Those marine drones in the Black Sea
Once more, a Russian Navy ship was attacked in the southern part of the Black Sea in the afternoon of the 11th of June. This article highlights some of the issues arising from the latest attack relating to onboard armament, as well briefly the latest implications of the UN Grain Deal for Russia.
Let's be honest, the use of marine drones in a naval conflict, (USVs or UUVs) is a niche topic, yet there are some general insights that may be of a wider interest. Certainly, it further underlines the apparent chasm between the attitudes and mentality shown by Ukraine, the U.S. and NATO, compared to Russia in general.
The operation of USVs is one small example where the U.S. is deeply implicated in Ukraianian operational activities, along with other NATO members. All too often, Russia is put on the backfoot as a result of a creeping expansion in types of weapons and systems. This is certainly the case with the use of naval drones.
The attack
The Vishnya-class 'Priazovye', (SSV-201) was on station when six uncrewed high-speed drones attempted an attack, this was successfully repelled by the ship's crew, understandably on alert given previous attacks. RIA Article (in Russian) and link to the Russian MoD article.
The ship attacked is another AGI type, in other words, an intelligence gathering ship, carrying out the same mission as the 'Ivan Khurs', see previous article refering to the attack by surface drones, very similar to the drawing on the infographic, albeit with some modifications. [https://natsouth.livejournal.com/38418.html]
Still from video clip Source: Russian Ministry of Defence
Russian intelligence gathering ships are monitoring the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines, came under attack from marine drones, with the help of U.S. intelligence flights, notably the Global Hawks RQ4 that regularly overfly the area, along with other NATO member aircraft. The fact that the Russian Navy is limited to a specific area of the Black Sea, so as to adquately monitor activities around the pipelines, also enables Ukraine and its backers to target the ships more precisely. An USAF RQ-4B Global Hawk surveillance drone was in the central part of the Black Sea at the time of the attack, of course it was in international airspace. It is a given that real-time tracking was passed on by the USAF directly to the Ukrainians. So much for the hackneyed refrain often cited ad nauseum that the U.S. or NATO aren't directly involved in the conflict.
Situation
It is a proxy war, where new technologies are being constantly developed, intelligence gathered ceaselessly to take adavantage of weaknesses and myriad of modifications made after each attack. Adjustments to processes / procedures are also made in order to give Ukraine an attempt to get desperate media attention it so badly wants. As such, upgraded equipment is subsequently sent out to destroy Russian military targets, and the circle continues.
The AGI ships are seen by the U.S. and NATO as weakly defenced ships, more so since they operated alone and some 300km from Crimea. The ships were also seen by NATO, Ukraine as a hindrance, an eyesore. The gas transit is considered by Ukraine as irksome to put mildly, much in the same way the Nord Stream pipelines were. After the spetacular sabotage of Nord Stream 1 and 2, anything goes. Nothing ought to be discounted in the planning and desire to disrupt gas flow in the Black Sea region, by trying to make a dent into the existing arrangements for gas transit between Turkey and Russia. It could also be an attempt to drive away Russian ships closer to the northern shores of the Black Sea.
TurkStream became operational in 2020 and Blue Stream was operational in 2003, are key energy infrastructure between Russia and Turkey. Noticeably, it is the Russian Navy that is keeping a watchful eye in international waters, on the limit of the Turkish exclusive economic zone. Little is known publicly on what the Turks are doing to monitor the pipelines.
Part 1 - The UN Grain Deal on its last legs.
While the 'Ivan Khurs' was slightly further west, on station monitoring the pipelines but also at that time, also monitoring navigation movements under the ‘grain deal.’ The Black Sea Grain Initiative agreements of July 2022 has now overlasted its (one-sided) usefulness, Russia having stated that it won't renew it in July. Hence, the latest sea attack is another nail in the coffin for the Grain Deal. It goes to show you that remarkably Russia had stayed very restrained over the last year, given how previous drone attacks were reported to have been linked to ship movements connected to the Grain Deal.
Russia did not gain anything from the deal other than getting targeted militarily by drones and getting strung along by the NATO states, consistently fed a litany of empty promises, that never materialised. The UN is in charge of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, has made no public comments on the attacks on the Russian Navy. The UN is part of the problem and is siding with the US and NATO. UN staff only offer limp bland statements, along the lines of ...
