death is not only an objective truth, but one that is subjective and can have the most existential relevance than any other event in an individual’s life. In facing one’s death as the inevitable halt of existence, one is truly able to understand his or her own existence authentically.
Before I examine each philosopher’s comments on authenticity, it is important to first grasp what it generally means to be authentic. Authenticity is defined as “not false or copied; genuine; real” (http://www.dictionary.reference.com). From this follows that anything genuine or real cannot come from dishonesty because this would contradict the very meaning of the authenticity. Thus, we can conclude that something authentic is inextricably coupled with honesty. This is without a doubt a very general characterization of authenticity, but it is nonetheless helpful as a starting point.
Why, then, is authenticity existentially relevant? To be existentially authentic means to be “genuine and real” with oneself when it comes to his or her existence. In a sense, no stone is left unturned and the individual is aware of and admits to both positive and negative features he or she finds in exploration of individual existence. In addition, the individual must be “not false or copied” in the sense that he or she does not use general terms or kinds to define or understand the self; if one is defined only by general terms or kind, it would suggest that it is “copied” and far from individual or authentic. Authenticity, then, is existentially relevant because it is authenticity that helps create the individual qua individual and also assures that the ultimate subject matter (the existing individual) is honestly approached and contemplated. It would be detrimental to the self and the process of studying existentialism to lie to oneself about existence.
Part I: Kierkegaard on Subjective Truth and the Three Movements of Faith
According to Soren Kierkegaard, the idea of authenticity rests on two major tenets: subjective truth and faith. I will first explore the difference between objective and subjective truth, and will then discuss what Kierkegaard believes to be the path to authenticity. While Kierkegaard suggests some legitimate points regarding authenticity, I believe his argument to be the weakest among the philosophers I will be discussing throughout this paper.
Kierkegaard suggests a dichotomy of truth: objective truth and subjective truth. Objective truth is characterized by upheld facts about “what is believed” (Oaklander 27). Attempting to understand one’s individual existence in terms of objective truths is detrimental to an individual because he is observing existence through a window - any objective knowledge that is acquired is existentially irrelevant because it does not change the way an individual acts, makes decisions, and lives his life. Kierkegaard notes the importance of an individual’s participation in his or her existence as opposed to observation of it.
Take for example the phrase, “God exists.” Supposing that there existed a set of facts that scientifically proved the existence of God, the phrase would be an objective truth. Belief in an objective truth means nothing to individual existence as it does not require any sort of individual personal relation to the fact; belief in the objective truth of the existence of God is merely adherence to a rule, existentially irrelevant, and deserves no merit. It would suffice to say that even if the existence of God was proven, it would mean nothing to Kierkegaard. I believe this can be characterized as Kierkegaard’s first description of inauthenticity.
The other half of the dichotomy - subjective truth - is Kierkegaard’s first attempt to explain authenticity. Kierkegaard’s emphasis was on the individual qua individual. This is to say that while we are all of the same kind, and while there are general truths that blanket the entire population, there is something distinguishable about each and every individual’s existence. Thus existential thought requires subjective knowledge that would lead each individual to his or her own reality - a reality free of general abstractions and objective truths about the world: an authentic reality based solely on the self as an existing individual.
Take again the phrase, “God exists.” A subjective decision on the basis of this phrase would require no objective truths whatsoever, and in fact, no justification is possible nor is it necessary according to Kierkegaard. A subjective belief in God requires a “personal, passionate decision and commitment to believe” (Oaklander 17). While objective belief would be suspended in the absence of the facticity of a claim, subjective truth according to Kierkegaard can be characterized by the belief in God despite the lack of a rational basis for His existence. Belief despite the paradox of the existence of God is called faith, and is the sole way to achieve inwardness and authenticity.
