The WORST (BETTER NATHAN?!) paper I have ever written.
Madeleine St. Marie
Ireland Since 1800
Professor O'Halpin
13 April 2007
Irish Neutrality
As Europe geared itself for the inevitable war at the close of the
1930s, Ireland shocked her former mother nation by declaring herself
a neutral state. Though scholars, among others, debate the morality
of staying neutral in the Second World War, especially in regards to
the Holocaust and the myriad human rights violations that occurred,
the declaration of neutrality was a giant step towards full autonomy
by Ireland. Though it was not kindly received by Britain and resulted
in political pressure by both England and the United States, by
refusing to be bullied by the larger nations, Ireland secured itself
a place among the international community as an independent entity.
A momentously and largely unprecedented step towards Irish autonomy
in regards to wartime decisions was the Anglo-Irish Agreement of
1938. This agreement, forged by de Valera and Chamberlain, “did not
guarantee neutrality but at least it did not preclude it” (RJR,
24). Essentially, it returned the ports at Berehaven, Cobh, and Lough
Swilly to Irish control, clearing up some of the “more problematic
ambiguities in the relationship with Britain” (Jackson, 298). This
allowed the government of Eire to more effectively block both the
British as well as potential foreign enemies utilizing the ports
during wartime, though as the war progressed, this would serve to
annoy and vex the British powers-that-be. Unfortunately, this
agreement was a double-edged sword: these concessions seemed to
highlight the indignity of Partition for the Irish nationalists,
which would become the chief stipulation precluding Ireland's
declaration of war on the side of the Allied forces (Ibid).
Obviously, Chamberlain had been willing to make such concessions to
help solidify diplomatic relations in an international context; even
if Ireland did not take an overwhelmingly positive attitude towards
British foreign politics, it could at least be mollified into being
grudgingly neutral and polite (Ibid). Chamberlain's eagerness to make
nice with his European peers did not end up going too well for the
Continent, however; 'appeasement' became and still remains a dirty
word in politics and diplomacy as a direct result of his actions.
Thus, the decision of whether or not to enter alongside Ireland's
historical ally (despite never truly having the power to choose
whether or not she was allied with the superpower) was the first time
Ireland was able to assert its sovereignty and rights to
self-determination. And although the over Dominions of the
Commonwealth were allowed to make the decision by themselves, Ireland
alone remained neutral. Neutrality made sense for Eire in both a
local and global context (though Alvin Jackson glibly states in his
historiographical survey that if nothing else, “it offered the
Irish a chance to buck the mainstream Commonwealth opinion” by
keeping out of the war). However, de Valera knew a political
opportunity when he saw it, and seized the bull by its horns. He made
the issue of joining the Allied forces into an issue about Partition,
a fact that the British did not take kindly to in the years before
the United States entered into the war. The end of Partition seemed
to be a political reality in June 1940 with the MacDonald -
Chamberlain initiative, but was rejected as being too insubstantial
and too demanding on immediate Irish engagement (Jackson, 301). In
1941, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, Winston
Churchill sent a telegram to de Valera offering him the chance for
Ireland to be a “nation once again”; “but the allusion was
rhetorical rather than substantive, and reflected not just
Churchillian bombast but also the extent to which mainstream British
political opinion had moved on” after the desperation caused by the
fall of France in 1940 (Jackson, 302). Though Ireland did not end up
gaining the six counties back, the assertion of neutrality even while
its neighbour grew steadily more angry enabled Ireland to emerge
infinitely more independent of England, unlike the other Dominions in
the Commonwealth.
Declarations of neutrality, in both World Wars, were often just
words instead actual states of existence. To be truly neutral, the
belligerents involved in the actual fighting had to agree to these
declarations. Belgium was one of the unlucky nations whose
declaration of neutrality was routinely ignored by the Germans. The
Germans were not the only power to show disinterest in international
law; both the British and the United States engaged in conduct that
directly violated the neutral status of various countries. In the
case of the United States, this is especially hypocritical, though
not surprising to the modern observer: while America had clung to her
neutrality via the Monroe Doctrine, she had complained and denounced
those countries who flouted neutrality; however, when she was
embroiled in the conflagration of war, America did not hesitate to
partake in the very actions she had once decried. In Ireland's case,
there was a trifecta of good luck: not only did Germany concede
neutral status, it was also officially recognized by the U.S. and
“tacitly accepted by Great Britain” (Clokie, 748). Of course,
such acceptance did not stop the Allies from trying to get Ireland to
act in overly pro-Allied manners, including the expulsion of
diplomats sent over from Berlin. In particular, both Britain and
America put pressure to hand over the German minister Hempel into
custody; however, Ireland did not acquiesce and Hempel was able to
sit out the war in Ireland and afforded kind treatment by the Irish,
a nicety that was not afforded Hempel's counterpart in Afghanistan,
Mr. Pilger, who was handed over to the Soviets and never heard from
again (O'Halpin, 3).
