(Untitled)

[masendik]

Кризис.

Честно говоря, пока не достал окончательно в плане материальном, но добивает морально. Радио можно слушать только на музыкальной волне, телевизор стращает в новостях, в аналитических и политических программах на столько, что, вспоминая старый совковый анекдот-утюг просто страшно включать. Свой бизнес очень маленький, просто малюсенький и

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part 2

[anonymous]

Unfortunately, this problem was not as straightforward as it appears. Had it remained a matter between the lenders (who disbursed risky loans) and unreliable borrowers (who took loans and then got defaulted) then probably it would remain a local problem of America. However, this was not the case. Let us understand what complicated the problem.
For original lenders these subprime loans were very lucrative part of their investment portfolio as they were expected to yield a very high return in view of the increasing home prices. Since, the interest rate charged on subprime loans was about 2% higher than the interest on prime loans (owing to their risky nature); lenders were confidant that they would get a handsome return on their investment. In case a sub-prime borrower continued to pay his loans installment, the lender would get higher interest on the loans. And in case a sub-prime borrower could not pay his loan and defaulted, the lender would have the option to sell his home (on a high market price) and recovered his loan amount. In both the situations the Sub-prime loans were excellent investment options as long as the housing market was booming. Just at this point, the things started complicating.
With stock markets booming and the system flush with liquidity, many big fund investors like hedge funds and mutual funds saw subprime loan portfolios as attractive investment opportunities. Hence, they bought such portfolios from the original lenders. This in turn meant the lenders had fresh funds to lend. The subprime loan market thus became a fast growing segment. Major (American and European) investment banks and institutions heavily bought these loans (known as Mortgage Backed Securities, MBS) to diversify their investment portfolios. Most of these loans were brought as parts of CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations). CDOs are just like mutual funds with two significant differences. First unlike mutual funds, in CDOs all investors do not assume the risk equally and each participatory group has different risk profiles. Secondly, in contrast to mutual funds which normally buy shares and bonds, CDOs usually buy securities that are backed by loans (just like the MBS of subprime loans.)
Owing to heavy buying of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) of subprime loans by major American and European Banks, the problem, which was to remain within the confines of US propagated into the word’s financial markets. Ideally, the MBS were a very attractive option as long as home prices were soaring in US. However, when the home prices started declining, the attractive investments in Subprime loans become risky and unprofitable.
As the home prices started declining in the US, sub-prime borrowers found themselves in a messy situation. Their house prices were decreasing and the loan interest on these houses was soaring. As they could not manage a second mortgage on their home, it became very difficult for them to pay the higher interest rate. As a result many of them opted to default on their home loans and vacated the house. However, as the home prices were falling rapidly, the lending companies, which were hoping to sell them and recover the loan amount, found them in a situation where loan amount exceeded the total cost of the house. Eventually, there remained no option but to write off losses on these loans.
The problem got worsened as the Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), which by that time had become parts of CDOs of giant investments banks of US & Europe, lost their value. Falling prices of CDOs dented banks’ investment portfolios and these losses destroyed banks’ capital. The complexity of these instruments and their wide spread to major International banks created a situation where no one was too sure either about how big these losses were or which banks had been hit the hardest.