man, what the fuck
Dear Erin,
I'm wonjun. I tried to answer the orginal quesitons and suggested a couple of questions related. And I attached it. I hope this will be helpful to the summary of the text.
I really appreciate your time and enthusiasm devoted to our presentation. I feel like I'm a free rider.
See you then,,
Best,
wonjun yoon
**attachment**
Study Questions:
Beyond Smoke and Mirrors
1. Given our readings in class to date, how comprehensive is the discussion of migration theory in the book? Are there any glaring errors? Is the discussion selective in any way? If so, how?
2. In concluding their discussion of how the U.S.-Mexico system was assembled, the authors argue: “migration between Mexico and the United States has never been a result of simple cost-benefit decisions taken by individuals, nor have migrants been motivated soley by a desire to relocate permanently North of the border to maximize time earning.”
3. How does their overall critique of the system challenge or limit more conventional economic analyses? In your opinion, is their critique effective?
: Except for Neo-classical economic theories (e.g., the authors mainly oppose those theories), every theoretical approaches to international migration such as new economics of labor migration, globalization theories, segregated labor market theories, and even world system theories were covered and relied on by the authors for explaining migration between Mexico and the United States. The question might arises about whether neo-classical economic theories’ emphasis on individual income maximization (or investment in human capital) necessarily lead to the logical conclusion that Mexican migrant workers will inevitably transform into permanent settlers. Can’t circular migration coincide with individual strategic decision? If we broaden individual rational calculus to include other values (family, culture, community other than material costs and benefits, can we render the neo-classical economic theories less conflicting with other approaches?
11. The authors argue that the majority of migrants enter the United States with the intent to stay temporarily, but that permanent settlement becomes more likely over time. When and why does this happen? Is the authors’ suggestion for encouraging return migration (by facilitating remittances and return) a feasible one?
And, permanent settlement is natural outcome of long-lasting migration history or the direct outcome of ineffective immigration policies such as the post-IRCA regime? And is the permanent settlement of different ethnic (or racial) groups bad or detrimental to the national cohesion and political stability of the host societies? Or the presumably negative (?) outcome derived from the permanent settlement is just due to the political mobilization (or manipulation) by aspiring politicians?
4. In concluding their discussion of how the U.S.-Mexico system was assembled, the authors argue: “migration between Mexico and the United States has never been a result of simple cost-benefit decisions taken by individuals, nor have migrants been motivated solely by a desire to relocate permanently North of the border to maximize time earning.”
: Between circular migration and permanent immigration, which do you think is the norm of international migration pattern? Or is there any trend from circular migration to permanent immigration or vice versa? Or that will be just determined by the specific immigration policies adopted by the migrant-receiving states?
5. How does their overall critique of the system challenge or limit more conventional economic analyses? In your opinion, is their critique effective?
6. What are the main ways in which the border crisis between the US and Mexico has been manufactured? What are the major economic, political, and social issues contributing to this manufacture in the United States?
: economic recession, electoral desire to get easily mobilizable conservative (or nativist constituents) votes, and the bureaucratic ambition to expand their size and power resources (especially, INS and the Border Patrol agency) combined to stir up the non-existing border crisis and exaggerate the problematic aspect of it.
7. What are some of the motivations leading to- and implications of- the feminization of undocumented migration between Mexico and the United States?
: According to the authors who seem to see permanent settlement as not desirable outcome of international migration, feminization is closely related to the permanent immigration. And, given their underlying assumption that female migrants will be economically dependent, feminization doesn’t contribute to the American economy and will just cause increased tax burden to provide them with social services. Is it true?
8. Why is the geographic diversification of migrant destinations a negative consequence of border militarization?
9. The authors say that border patrol is “ritualized as a mandatory public performance” (p 89) and recent border enhancements around major border cities hold unintended consequences on both sides of the border, including migrant deaths, a disperse geography of destinations, longer migrant stays and greater numbers of dependent migrants. At the same time, the authors’ data show that border enhancements haven’t reduced migration or increased the likelihood of apprehension. Consequently, the authors argue for a severely reduced border control. Is this a feasible policy option in the current security climate?
: Is it possible to distinguish border control for unauthorized migration from that for the drug traffic and terrorist entry? And does the U.S government have to focus on the latter?
10. One of the unintended consequences of the 1996 welfare and immigration reforms was to push legal residents towards naturalization, which increased the number of potential beneficiaries of family reunification visas. At the same time, the authors argue that the number of visas allotted to Mexicans should be increased. Aren’t they arguing for the same thing that they call an unintended consequence of faulty policy?
12. Another unintended consequence of U.S. policy (specifically border militarization) was that migrant trips grew in duration. However, the authors show that border militarization did not have the effect of reducing the likelihood of initial migration (or of reducing migration numbers in general). In essence, border militarization increases the cost of migration but only reduces circular migration, not migration overall. How can we understand this theoretically?
: Is it also empirically convincing? Considering the natural increase in permanent settlement among initially temporary migrants over the time, did the authors control for that natural increase when they conclude that ineffective and wrongly designed border enforcement policies triggered the permanent settlement of larger numbers of Mexican migrant workers who otherwise would have returned to their home country after the short term sojourn as targeted earners?
13. Recalling Sassen, Durand et al. make the claim several times that migration systems are bounded, and the time frame for migration driven out of development is about 9 decades. When should we begin counting for the Mexican case? Do we think that the examples set by Europe and South Korea are fair comparisons to Mexico?
: What about other unimpressive cases? Most developing countries have not shown the similar trend of economic development? Rather, European and South Korean cases aren’t the exceptions?
i've got absolutely no clue what they are talking about, but yay me!