Respect and acceptance were the exception and not the rule, as is
evidenced in the treatment for other nations that had a relationship
of some kind with Great Britain; Iraq and Egypt, though independent
at this point in time, were bound by close alliance to the former
colonial power. Both states severed diplomatic relationships with
Germany, though being allied with Britain does not make her a
belligerent under national law (Kunz 732). However, as Eunan O'Halpin
states in his essay 'Ireland and Afghanistan compared: Britain's
neutral neighbours in the Second World War', “Britain took her turn
[after Hitler at the start of the war] to show disdain for the
niceties of international law and the principles of national
sovereignty amongst the newly emerging countries in the Middle East”
(O'Halpin, 16). Both countries were utilized for helping move troops
over land and sea; thus they were not, as Ireland was, truly neutral,
but served as pawns in a larger political and military chess game. It
can be argued here that the constant meddling of the war's
belligerents in the Middle East, including the regular flouting of
international statues and the higher principles these countries
claimed they were defending, is in part to the complete and utter
instability that region currently enjoys today. Though landing
personnel and material through these areas seems benign enough, it
was one action in a seemingly-endless line of complete disregard for
self-determination of the countries in the Middle East, especially if
the decision reached by the “sovereign” states was not in
accordance with the opinion of the superpowers-that-be.
Though
Britain “tacitly” approved of Ireland's decision to stay neutral,
and even though it was officially recognized by the U.S., pressure
on Ireland to revoke its neutral status and join in on the side of
the Allies steadily mounted throughout the war, reflecting growing
annoyance on the parts of the Allied political administrations. In
1941, Winston Churchill, meeting with John Dulanty, the Irish High
Commissioner in London, was loudly questioning the bravery of Ireland
and her constituents by staying out of the war while discussing the
possibility of introducing conscription in Northern Ireland. Dulanty
relates that Churchill said '”We were one of the world's finest
fighting nations” - and how lamentable it was that we had put
ourselves out of the world fight for freedom through the ignoble fear
of being bombed” (WebCT, 1941 May 22 Dulanty meets Churchill 3.JPG
). Later, in a personal memo from early 1943, expresses his further
bitterness at Ireland's decision. “Their conduct in this war will
never be forgiven by the British nation unless it is amended before
the end. This in itself would be a great disaster. It is our duty to
try to save these people from themselves” (from WebCT; JIC
minutes Jan June 1966 050.jpg).
Churchill also believed that the arrival of the United States into
the Allied camp will help convince, if not outright coerce, the Irish
into joining the Allied cause. “There seems to be a very strong
case in favour of doing what is right and just and facing the usual
caterwaul from the disloyal Irish elements in various parts of the
Dominions. I shall take advantage of my visit to Washington to
discuss the matter again with the President” (Ibid). Unfortunately
for Churchill, what was “right and just” never actually took
place, and Ireland was allowed to remain neutral, despite Britain's
best efforts to get Eire to recant.
Public opinion in Ireland on the fighting seemed to indicate that de
Valera, and not Churchill, had a better handle on what was good for
Ireland during the war. In an article that appeared in The Times
on Saturday, 09 September 1939, stated that “Mr. de Valera's policy
of neutrality is reflected generally in popular attitude, and
although there is keen interest in the progress of events and the
owners of wireless sets have been spending their leisure hours
listening, a visitor would hardly realize a war was being waged in
Europe at all” (Times article). Traditionally, Irish opinion had
been lukewarm at best but generally disinterested in the wars that
Britain embroiled herself in during Ireland's tenure as a
full-fledged member of the Commonwealth. The Second World War seemed
to be no different. However, other observers felt that such
disinterest would quickly fade as the war progressed. In the same
article, the author, commenting on the Irish volunteers to the
British army states “[t]he government already have called up the
first line of volunteers, but the response to repeated appeals even
for A.R.P. Work has been disappointing, and nobody would be surprised
if in the near future Mr. de Valera, who personally is opposed to all
forms of compulsion, should find it necessary to introduce some form
of conscription” (Times Article). The tone is bemused, as if
declaring neutrality was a nice statement but would not hold up when
the reality of war fell onto the Irish and their government. This
indulgent and superior air would quickly fade as Ireland refused to
budge from a position of neutrality.
