(no subject)
Accept as true DeLanda’s Deleuzean ontology…
DeLanda’s Deleuzean ontology perceives the world in operating under the categories of universal and individual singularities; universal in the sense that there are general laws whose inferences all objects much abide by, and individual in the sense that all objects and organisms are in fact unique particulars whose interactions are simply causal events intermittently existing in their respected spatio-temporal realms. Such a perception of the universe remains in stark contrast to what DeLanda describes as the other two major philosophical perceptions, idealism and pragmatists. Such a criticism contends that the true perception of the universe lies in the greater singular perception of all objects animate or otherwise. This conception of noumena infers that all properties in the universe are in and of themselves distinct free radicals. Further, this conceptualization of independent radicals forms a greater metaphysical perception of the temporal perfunctory operations of such objects.
DeLanda’s philosophy is thus based in scientific methodology hence implicitly devoid of the “popular” belief in qualitative perception and strictly grounded in empiricism. Further, the recurrence or contiguous similarities between individuals is then regarded as conducive to a virtual appraisal of abstract structure. This implies that both physiological and cognitive similarities, perceptions, et cetera are simply perverse coincidences yet whose fundamental nature is devoid of any greater universal similarity. Both DeLanda and Deleuze argue that such “objective” knowledge is hence conditional and its similarities not necessarily implicit to a greater founding source of truth. Thus, our virtual conception of the universe is built upon conditional abstractions whose freak coincidences amongst other individual singularities are simply occurring through the similar “bootstrapping” pattern of applying temporal knowledge to a contemporaneously held idea, pattern, perception, et cetera.
Yet such a seemingly reductionist perspective of the universe does seem problematic. First, it out right negates qualitative perception-and with it emotional repercussions and value-categorized belief systems. This implies that our existence is henceforth affiliated only in the sense that our individual pattern perception might work parallel to one another yet in the greater realm of the noumena universe we are strictly following perfunctory free radical operations. This computerized notion of existence is furthered only in the second apprehension to the Realist’s conception of the universe: the bootstrapping acquisition of knowledge. Under such a concept, we must believe that our acquisition of knowledge is strictly temporal and, like the computer and its software commands, conducive only to misperceived greater truths-abstract knowledge, not universal singularities. Deleuzean bootstrapping implies then that objective knowledge is and of itself contemporaneously grounded and thus negates greater qualitative truths. His theory is stressed to the greater physical and biological foundations of the universe and briefly attempts to negate any greater sociological importance as a virtual abstract.
And while it is easy for Realists to critique the supposed perfunctory manner of greater singularities, the outright negation of greater qualitative ponderings, i.e. death, seem to work in opposition and confrontation to the Hellenistic perception of the philosophical way of life. Both philosophies imply an awareness of death and yet the Realist classifies it as simply a scheduled terminus to an individual singularity-necessary, only to a specific temporal moment. Plato implied that death was an essential category of philosophy, of one’s perception of life. Hence, life equaled death and vice versa. Philosophizing was the qualitative conditioning of the individual to not only accept this fact, but not be intimidated by it. We have them seemed to of arrived at a juncture; a confrontation point between the qualitative and quantitative perception of philosophy in which the Realist will claim that the ultimate moment to the temporal life is simply a scientifically substantiated datum devoid of any greater abstract quality while the Hellenist-and with him Hadot- would argue that the greater abstract quality of death is a qualitative goal for the aspiring philosopher who seeks a refinement and greater equilibrium in his perception of the universe around him.
It is most interesting to note at this time that the heart of such a confrontation does not lie in the overall idea of death, but rather the differentiation in the individual’s personal involvement in death. The Hellenist would prove to be a strict phenomenologist and claim that it is in the greater qualitative appreciation of the terminus that therein lays the ultimate understanding of death. The Realist would counter with the same redundant noumenological support which has been stated earlier in this paper. And so it is at this point in which we see the incompatibility between DeLanda/Deleuze and Hadot; that the ultimate confrontation between the phenomenology and noumenolgy of the perceived, and with it the concept of death, proves to negate the other to a point of nihil ex nihilo. Might we then have constructed another horror metaphysicus? For Hadot and the Hellenists would construct death in a strictly phenomenological manner whilst the Realist would support his empiricism with the concept of singularities (noumena), both sides negating the others perception to the point that neither one could understand or view his opposing counterpart. If the Hellenist is phenomenological he will thus be unable to peruse the constructs of the universe through singularities. If the Realist is noumenological he will then only construct his universe based upon temporal and conditional truths as guided by greater perfunctory laws. Thus in keeping with the greater topic of death, we cannot conceive of its perceived compatibility between the Hellenists (including Hadot) and the Realists as being plausible simply due to both sides reductionism.
May we then infer that to understand death we must operate under the guidelines of either the Realist or the Hellenist? Is then the conceptualization of death based upon an individual’s leap of faith? Unless we assume that an amalgamation of the opposing factions could be achieved-a philosophy working in tandem with noumena, empiricism, phenomenology, et cetera- this author believes that the greater appreciation for death will be lost in the metaphysical horrors negating sides will continue to facilitate.