I'm wonjun. I tried to answer the orginal quesitons and suggested a couple of questions related. And I attached it. I hope this will be helpful to the summary of the text.
I really appreciate your time and enthusiasm devoted to our presentation. I feel like I'm a free rider.
See you then,,
Best,
wonjun yoon
**attachment**
Study Questions:
Beyond Smoke and Mirrors
1. Given our readings in class to date, how comprehensive is the discussion of migration theory in the book? Are there any glaring errors? Is the discussion selective in any way? If so, how?
2. In concluding their discussion of how the U.S.-Mexico system was assembled, the authors argue: “migration between Mexico and the United States has never been a result of simple cost-benefit decisions taken by individuals, nor have migrants been motivated soley by a desire to relocate permanently North of the border to maximize time earning.”
3. How does their overall critique of the system challenge or limit more conventional economic analyses? In your opinion, is their critique effective?
: Except for Neo-classical economic theories (e.g., the authors mainly oppose those theories), every theoretical approaches to international migration such as new economics of labor migration, globalization theories, segregated labor market theories, and even world system theories were covered and relied on by the authors for explaining migration between Mexico and the United States. The question might arises about whether neo-classical economic theories’ emphasis on individual income maximization (or investment in human capital) necessarily lead to the logical conclusion that Mexican migrant workers will inevitably transform into permanent settlers. Can’t circular migration coincide with individual strategic decision? If we broaden individual rational calculus to include other values (family, culture, community other than material costs and benefits, can we render the neo-classical economic theories less conflicting with other approaches?
11. The authors argue that the majority of migrants enter the United States with the intent to stay temporarily, but that permanent settlement becomes more likely over time. When and why does this happen? Is the authors’ suggestion for encouraging return migration (by facilitating remittances and return) a feasible one?
And, permanent settlement is natural outcome of long-lasting migration history or the direct outcome of ineffective immigration policies such as the post-IRCA regime? And is the permanent settlement of different ethnic (or racial) groups bad or detrimental to the national cohesion and political stability of the host societies? Or the presumably negative (?) outcome derived from the permanent settlement is just due to the political mobilization (or manipulation) by aspiring politicians?
4. In concluding their discussion of how the U.S.-Mexico system was assembled, the authors argue: “migration between Mexico and the United States has never been a result of simple cost-benefit decisions taken by individuals, nor have migrants been motivated solely by a desire to relocate permanently North of the border to maximize time earning.”
: Between circular migration and permanent immigration, which do you think is the norm of international migration pattern? Or is there any trend from circular migration to permanent immigration or vice versa? Or that will be just determined by the specific immigration policies adopted by the migrant-receiving states?
5. How does their overall critique of the system challenge or limit more conventional economic analyses? In your opinion, is their critique effective?
6. What are the main ways in which the border crisis between the US and Mexico has been manufactured? What are the major economic, political, and social issues contributing to this manufacture in the United States?
: economic recession, electoral desire to get easily mobilizable conservative (or nativist constituents) votes, and the bureaucratic ambition to expand their size and power resources (especially, INS and the Border Patrol agency) combined to stir up the non-existing border crisis and exaggerate the problematic aspect of it.
7. What are some of the motivations leading to- and implications of- the feminization of undocumented migration between Mexico and the United States?
: According to the authors who seem to see permanent settlement as not desirable outcome of international migration, feminization is closely related to the permanent immigration. And, given their underlying assumption that female migrants will be economically dependent, feminization doesn’t contribute to the American economy and will just cause increased tax burden to provide them with social services. Is it true?
8. Why is the geographic diversification of migrant destinations a negative consequence of border militarization?
9. The authors say that border patrol is “ritualized as a mandatory public performance” (p 89) and recent border enhancements around major border cities hold unintended consequences on both sides of the border, including migrant deaths, a disperse geography of destinations, longer migrant stays and greater numbers of dependent migrants. At the same time, the authors’ data show that border enhancements haven’t reduced migration or increased the likelihood of apprehension. Consequently, the authors argue for a severely reduced border control. Is this a feasible policy option in the current security climate?
: Is it possible to distinguish border control for unauthorized migration from that for the drug traffic and terrorist entry? And does the U.S government have to focus on the latter?
10. One of the unintended consequences of the 1996 welfare and immigration reforms was to push legal residents towards naturalization, which increased the number of potential beneficiaries of family reunification visas. At the same time, the authors argue that the number of visas allotted to Mexicans should be increased. Aren’t they arguing for the same thing that they call an unintended consequence of faulty policy?
12. Another unintended consequence of U.S. policy (specifically border militarization) was that migrant trips grew in duration. However, the authors show that border militarization did not have the effect of reducing the likelihood of initial migration (or of reducing migration numbers in general). In essence, border militarization increases the cost of migration but only reduces circular migration, not migration overall. How can we understand this theoretically?
: Is it also empirically convincing? Considering the natural increase in permanent settlement among initially temporary migrants over the time, did the authors control for that natural increase when they conclude that ineffective and wrongly designed border enforcement policies triggered the permanent settlement of larger numbers of Mexican migrant workers who otherwise would have returned to their home country after the short term sojourn as targeted earners?
13. Recalling Sassen, Durand et al. make the claim several times that migration systems are bounded, and the time frame for migration driven out of development is about 9 decades. When should we begin counting for the Mexican case? Do we think that the examples set by Europe and South Korea are fair comparisons to Mexico?
: What about other unimpressive cases? Most developing countries have not shown the similar trend of economic development? Rather, European and South Korean cases aren’t the exceptions?
i've got absolutely no clue what they are talking about, but yay me!