Leibniz
Leibniz's Notion of Pre-Determined Harmony
The problem of free will is a common difficulty emerging whenever a concept of an omniscient God or other being is presented. Leibniz does not escape this problem in his definition of reality and the world in which we live. Leibniz creates the controversy over free will with his claim that all things are pre-determined, and that God has examined all possible outcomes and has chosen the best possible world for us to live in. In this example, God must know what is to come, and cannot be wrong in his knowledge, so therefore the events of the world are pre-determined. This pre-determination removes free will from the agents living in the world created by God, and violates the Christian idea of freedom, and punishment. Leibniz attempts to support his assertion that despite the omniscient God, free will remains. Leibniz uses several arguments to support his claims, but all fall short of refuting the claim that Arnauld makes; that according to Leibniz's world view, free will does not exist.
Leibniz begins his world view with the idea that God is a being who is omniscient, and infallible. God created all things, and therefore has a complete knowledge of all these things. The perfect world which Leibniz refers to is a result of God's determination of how the world must be in order to produce the best results. This notion of the perfect world is tainted by the language used; specifically the word perfect. Leibniz is not asserting that the world God created is one in which there is no evil, or pain, rather that God is an ultimatly good being, and therefore has created the best possible world for the agents to live in. This means that God has examined all the possible actions and events, and has determined the best possible sequence, and then created that sequence. In order to develop this world, God must have created the entirety of the world, and the entirety of time at one specific moment in time. The temporal specifics are relevant only in the way that when God created this world, all things came into being. This is the assertion that every agent, and substance has existed since the inception of this world, since God had a concept of that agent or substance. This is the first breach of free will, that the substance has always existed negates the possibility of the being not coming into existence. Take for instance the birth of a child; the parents were destined to meet and have that child as determined by God. All the circumstances that lead up to the meeting and birth of the child were determined and there is no way that the child could not be born.
Leibniz also attempts to refute the argument that free will does not exist in his system due to the inability to perform 'unpredictable acts'. Unpredictability is a basic tenet of free will, that an agent may change the course of his future by performing some action which is unknown to any agent, including God. It seems to be that if God knows what an agent will do, then the agent has no real choice in the matter, since he will inevitably choose to act according to the plan which God has set. The illusion of free will is present, since the agent beleives he must make a choice between many actions, but the action he ultimately takes has been pre-determined, and is therefore not free. leibniz refutes this claim by using a cause and effect analysis of actions. The cause and effect analysis claims that the agent is himself the cause of the event. This, according to Leibniz, is the fundamental definition of free will. Every action has a cause, and the cause of the action is the agent, not some third party intervening. This refutation of the intervention of God is a major refutation given by Leibniz. Leibniz seems to believe that free will is maintained as long as God is not directly involved in every action which an agent performs. Since the agent is not influenced by God directly, the agent is seen to be performing the action of his own free will. The cause and effect argument does not manage to maintain integrity in Leibniz's refutation, since it can be easily reversed to refute Leibniz's refutation. Although God is not directly causing the agent to act in a certain manner, he has set the causes before the action and the causes before that action as well. This is the idea that Leibniz presents of the agent existing since the inception of this world, the initial cause is set by God, and all the resulting effects produce more causes, therefore God has influenced all the causes and effects, rendering free will impossible.
Knowledge of the future is another violation of free will. In order to know what it to come in the future, the events leading up to that time must be pre-determined, especially in the case of an omniscient being such as God, who cannot be wrong. That God cannot be wrong, and according to Leibniz, is aware of future events, is a breach of free will. Leibniz attempts to refute this claim by illustrating the inability of human minds to comprehend the concepts of the full explanation of a 'predicate'. Leibniz uses the example of the notion of the square root of two, a number undefinable in any finite number. This is then used to describe the finite nature of human minds, and the inability of the finite to comprehend the infinite. Though this is unsatisfactory to most, it is irrelivent whether the human mind is capable of perceiving these infinite truths, this may not conflict with the idea of free will. Leibniz is once again drawn away from the claim by Arnauld that it is God who is violating the concept of free will. Leibniz has only propagated Arnauld's argument with his refutation. Since God is an infinite being, he is capable of understanding these infinite principles, and therefore is capable of understanding the entirety of a 'predicate'. In fact, God must be capable of understanding this, since he did this when creating the perfect world.
Leibniz's greatest refutation comes in the form of the argument for non-action. If free will is not possible, then why should an agent take any action whatsoever? The future is determined, so non-action should produce the very same results. In fact, perhaps this life of non-action was only pre-determined and set by God. Leibniz does not like this argument, and claims that the will of the agent is paramount in determining the life the agent will live, and the happiness the agent will enjoy. Leibniz asserts that the agent is responsible for his own life, and a life of non-action is immoral, and will result in an unhappy life. The argument of non-action is the turning point of the free will argument, if the agent is pre-determined to a life of non-action, then free will does not exist, and the agent was right to deny free will, but the cost to society and individual is much too great. For this reason, the idea that Leibniz seems to postulate, though he does not claim it in his own words, is one of a false sense of free will. Though God is fully aware of all the events of the future, and has pre-determined the life of every agent, in order for the agent to live a happy and moral life, there must be a false sense of free will. This way, society will be maintained and the individual agents will also live well. This is not a primary concern for Leibniz, but it is ultimatly the coclusion which his world view comes to. There is no free will, but the illusion of free will is important to maintain a world which is bearable to exist in.