DeLanda’s Deleuzean ontology perceives the world in operating under the categories of universal and individual singularities; universal in the sense that there are general laws whose inferences all objects much abide by, and individual in the sense that all objects and organisms are in fact unique particulars whose interactions are simply causal events intermittently existing in their respected spatio-temporal realms. Such a perception of the universe remains in stark contrast to what DeLanda describes as the other two major philosophical perceptions, idealism and pragmatists. Such a criticism contends that the true perception of the universe lies in the greater singular perception of all objects animate or otherwise. This conception of noumena infers that all properties in the universe are in and of themselves distinct free radicals. Further, this conceptualization of independent radicals forms a greater metaphysical perception of the temporal perfunctory operations of such objects.
DeLanda’s philosophy is thus based in scientific methodology hence implicitly devoid of the “popular” belief in qualitative perception and strictly grounded in empiricism. Further, the recurrence or contiguous similarities between individuals is then regarded as conducive to a virtual appraisal of abstract structure. This implies that both physiological and cognitive similarities, perceptions, et cetera are simply perverse coincidences yet whose fundamental nature is devoid of any greater universal similarity. Both DeLanda and Deleuze argue that such “objective” knowledge is hence conditional and its similarities not necessarily implicit to a greater founding source of truth. Thus, our virtual conception of the universe is built upon conditional abstractions whose freak coincidences amongst other individual singularities are simply occurring through the similar “bootstrapping” pattern of applying temporal knowledge to a contemporaneously held idea, pattern, perception, et cetera.
Yet such a seemingly reductionist perspective of the universe does seem problematic. First, it out right negates qualitative perception-and with it emotional repercussions and value-categorized belief systems. This implies that our existence is henceforth affiliated only in the sense that our individual pattern perception might work parallel to one another yet in the greater realm of the noumena universe we are strictly following perfunctory free radical operations. This computerized notion of existence is furthered only in the second apprehension to the Realist’s conception of the universe: the bootstrapping acquisition of knowledge. Under such a concept, we must believe that our acquisition of knowledge is strictly temporal and, like the computer and its software commands, conducive only to misperceived greater truths-abstract knowledge, not universal singularities. Deleuzean bootstrapping implies then that objective knowledge is and of itself contemporaneously grounded and thus negates greater qualitative truths. His theory is stressed to the greater physical and biological foundations of the universe and briefly attempts to negate any greater sociological importance as a virtual abstract.
And while it is easy for Realists to critique the supposed perfunctory manner of greater singularities, the outright negation of greater qualitative ponderings, i.e. death, seem to work in opposition and confrontation to the Hellenistic perception of the philosophical way of life. Both philosophies imply an awareness of death and yet the Realist classifies it as simply a scheduled terminus to an individual singularity-necessary, only to a specific temporal moment. Plato implied that death was an essential category of philosophy, of one’s perception of life. Hence, life equaled death and vice versa. Philosophizing was the qualitative conditioning of the individual to not only accept this fact, but not be intimidated by it. We have them seemed to of arrived at a juncture; a confrontation point between the qualitative and quantitative perception of philosophy in which the Realist will claim that the ultimate moment to the temporal life is simply a scientifically substantiated datum devoid of any greater abstract quality while the Hellenist-and with him Hadot- would argue that the greater abstract quality of death is a qualitative goal for the aspiring philosopher who seeks a refinement and greater equilibrium in his perception of the universe around him.
It is most interesting to note at this time that the heart of such a confrontation does not lie in the overall idea of death, but rather the differentiation in the individual’s personal involvement in death. The Hellenist would prove to be a strict phenomenologist and claim that it is in the greater qualitative appreciation of the terminus that therein lays the ultimate understanding of death. The Realist would counter with the same redundant noumenological support which has been stated earlier in this paper. And so it is at this point in which we see the incompatibility between DeLanda/Deleuze and Hadot; that the ultimate confrontation between the phenomenology and noumenolgy of the perceived, and with it the concept of death, proves to negate the other to a point of nihil ex nihilo. Might we then have constructed another horror metaphysicus? For Hadot and the Hellenists would construct death in a strictly phenomenological manner whilst the Realist would support his empiricism with the concept of singularities (noumena), both sides negating the others perception to the point that neither one could understand or view his opposing counterpart. If the Hellenist is phenomenological he will thus be unable to peruse the constructs of the universe through singularities. If the Realist is noumenological he will then only construct his universe based upon temporal and conditional truths as guided by greater perfunctory laws. Thus in keeping with the greater topic of death, we cannot conceive of its perceived compatibility between the Hellenists (including Hadot) and the Realists as being plausible simply due to both sides reductionism.
May we then infer that to understand death we must operate under the guidelines of either the Realist or the Hellenist? Is then the conceptualization of death based upon an individual’s leap of faith? Unless we assume that an amalgamation of the opposing factions could be achieved-a philosophy working in tandem with noumena, empiricism, phenomenology, et cetera- this author believes that the greater appreciation for death will be lost in the metaphysical horrors negating sides will continue to facilitate.