A similar, though somewhat
resigned, attitude is taken by H. McD. Clokie in an article published
in The American Political Science Review
in 1940. His article, “International Affairs: The British
Dominions and Neutrality” examines the curious nature of how the
Dominions reacted to the declaration of war by Britain and Ireland's
defiant and contrary stance. Towards the close of the article, he
states “The maintenance of this neutral status may be of great
difficulty for Ireland, as it is for other small neutral states
contiguous to and overshadowed by a great belligerent Power”
(Clokie, 748). Though his words seem to be a bit prophetic for the
fate of other neutral countries, such as Iraq and Egypt, they
foreshadow the relationship that Ireland was to have with both
Britain and the United States. This was clearly evident in the
handling of Ireland and her position by both politicians like
Churchill and the press. As the war
went on, the attitude towards Ireland's position in the British press
became more and more hostile. In a Letter to the Editor in
1940, Thomas Bodkin states that “[negative] pronouncements like
those of Dr. Macan [author of a rather inflammatory article on
Ireland's neutrality], so far from being helpful will tend to harden
Irish opinion in the views that Ireland is best defended by
her own citizens on her own soil and
that she has the same right to proclaim neutrality
as have the United States, Portugal, or Switzerland” (Letter to the
Editor, emphasis added). A few years later, the treatment of Ireland
prompted one R.N.V.R. to write on 21 May 1945 that “[t]he attitude
adopted by the English Press towards Eire's neutrality would appear
to be illogical. Neither Russia, the United States of America,
Holland, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Greece, nor Yugoslavia abandoned
their neutrality until they themselves were attacked, yet they have
not been held up to opprobrium. Moreover, the virtues of Turkey,
Sweden and even Spain have been extolled” (Letter to the Editor).
If Ireland had its own version of Pearl Harbour, perhaps its outlook
on the war would have been different. Active involvement in the war,
however, would have been a huge, if not over-large, strain on the
fledgling country, both in terms of manpower, economics, and
industry.
America had taken an similar stance at its outset; George Washington
had urged the country to turn its back on Europe or become involved
at her own peril. Washington's stance was reinforced by the Monroe
Doctrine, though with a twist: America would not get involved with
Europe and her wars and Europe would stay out of the Americas,
especially with regards to colonization. However, America's
neutrality concerning European affairs was finally broken when Dr.
Woodrow Wilson involved the United States in the Great War, though
this had come as a result of massive public outrage concerning the
sinking of passenger liners and the Zimmermann telegram, which urged
Mexico to declare war on the United States in order to regain
territories taken by the U.S. America's engagement in military action
in an only after a direct and dire threat was presented to the
American people would be repeated time and time again, as was seen in
the Second World War and more recently, after the 9/11 attacks.
Instead of being the upholder of a higher moral standard, America
seems to act only in self-interest or self-preservation. Luckily for
Ireland, this situation was never forced upon them, and Eire was able
to maintain neutrality through World War II and continues to maintain
neutrality even today.
The
treatment of Ireland, especially in regards to her neutrality, in
the Second World War is probably what helped separate her from other
former colonies, though
it involved no small amount of luck that her neutrality was upheld by
the belligerent powers. Obviously, the fate of other
countries that had been dominated by one or more colonial powers
might have been different if the West had not been so meddlesome. Of
course, the situation regarding the countries in the Middle East is
more complicated than simply treatment by the belligerents during the
Second World War; there are also issues of culture and religion to
examine. However, the parallels are there and unfortunately go
largely unstudied by Irish scholars, with a few notable exception,
such as Eunan O'Halpin. In any case, Ireland has become a political
and economical force to be reckoned with in the European Union. By
sticking to her guns, Eire was able to ensure her status as a
sovereign nation independent of Great Britain and able to set her own
course to modernity, despite any ill-will or enmity it
may have evoked at the time from her neighbours.
Well, at least I only have two papers left.