The Office of the UN Coordinator calls on all parties to work towards the full implementation of the Initiative's provisions. The Office further calls on all parties to work towards predictable, stable operations in line with their commitments to global food security.
15 June press statement UN
Then there is this, predictable soundbite:
The Secretary-General is disappointed by the slowing pace of inspections and the exclusion of the port of Yuzhny/Pivdennyi from the Black Sea Initiative. This has resulted in a reduction in the movement of vessels coming in and out of Ukrainian sea ports, leading to a drop in the supply of essential foodstuffs to global markets.
3...2...1... Russia is denying the Global South essential foodstuffs quip from the UN, which will be widely echoed by Western MSM. The reality is quite different, a lot of the foodstuff isn't going to the Global South, nor can the Global South get shipments of Russian fertilisers, because of the sancions imposed on Russia.
The UN figures speak for themselves, 99.999% of Western journalists will completely ignore it.
Outbound voyages and destinations
China, Spain, Turkey, Italy, The Netherlands... corn shipments mostly, which isn't for human consumption but usually for animal feedstock, with China receiving a sizeable amount. Only modest amounts of wheat has been recently sent to the Global South, very modest figure indeed, a drop compared to the overall total. It is really a token effort on the part of the UN, in cahoots with the West, to give a veneer of interest, when the reality is hugely different.
Part 2 - Naval aspect of the attacks
The Soviet-era modernised naval ship 'Priazovye' was better armed against the drones, in that it had a remotely-controlled radar assisted turret-mounted gun, (part of the AK-176/ AK 630 family), which enabled the ship to engage the six drones much farther out than the modern 'Ivan Khurs' did.
The 'Ivan Khurs' returned to Sevaspotol very soon after the 24th May attack. The attack highlighted a significant issue, the type of close-in weaponry onboard. As noted by a number of naval commentators and ex-officers, it only had a human operated MTPU gun mount with 14.5mm machine gun, to tackle the high-speed drones. This was frankly too close for comfort.
The automated Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) on the other hand, proved effective in this instance. However, it was during daytime, so it was a bonus for the Russian Navy. The likelihood of a night time attack would prove extremely problematic for a ship, given the lack of nighttime surveillance integrated into radar guided point defence systems. Equally needed are systems that can monitor and track submersibles, acoustic positioning system to locate incoming UUVs, not necessarily the full range of Anti-Submarine Warfare, (ASW) but a version specific for high-speed drones.
There is a overall issue over point defence, automated radar guided systems also need thermal imaging sights, along with potentially AI assisted surveillance systems. A modified form of an ATGM system would be also useful, (similarly to the Pantsir combo of missiles and rotary guns).
Naval new builds including auxilary classes of ships require CIWS and Pantsir-M air defense gun/missile systems as a standard point defence armament. This aspect has been long neglected and overlooked for years. The difference between the 'Ivan Khurs' and the 'Priazovye' is a case in point and shows a crucial need to rethink how ships should be able to defence themselves. There shouldn't be a quibble over what is needed, as the Ukrainian conflict is constantly revealing warts and all, in every aspect of warfare, (air, land, sea, ISR etc...).
NB: Having a land-based Pantsir strapped down on the flight-deck or cargo deck is a very poor substitue imho. It really shows how Russian authorities have been caught unprepared for events following February 2022. Yet there are Karakurt class naval ships with Pantsir, in the Baltic Fleet. Follow the logic (not).
At the same time, both attacks show the restricted scope of such marine drones, as well the current limitations of USV in long-distance swarm operations, notably the coordination with real-time intelligence systems and ultimately the small mission area. It does show the progression in technology, but also highlights the reliance of similar high-technological systems (satellite / Global Hawk) to carry out a mission.
There is a greater danger, with eventual modifications, (as already seen in Ukraine), surface drones become semi-submersible drones then there will be a range of fully submersible versions, much harder to spot. The small, surface version will become more widespread, creating a serious threat to any navy. The general concept, likely trends, capabilities of point defence against sea and air drones needs to be revisited into a determined and ruthless manner and promptly.
Aerial versions have dramtically widened and altered the nature of land battles, in ways that up to now, was not adaquately grasped by senior officers or military planners on either side. The same scenarios applies to maritime remotely controlled boats and submersible will similarly create unpleasant situations. The onus at present rests with the U.S., UK and NATO. The type and use of Russian naval drones have yet to take the same dimension and aspects as those operated by Ukraine.
Infographic