The second tenet on which Kierkegaard’s authenticity rests is faith and the Three Movements of Faith. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard outlines the three steps toward achieving authentic, genuine faith. I will turn to the story of Abraham (who Kierkegaard considers a Knight of Faith) to explain these three movements toward authenticity. The first stage is “Commitment” in which the individual 1) commits himself to a finite goal and 2) realizes that it is impossible to achieve. Using the story of Abraham, his commitment was to his only son Isaac whom he loved very much. Abraham realized that he embodied this commitment, but at the same time believed that God’s will would surpass any commitment that he had to his son, Isaac. The second stage is “Infinite Resignation” in which an individual separates and “renounces” (Oaklander 21) the finite commitment from Stage One. Abraham was willing to set aside his love for his son because he knew that it was impossible for him to achieve his finite goal in his lifetime; there was also a larger issue at hand - his relationship with God. The third and final stage is “Faith” in which by a belief in God, one believes that “one will receive what one has renounced” (Oaklander 22). For Abraham, this meant a willingness to sacrifice his son as an offering to God. Abraham subjectively believed that God would not “ask” him to sacrifice his son if he were not to receive at a later time equal or perhaps greater satisfaction than that which Isaac would bring him if Isaac were to stay alive.
I believe this last stage deserves a bit more depth. Most people, if not all, would find the final stage problematic. One might ask, “Why would God permit Abraham to sacrifice his son if it is simultaneously defying the 6th Commandment (“Thou Shalt Not Kill”)?” Kierkegaard would respond to this question with, “The particular is higher than the universal” (Oaklander 24). Recall that objective truths are general truths that can be universalized. Thus, the 6th Commandment is an objective truth about God’s rules, and is irrelevant in Abraham’s case. In the final stage of faith, one is suspending the ethical judgments that he or she usually lives by and no longer has any objective justification for his or her actions; it would be safe to say that objective justification would be impossible to find in Abraham’s situation, but it would also be completely irrelevant. However, Kierkegaard argues that Abraham was justified in his willingness to sacrifice Isaac because he “gives rise to self-awareness: a sense of what it means to exist as an individual and not as a universal” (Oaklander 24-25). In this way, because Abraham 1) characterized himself as an individual and made his decision purely by faith and subjective knowledge, and 2) was “entirely responsible for his faith and…was alone [with his faith],” Kierkegaard believed him to be a “knight of faith” and a prime example of authenticity (Oaklander 18).
I find two major problems with Kierkegaard’s argument regarding authenticity and faith. The first of these problems rests in Kierkegaard’s claim that belief despite paradoxes constitutes faith. In his work, he outlines both the paradox of the existence of God and the paradox of the teleological suspension of the ethical and applauds those who have subjective strength and maintain a relationship with God despite these paradoxes. While for Kierkegaard, subjective strength, faith, and authenticity of an individual come from belief despite major inconsistencies, it has been my personal experience that it is very problematic to believe anything that seems to contradict itself. Even with the suspension of objective truths, I do not agree with Kierkegaard’s connection between faith and paradoxes constituting authenticity. I doubt my finding this problematic is a result of my inability to think subjectively (which is what I think Kierkegaard would suggest is my problem), but merely a product of my subjective truths and honesty about my existence.
The second major problem with Kierkegaard’s depiction of authenticity is his lack of consideration for honesty. True, Kierkegaard believed Abraham was being authentic, and thus honest, in his decision to sacrifice Isaac. However, what if Abraham honestly and authentically did not believe it was right to kill his son? This belief would not be based on the 6th Commandment, but could likely be based on what the individual believed to be right or wrong. Without using objective truths, it is easy to conceive of subjective reasons why one would not want to sacrifice his son, and I do not believe one would be wrong (or inauthentic) for following this reasoning. If one is honest and authentic with oneself in making decisions, there is a good chance that an authentic decision would be one of non-belief. Thus, unlike Kierkegaard suggests, it is possible to be authentic with regard to existence despite a lack of subjective belief in God.
Part II: Sartre on Consciousness and Bad Faith
In contrast to Kierkegaard’s argument regarding authenticity is Sartre’s account of “bad faith” or “mauvaise foi.” Before understanding bad faith, it is crucial to explain Sartre’s characterization of consciousness because bad faith is centered upon this characterization. I thoroughly enjoyed Sartre’s selection and partly believe in the possibility of bad faith, but I feel his characterization of bad faith makes it possible for one to be in good faith but simultaneously be inauthentic.
Sartre, unlike many other philosophers, created a dichotomy of consciousness. The first part of consciousness is being. This is what Sartre calls en-soi, meaning a being in itself. En-soi is characterized by that which is a fact about you and thus partly defines you; in short, it is an individual’s relationship to the world. To define it in terms of Kierkegaard’s terminology, it could be said that en-soi is made up of objective truths about the self: “I am a waitress,” or “I am a student at Cal Poly Pomona.” This facticity, Sartre believed, is all we can know about other individuals. In addition, this facticity is our essence that has been created by our decisions made in the past.
