For you philosophers/theologians out there, need feedback
This is a trial run at my argument against Richard Dawkins' argument for why God is highly, highly unlikely to exist. It may be edited a bit tomorrow (as I'm sleepy now), but here's the gist of it. If you have any Kantian background it would surely help as well.
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Here I discuss Dawkins' "Ultimate 747" argument against God's existence (Ch. 4). While his earlier discussion of the anthropic principle is very persuasive, I'm having severe problems with understanding how this 'ultimate' argument demonstrates anything. The argument (roughly) goes like this:
Theists invoke God the Fine Tuner to explain why the 6 fundamental constants (in particle physics/gravitation, etc.) are the way they are since the probability of them being different - or rather, the probability of having a universe much like that we know today with them different - is so vanishingly small that it couldn't have happened by chance. However (direct quotes here) ... "the theist's answer is deeply unsatisfying because it leaves the existence of God unexplained. A God capable of calculating the Goldilocks values (the just right ones) for the six numbers would have to be at least as improbable as the finely tuned combination of numbers itself, ad that's very improbable indeed..." Furthermore, multiverse theories or 'cosmological Darwinism (Lee Smolin) may be able to explain the supposed 'fine tuning' of these fundamental constants. So the theist explains nothing. However, it's worse than this. Because God is so complex and statistically improbable (and because we have alternate explanations??), it is highly unlikely that God exists."
Here are the problems. As Points 2 and 3 get to the real problem with the argument (Point 1 takes the argument on its own terms), if you feel unpersuaded by the first point then skip to the next two.
1. We have a means by which to assign probability to the universe being the way it is if we tinker with the fundamental constants or some other cosmological parameter. Here's one not covered in the book. If the curvature of space-time at Planck time (10^-43 s) departed from being perfectly flat (omega_o=1) by more than one part in 10^59 then the universe either would have collapsed within fractions of a second into a Big Crunch or would have expanded so fast that large-scale structure (and thus eventually galaxies) could not have formed. Given this extreme condition (and the likely fact that an *integer*, of all things, appears to be the 'right' answer) theists may say that the universe was designed. Of course Inflationary Big Bang cosmology explains this with no need for a designer. Anyway, we have a robust way of calculating the probability of forming a universe like ours from this one simple parameter. The problem with Dawkins' analogy is that, granting that there could be a need for a 'Designer', I have no idea how you 'assign' a probability for God, specifically how you could assign probability for the 'existence' of an entity rather than a mathematically quantifiable parameter like the mass-energy density of the universe. Suspend our reasoning for a second and assume the universe requires a 'skyhook' here. The only analogy I can think of for the causal relationship between the Designer and the universe is the human designer of an invention (say, with 6 knobs like the universe) and the invention. The invention produces some result x (analogous to the 'universe as we know it'). That combination of 6 knob settings is highly improbable (say, 10^-59). If you're going to invoke a 'designer' to explain this, how can you say anything about such a designer's probability? The designer is a skyhook, albeit one with intent, not a random setting of a meta-knob or something like that. If it were just another metaknob I could understand Dawkins' argument. But the Designer is the complete opposite of that, so I don't understand how you can assign probability to a designer, let alone say that it's probability is < than that of the designed.
2. Assuming that the first objection is poorly motivated, there's an additional problem. I, of course, think the 'Fine Tuning' argument is silly. The anthropic principle is perfectly sufficient. The universe is the way it is because if it weren't the way it is then we wouldn't be here to argue about it. I find the argument answered analogously to going to the parking lot, finding the license # of the first car and not concluding that because the probability of that combination is so low then the car with that # must have been put in front of me on purpose. So the need to demonstrate God's existence by the universe's supposed fine tuning is a desire dead to me.
However, Dawkins' entitles the chapter "Why There Almost Certainly is No God" and proceeds on with the next section as if he's demonstrated that God almost certainly doesn't exist, not that 'I've almost certainly shown why the Fine Tuning argument doesn't work'. The entire argument about God's probability of existing was invoked in the first place to counter the theist argument, not as a standalone argument. But what if I reject the reason for needing the counterargument in the first place? One would think that any assignment of God's probability of existing from the section on Fine Tuning, however well/poorly motivated, would be a moot point if is never brought up/irrelevant. To put it another way, if the entire point about Fine Tuning one of the constants is irrelevant (since there's a naturalistic explanation or the entire question is misguided), why still tether the fine tuning probability to God as being the probability of God's existence? And by the way, which 'unlikely probability' should it be? The combination of 6 constants is one choice, but I've given another with the mass-energy density of the universe at Planck time. For many natural phenomena (e.g. the existence of the Earth, of the eye, of DNA, etc.) explained by naturalistic processes you can conceivably assign a probability for its appearance being 'chance'. So which is it: the probability of DNA being the way it is? the 6 constants? Taken to its extreme, this ends up reducing to 'complicated outcome A is explained naturalistically, therefore God's existence is unlikely'. This is a very strange, 'Anselmian' position to be in. Nevertheless, Dawkins seems to smuggle this argument out of its context and decides that it stands alone as an argument against God's existence (much like others do with the problem of evil which, amazingly, Dawkins thinks isn't an issue).