The problem of free will is a common difficulty emerging whenever a concept of an omniscient God or other being is presented. Leibniz does not escape this problem in his definition of reality and the world in which we live. Leibniz creates the controversy over free will with his claim that all things are pre-determined, and that God has examined all possible outcomes and has chosen the best possible world for us to live in. In this example, God must know what is to come, and cannot be wrong in his knowledge, so therefore the events of the world are pre-determined. This pre-determination removes free will from the agents living in the world created by God, and violates the Christian idea of freedom, and punishment. Leibniz attempts to support his assertion that despite the omniscient God, free will remains. Leibniz uses several arguments to support his claims, but all fall short of refuting the claim that Arnauld makes; that according to Leibniz's world view, free will does not exist.
Leibniz begins his world view with the idea that God is a being who is omniscient, and infallible. God created all things, and therefore has a complete knowledge of all these things. The perfect world which Leibniz refers to is a result of God's determination of how the world must be in order to produce the best results. This notion of the perfect world is tainted by the language used; specifically the word perfect. Leibniz is not asserting that the world God created is one in which there is no evil, or pain, rather that God is an ultimatly good being, and therefore has created the best possible world for the agents to live in. This means that God has examined all the possible actions and events, and has determined the best possible sequence, and then created that sequence. In order to develop this world, God must have created the entirety of the world, and the entirety of time at one specific moment in time. The temporal specifics are relevant only in the way that when God created this world, all things came into being. This is the assertion that every agent, and substance has existed since the inception of this world, since God had a concept of that agent or substance. This is the first breach of free will, that the substance has always existed negates the possibility of the being not coming into existence. Take for instance the birth of a child; the parents were destined to meet and have that child as determined by God. All the circumstances that lead up to the meeting and birth of the child were determined and there is no way that the child could not be born.
Leibniz also attempts to refute the argument that free will does not exist in his system due to the inability to perform 'unpredictable acts'. Unpredictability is a basic tenet of free will, that an agent may change the course of his future by performing some action which is unknown to any agent, including God. It seems to be that if God knows what an agent will do, then the agent has no real choice in the matter, since he will inevitably choose to act according to the plan which God has set. The illusion of free will is present, since the agent beleives he must make a choice between many actions, but the action he ultimately takes has been pre-determined, and is therefore not free. leibniz refutes this claim by using a cause and effect analysis of actions. The cause and effect analysis claims that the agent is himself the cause of the event. This, according to Leibniz, is the fundamental definition of free will. Every action has a cause, and the cause of the action is the agent, not some third party intervening. This refutation of the intervention of God is a major refutation given by Leibniz. Leibniz seems to believe that free will is maintained as long as God is not directly involved in every action which an agent performs. Since the agent is not influenced by God directly, the agent is seen to be performing the action of his own free will. The cause and effect argument does not manage to maintain integrity in Leibniz's refutation, since it can be easily reversed to refute Leibniz's refutation. Although God is not directly causing the agent to act in a certain manner, he has set the causes before the action and the causes before that action as well. This is the idea that Leibniz presents of the agent existing since the inception of this world, the initial cause is set by God, and all the resulting effects produce more causes, therefore God has influenced all the causes and effects, rendering free will impossible.
Knowledge of the future is another violation of free will. In order to know what it to come in the future, the events leading up to that time must be pre-determined, especially in the case of an omniscient being such as God, who cannot be wrong. That God cannot be wrong, and according to Leibniz, is aware of future events, is a breach of free will. Leibniz attempts to refute this claim by illustrating the inability of human minds to comprehend the concepts of the full explanation of a 'predicate'. Leibniz uses the example of the notion of the square root of two, a number undefinable in any finite number. This is then used to describe the finite nature of human minds, and the inability of the finite to comprehend the infinite. Though this is unsatisfactory to most, it is irrelivent whether the human mind is capable of perceiving these infinite truths, this may not conflict with the idea of free will. Leibniz is once again drawn away from the claim by Arnauld that it is God who is violating the concept of free will. Leibniz has only propagated Arnauld's argument with his refutation. Since God is an infinite being, he is capable of understanding these infinite principles, and therefore is capable of understanding the entirety of a 'predicate'. In fact, God must be capable of understanding this, since he did this when creating the perfect world.
Leibniz's greatest refutation comes in the form of the argument for non-action. If free will is not possible, then why should an agent take any action whatsoever? The future is determined, so non-action should produce the very same results. In fact, perhaps this life of non-action was only pre-determined and set by God. Leibniz does not like this argument, and claims that the will of the agent is paramount in determining the life the agent will live, and the happiness the agent will enjoy. Leibniz asserts that the agent is responsible for his own life, and a life of non-action is immoral, and will result in an unhappy life. The argument of non-action is the turning point of the free will argument, if the agent is pre-determined to a life of non-action, then free will does not exist, and the agent was right to deny free will, but the cost to society and individual is much too great. For this reason, the idea that Leibniz seems to postulate, though he does not claim it in his own words, is one of a false sense of free will. Though God is fully aware of all the events of the future, and has pre-determined the life of every agent, in order for the agent to live a happy and moral life, there must be a false sense of free will. This way, society will be maintained and the individual agents will also live well. This is not a primary concern for Leibniz, but it is ultimatly the coclusion which his world view comes to. There is no free will, but the illusion of free will is important to maintain a world which is bearable to exist in.