The second part of consciousness is what Sartre calls nothingness. In contrast to en-soi, this part of consciousness is called pour-soi meaning a being for itself. This other half of consciousness is considered to have the ability to make decisions and will and desire things. Pour-soi is considered nothingness because “in virtue of my future I do not have an essence, but rather I create my essence by continuing to make decisions” (Oaklander 224). Pour-soi, then, cannot be characterized by facticity because it is pour-soi that has the ability to change the en-soi in every passing moment. It may be easier to think of pour-soi as a blank slate on which anything can be written.
This characterization of consciousness may be difficult to understand because one consciousness is made up of two polar opposites. This paradox concludes that there is a “distinction between our facticity and transcendence, but there is no difference” (Oaklander 227).
Now with these definitions in place, it will be much easier to explain Sartre’s account of bad faith, or for our purposes, inauthenticity. He characterizes bad faith as the “falling apart of one consciousness into two poles and oscillation between them” (Richards 2/6 Lecture). To clarify this state of bad faith, Sartre uses the example of a waiter. Imagine you are sitting at a restaurant and you observe your waiter as he brings you your food. He seems to be in a very foul mood, and you ask him what is wrong. The waiter replies, “I am so tired of this. I am not a waiter, I’m a free being and I can decide on a new job whenever I feel like it.” Sartre considers the waiter to be in bad faith because the waiter is being dishonest with himself about his essence and attributing his nothingness (the fact that he can choose any job he so desires) to his being. This waiter’s en-soi or essence in the world is that he is in fact a waiter. In relation to the world, he is a waiter although he is denying it and claiming to be only transcendence and nothingness.
Imagine this situation from the opposite perspective. Again, you ask the waiter what is wrong, but this time he replies, “I am just a waiter. I can never do anything else because this is what defines me.” This would also be an example of bad faith according to Sartre because the waiter is attributing his facticity to his transcendence; being a waiter is “not a fixed quality that determines his behavior” although he claims it to be (Oaklander 228). Because transcendence can will and decide things, nobody is just a waiter and cannot escape responsibility because of a fact about his being. The waiter, in this case, is denying the fact that he is able to make decisions that will make him a different essence than he is today.
How then, according to Sartre, is one able to be authentic? From what I gather from his characterization of bad faith, I assume to be in good faith would be to acknowledge both poles of consciousness without completely claiming to be being or nothingness. For example, perhaps the waiter would be in good faith if he replied, “I am tired of being a waiter (my essence). Maybe it’s time for me to broaden my horizons and choose (transcendence) a new job that will change that essence.” In this case, the waiter would arguably be in good faith because of his honesty with regard to his essence and his nothingness.
One of the main problems with Sartre’s argument on authenticity and bad faith comes when questioning the very nature of authenticity. Recall that Sartre’s characterization splits consciousness into two parts: facticity (what we are in the world and what people think of us) and transcendence (the ability choose and originate). Imagine a friend commented to an individual, “You are inauthentic.” Logically, the friend would be commenting only on the individual’s facticity because Sartre claims this is all others can know; it is impossible to know another’s transcendence. If the individual were to accept his friend’s comment as truth, he would arguably be in bad faith because he would be accepting inauthenticity as a fact that defines him. The individual would be denying that he could in fact, even in his next action, be authentic, but would refuse to do so because he believes this definition of himself.
Also, from a different angle, imagine a friend told the individual, “You are authentic.” In this case, belief in this statement would also be in bad faith. Despite the positive connotation of the statement, the individual would still be in bad faith because he would be denying that in the next moment he could choose an action that would make him inauthentic.
Although Sartre poses a much stronger argument about authenticity than Kierkegaard’s Three Movements of Faith, I still find there is something missing with regard to honesty. If any kind of information is to be existentially relevant, then it should change the way a person lives. In Sartre’s case, I feel as though being honest with oneself about both facticity and transcendence simultaneously would not necessarily change the way a person lives for the better. There may even be a chance that this type of honesty would lead to stagnation. Recall my example of a waiter in good faith: “I am tired of being a waiter. Maybe it’s time for me to broaden my horizons and choose a new job that will change that essence.” Ten years pass, and he is still a waiter in the same restaurant. This waiter, then, would be in good faith even though he did not necessarily take action with respect to his transcendence. Thus, being in good faith does not make one authentic because it does not necessarily lead one to change his course of action and take advantage of his transcendence.