This tactic is furthermore confusing since Ch. 2 has one page devoted to the probabilities that people assign for God's existence (1-7, 1 being 'i know for sure' (affirmative), 7 (negative)) and states that "...there is ... no reason to suppose that, just because God can be neither proved or disproved, his probability of existence is 50%. On the contrary, as we shall see". We shall see? But when have we actually established the probability of God's existence? All Dawkins does between then and the end of the chapter where he declares that God is highly unlikely to exist is the following: refute the Ontological argument, the cosmological argument, the design argument, and the argument from experience, etc. The only place where probability is mentioned at all is in the counterargument to the Fine Tuning argument, and the choice of assigning God's existence this probability (this number is never actually listed, by the way) is extremely arbirtrary.
I could understand if he invoked problems about the intelligibility of omnipotence or omniscience and, by some calculus, assigned a probability to God from each issue. But he doesn't even feign an attempt at this.
3. There's a final problem. Namely, that Dawkins says (no less than about a dozen times or so) that the God hypothesis is a scientific hypothesis. Scientific hypotheses, though, deal with statements about the regularities of objects, regularities that can be tested, and experiments concerning these regularities are repeatable. All objects of scientific concern are objects of perception. Our knowledge about them is conditioned by the means by which we can acquire knowledge: we observe them, necessarily, in time and space. Any causal relationships we confer on them are not *in* the object but result from how we perceive them. There are empirical objects but we know of them only by sensory experience. All sensory *information* is manufactured, by created by that process in the brain upon receiving it. However, we can never cut out the middle man in this process and just experience what yields this information *as it is*, that is to say as noumena.
God, though, is not like all the examples of phenomena, whereby we can make statements about the probability of this or that existing or this or that being a likely causal explanation. God is being outside the universe, is not a conditioned object like a proton and is not perceived in the way that protons are perceived: that is to say, not perceived at all. Is there way in which we could possibly have knowledge of God? Perhaps. We can have knowledge of 'some' things without recourse to synthetic analytical propositions (e.g. definition of a triangle) or empirical propositions, both of which would be about conditioned objects. Rules of logic, such as commutative and identity properties are candidates. But even if we couldn't come up with examples it only demonstrates that we are limited to conditioned realities in our knowledge pool. Whether or not there's something more beyond this is not a question we can answer. Since God is something which is unconditioned and not an object of perception, how could God's existence possibility be a scientific hypothesis?
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Here I discuss Dawkins' "Ultimate 747" argument against God's existence (Ch. 4). While his earlier discussion of the anthropic principle is very persuasive, I'm having severe problems with understanding how this 'ultimate' argument demonstrates anything. The argument (roughly) goes like this:
Theists invoke God the Fine Tuner to explain why the 6 fundamental constants (in particle physics/gravitation, etc.) are the way they are since the probability of them being different - or rather, the probability of having a universe much like that we know today with them different - is so vanishingly small that it couldn't have happened by chance. However (direct quotes here) ... "the theist's answer is deeply unsatisfying because it leaves the existence of God unexplained. A God capable of calculating the Goldilocks values (the just right ones) for the six numbers would have to be at least as improbable as the finely tuned combination of numbers itself, ad that's very improbable indeed..." Furthermore, multiverse theories or 'cosmological Darwinism (Lee Smolin) may be able to explain the supposed 'fine tuning' of these fundamental constants. So the theist explains nothing. However, it's worse than this. Because God is so complex and statistically improbable (and because we have alternate explanations??), it is highly unlikely that God exists."
Here are the problems. As Points 2 and 3 get to the real problem with the argument (Point 1 takes the argument on its own terms), if you feel unpersuaded by the first point then skip to the next two.
1. We have a means by which to assign probability to the universe being the way it is if we tinker with the fundamental constants or some other cosmological parameter. Here's one not covered in the book. If the curvature of space-time at Planck time (10^-43 s) departed from being perfectly flat (omega_o=1) by more than one part in 10^59 then the universe either would have collapsed within fractions of a second into a Big Crunch or would have expanded so fast that large-scale structure (and thus eventually galaxies) could not have formed. Given this extreme condition (and the likely fact that an *integer*, of all things, appears to be the 'right' answer) theists may say that the universe was designed. Of course Inflationary Big Bang cosmology explains this with no need for a designer. Anyway, we have a robust way of calculating the probability of forming a universe like ours from this one simple parameter. The problem with Dawkins' analogy is that, granting that there could be a need for a 'Designer', I have no idea how you 'assign' a probability for God, specifically how you could assign probability for the 'existence' of an entity rather than a mathematically quantifiable parameter like the mass-energy density of the universe. Suspend our reasoning for a second and assume the universe requires a 'skyhook' here. The only analogy I can think of for the causal relationship between the Designer and the universe is the human designer of an invention (say, with 6 knobs like the universe) and the invention. The invention produces some result x (analogous to the 'universe as we know it'). That combination of 6 knob settings is highly improbable (say, 10^-59). If you're going to invoke a 'designer' to explain this, how can you say anything about such a designer's probability? The designer is a skyhook, albeit one with intent, not a random setting of a meta-knob or something like that. If it were just another metaknob I could understand Dawkins' argument. But the Designer is the complete opposite of that, so I don't understand how you can assign probability to a designer, let alone say that it's probability is < than that of the designed.
