The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God
I find, lately, that when it is late at night and I want to procrastinate from working on my thesis, I sometimes spend time pointlessly reading about philosophy. I came across this particular argument recently and found it pretty funny and worth posting about in a frivolous waste of time.
Major Premise: God, by his concept, is the most perfect being.
Minor Premise: Existence belongs to the concept of the most perfect being.
Conclusion: God exists.
There are two ways you can interpret how this argument is supposed to flow, and I think both of them lead to its discredit:
1) The minor premise is a stilted way of saying "you can't be the most perfect being without also existing - existing is part of being the most perfect being." One obvious counter-argument follows:
Major Premise: Clifford, by his very concept, is a big red dog.
Minor Premise: Existence belongs to the concept of being big, red, and a dog.
Conclusion: Clifford the big red dog exists.
As much as I would like this state of affairs to represent reality, it does not, except in the sense that fictional characters can be said to "exist" - which is to say, unsatisfyingly.
2) The minor premise turns on the word "perfect." "Perfect," in this concept, means fully actualized, which is to say that all possibilities have been achieved. A "perfect being" is a being (a thing that is, or a thing that exists) for which all possibilities are actualized. The "Clifford the big red dog" counter-argument is wrong because the minor premise doesn't just require that you can't be the thing in the major premise without existing - it also requires that the concept be inextricably tied to existence. So while it might make sense to talk about something that we imagine but which does not exist as being very red, it doesn't make sense to talk about something we imagine but which does not exist as being very perfect, or wholly perfect - existent. But then a restatement of the argument, using this definition of "perfect being" makes the whole thing fall apart.
Major Premise: God, by his very concept, is everything that could possibly exist.
Minor Premise: Existence belongs to the concept of everything that could possibly exist.
I would restate this as "Everything that could possibly exist necessarily exists," which is much less intrinsically obvious, but hey, let's keep going and see what we get.
Conclusion: God exists.
Restatement of conclusion: Everything that exists exists.
Oops.
A neat verbal sleight of hand, I suppose, but not really much more than that.
Major Premise: God, by his concept, is the most perfect being.
Minor Premise: Existence belongs to the concept of the most perfect being.
Conclusion: God exists.
There are two ways you can interpret how this argument is supposed to flow, and I think both of them lead to its discredit:
1) The minor premise is a stilted way of saying "you can't be the most perfect being without also existing - existing is part of being the most perfect being." One obvious counter-argument follows:
Major Premise: Clifford, by his very concept, is a big red dog.
Minor Premise: Existence belongs to the concept of being big, red, and a dog.
Conclusion: Clifford the big red dog exists.
As much as I would like this state of affairs to represent reality, it does not, except in the sense that fictional characters can be said to "exist" - which is to say, unsatisfyingly.
2) The minor premise turns on the word "perfect." "Perfect," in this concept, means fully actualized, which is to say that all possibilities have been achieved. A "perfect being" is a being (a thing that is, or a thing that exists) for which all possibilities are actualized. The "Clifford the big red dog" counter-argument is wrong because the minor premise doesn't just require that you can't be the thing in the major premise without existing - it also requires that the concept be inextricably tied to existence. So while it might make sense to talk about something that we imagine but which does not exist as being very red, it doesn't make sense to talk about something we imagine but which does not exist as being very perfect, or wholly perfect - existent. But then a restatement of the argument, using this definition of "perfect being" makes the whole thing fall apart.
Major Premise: God, by his very concept, is everything that could possibly exist.
Minor Premise: Existence belongs to the concept of everything that could possibly exist.
I would restate this as "Everything that could possibly exist necessarily exists," which is much less intrinsically obvious, but hey, let's keep going and see what we get.
Conclusion: God exists.
Restatement of conclusion: Everything that exists exists.
Oops.
A neat verbal sleight of hand, I suppose, but not really much more than that.