Part III: Heidegger on Authentic and Inauthentic Dasein
In contrast to Kierkegaard and Sartre, I feel that Martin Heidegger has the most convincing argument on the path to authenticity. Despite criticisms of being a nihilist and having a negative viewpoint, I agree with Heidegger when he says that one can only be authentic when he or she comes to terms with death, and it is only then that one can live authentically and make choices based upon the inevitability that one day he or she will no longer exist.
The term “Dasein” is Heidegger’s term for what Kierkegaard, Sartre, and other existential philosophers call “consciousness” or “human being.” It is made up of its essence and past decisions, but is also able to originate.
In contrast, Heidegger claims that “The One” or “das man” is an “inauthentic mode of existence in which w forget that we are existing individuals and become lost in the ‘one like many’” (Oaklander 161). For example, similar to Kierkegaard, Heidegger believed that being characterized by kind or general terms was to be inauthentic; it denied that there is something individual about each and every Dasein. In addition to being similar to Kierkegaard, Heidegger also seems to comment on the notion of Sartre’s account of bad faith. For Heidegger, fallenness is characterizing oneself in terms of the roles he or she plays, and he believes this to be a prime example of inauthenticity.
Heidegger claimed that the way one faces death determines his authenticity or lack thereof. Unlike the usual negative characterization of death, Heidegger says that “death individualizes or isolates us from all other individuals” (Oaklander 154). Death is what completes Dasein and what makes the individual unique in the world - a very important fact to the study of Existentialism. In addition, the importance of death is for the individual to realize that there is an inevitable time when he or she will no longer be able to choose a possible future; death’s significance comes from the halt of our ability to be choosing and free-minded Dasein.
Death can be approached in one of two ways. The first approach is what Heidegger calls “Inauthentic Dasein.” This individual believes death to be “distinct, abstract, and universal”; in other words, “it happens to everyone and has nothing to do with me personally” (Richards 2/22 Lecture). This is a problem for Heidegger because it is a refusal to believe that death plays an important role for each and every individual. The Inauthentic Dasein will flee from death and attempt to avoid it. This denial leads to “tranquillization” in which we tell others and also convince ourselves that we will escape death. The acceptance of this tranquillization is detrimental to Dasein because it keeps an individual from effectively choosing a future while he still has the chance.
On the other hand, we have what Heidegger calls “Authentic Dasein.” This individual is able to face one’s death by realizing that it is unique and not part of das man. This awareness and acceptance of death frees the individual and makes it possible for him to effectively choose his or her future and give rise to a higher level of self-understanding than is possible when one is inauthentic regarding death. The freedom that the acceptance of death brings is utterly crucial because it is only then that the self can create itself, change, and perhaps grow in positive directions (Richards 2/22 Lecture).
In being authentic towards death, one reaches conscience. “In conscience, one is in a state, when facing a decision, in which one recognizes that one is completely alone and on one’s own; nothing other than Dasein is regarded as relevant, no even or anything in Dasein’s past” (Oaklander 158). This should sound familiar because as stated earlier, Kierkgaard believed Abraham to be authentic because he was alone with his decision and thus completely responsible for it.
I believe Heidegger’s characterization of authenticity is the most convincing among the three philosophers I have discussed. While he takes some characteristics of authenticity from both Kierkegaard and Sartre, Heidegger’s characterization has strength where the other two showed weakness. Unlike Kierkegaard, Heidegger has shown that it is possible to be authentic without a personal relationship with God; unlike Sartre, Heidegger has shown that the realization of death will ultimately change how a person chooses and lives (as stated earlier, existentially relevant knowledge should and will change how a person lives). Heidegger, though criticized for his emphasis on death, has truly captured one of the most important realizations one must come to before making important decisions as an authentic being. Death is not only an objective truth, but one that is subjective and can have the most existential relevance than any other event in an individual’s life. In facing one’s death as the inevitable halt of existence, one is truly able to understand his or her own existence authentically.