2. Assuming that the first objection is poorly motivated, there's an additional problem. I, of course, think the 'Fine Tuning' argument is silly. The anthropic principle is perfectly sufficient. The universe is the way it is because if it weren't the way it is then we wouldn't be here to argue about it. I find the argument answered analogously to going to the parking lot, finding the license # of the first car and not concluding that because the probability of that combination is so low then the car with that # must have been put in front of me on purpose. So the need to demonstrate God's existence by the universe's supposed fine tuning is a desire dead to me.
However, Dawkins' entitles the chapter "Why There Almost Certainly is No God" and proceeds on with the next section as if he's demonstrated that God almost certainly doesn't exist, not that 'I've almost certainly shown why the Fine Tuning argument doesn't work'. The entire argument about God's probability of existing was invoked in the first place to counter the theist argument, not as a standalone argument. But what if I reject the reason for needing the counterargument in the first place? One would think that any assignment of God's probability of existing from the section on Fine Tuning, however well/poorly motivated, would be a moot point if is never brought up/irrelevant. To put it another way, if the entire point about Fine Tuning one of the constants is irrelevant (since there's a naturalistic explanation or the entire question is misguided), why still tether the fine tuning probability to God as being the probability of God's existence? And by the way, which 'unlikely probability' should it be? The combination of 6 constants is one choice, but I've given another with the mass-energy density of the universe at Planck time. For many natural phenomena (e.g. the existence of the Earth, of the eye, of DNA, etc.) explained by naturalistic processes you can conceivably assign a probability for its appearance being 'chance'. So which is it: the probability of DNA being the way it is? the 6 constants? Taken to its extreme, this ends up reducing to 'complicated outcome A is explained naturalistically, therefore God's existence is unlikely'. This is a very strange, 'Anselmian' position to be in. Nevertheless, Dawkins seems to smuggle this argument out of its context and decides that it stands alone as an argument against God's existence (much like others do with the problem of evil which, amazingly, Dawkins thinks isn't an issue).
This tactic is furthermore confusing since Ch. 2 has one page devoted to the probabilities that people assign for God's existence (1-7, 1 being 'i know for sure' (affirmative), 7 (negative)) and states that "...there is ... no reason to suppose that, just because God can be neither proved or disproved, his probability of existence is 50%. On the contrary, as we shall see". We shall see? But when have we actually established the probability of God's existence? All Dawkins does between then and the end of the chapter where he declares that God is highly unlikely to exist is the following: refute the Ontological argument, the cosmological argument, the design argument, and the argument from experience, etc. The only place where probability is mentioned at all is in the counterargument to the Fine Tuning argument, and the choice of assigning God's existence this probability (this number is never actually listed, by the way) is extremely arbirtrary.
I could understand if he invoked problems about the intelligibility of omnipotence or omniscience and, by some calculus, assigned a probability to God from each issue. But he doesn't even feign an attempt at this.
3. There's a final problem. Namely, that Dawkins says (no less than about a dozen times or so) that the God hypothesis is a scientific hypothesis. Scientific hypotheses, though, deal with statements about the regularities of objects, regularities that can be tested, and experiments concerning these regularities are repeatable. All objects of scientific concern are objects of perception. Our knowledge about them is conditioned by the means by which we can acquire knowledge: we observe them, necessarily, in time and space. Any causal relationships we confer on them are not *in* the object but result from how we perceive them. There are empirical objects but we know of them only by sensory experience. All sensory *information* is manufactured, by created by that process in the brain upon receiving it. However, we can never cut out the middle man in this process and just experience what yields this information *as it is*, that is to say as noumena.
God, though, is not like all the examples of phenomena, whereby we can make statements about the probability of this or that existing or this or that being a likely causal explanation. God is being outside the universe, is not a conditioned object like a proton and is not perceived in the way that protons are perceived: that is to say, not perceived at all. Is there way in which we could possibly have knowledge of God? Perhaps. We can have knowledge of 'some' things without recourse to synthetic analytical propositions (e.g. definition of a triangle) or empirical propositions, both of which would be about conditioned objects. Rules of logic, such as commutative and identity properties are candidates. But even if we couldn't come up with examples it only demonstrates that we are limited to conditioned realities in our knowledge pool. Whether or not there's something more beyond this is not a question we can answer. Since God is something which is unconditioned and not an object of perception, how could God's existence possibility be a scientific hypothesis?