(no subject)
UCD HISTORY ESSAY COVER SHEET
Student Name: Emer Tannam
Student Number: 04354923
Course: German History, 1918-1973
Lecturer/Tutor: Dr Christoph Müller
Essay question: Critically evaluate the achievements of Willy Brandt as a German and European statesman.
Word count including footnotes:2,571 Due date:28th November Date submitted: 28th November
Student Declaration
This essay was researched by me and is written in my own words. It has not been submitted for credit in any other course. I understand that plagiarism is the unacknowledged use of other people’s research and words and that it carries penalties that include the failure of this essay.Signature___________________________________
Assessment (marker use only)
Check list Ex. V. Gd Good OK Weak Comment
ü Relevance of answer to question
ü Structure, originality and force of argument
ü Effective use of assigned primary sources
ü Depth, breadth and critical use of secondary sources
ü Written expression, grammar & spelling
ü Critical apparatus including footnotes & bibliography
University Marking Scheme
70-100/ I 60-69/ 2.i 50-59/ 2.ii 40-49/ 3 - Pass 0- 40/ Fail Not Gradable (eg plagiarism) MARK %
Additional Comments
Critically evaluate the achievements of Willy Brandt as a German and European statesman.
In evaluating the achievements of Willy Brandt (1913-1992) as a German and European statesman this essay will focus on the years 1966 to 1974, when Brandt was a prominent member of government, as foreign minister 1966-1969, and as chancellor, 1969-1974. His achievements in the European Community define him as a European statesman, although he is always acting with his nation in mind. His domestic policies indicate the value of his actions as a German statesman. In his Ostpolitik it must be argued that although he was acting as a German statesman, his progress had a wider significance and European wide repercussions, so he was also a European statesman.
When Willy Brandt heard the results of the 1969 election he said that "tonight, finally and for ever, Hitler lost the war." One of the major achievements of Willy Brandt as a German statesman was that his time in office demonstrated a decisive turning away from Nazi Germany, something that had not happened under Konrad Adenaur. Willy Brandt was the assumed name of Herbert Ernst Karl Frahm, which he adopted in 1933 to avoid Nazi detection. He had been involved with the socialist movement in Germany from 1929 and so had to leave Germany to escape persecution. For this reason, and because of his activism while in exile, Brandt was in no way implicated by Nazi Germany, and represented opposition to Nazism. Konrad Adenaur, on the other hand, had believed in the necesity of continuity in governmental structures to ensure stability. Through this justification former Nazis were accomadated in Adenaur’s Germany. By the 1950s between 50 and 80% of state officials were former NSDAP members. Indeed Adenaur’s chief aide was Hans Globke, who had written the official commentary of the Nuremberg race Laws for the Nazis in 1953. Although this approach seems to have been vindicated by the success and prosperity of the federal republic, Brandt’s clean record was nevertheless a welcome change. In December 1970 Brandt went to Warsaw to sign and treaty, and while he was there he visited the site of a Jewish ghetto. There, he fell to his knees in a public act of contrition, on behalf of the German people. Although this achievement is hard to substantiate it was a significant factor in his role as a German statesman. Furthermore it contrasted with the previous attitude to Nazism characteristic of Adenaur’s era, that of seeing the German people as victims of Adolf Hitler’s regime, and unaware of the full scale of the atrocities of the era. Adenaur had, during his Chancellorship, sought to empphasise the continuity between the Second Reich and the Bonn Republic. Brandt rejected this and stated that he would not accept “any mistaken ideas about continuity…whereby Hitler’s war was ostensibly consigned to oblivion or its consequences rescinded”
Willy Brandt’s biggest achievement, and the policy which largely characterised his Chancellorship, was his Ostpolitik. It has been described as “the cement that held the government together.” In this too, Brandt demonstrated a break from the past. Because of his anti-communism Adenaur had closely identifies with the United States in terms of foreign policy. This meant hostility to the Soviet Union, and the East. However over a quarter of West Germany’s population were refugees from the East, with a strong interest in reunification. The Social Democratic Party advocated reunification, despite the fact that this would necessitate neutrality in the Cold War. So after 1969, under Brandt, the emphasis in foreign policy shifted from reestablishment of sovereignty and reconstruction, to reconciliation with the German Democratic Republic. The aims of Ospolitik were to imporve the situation of the Germans living under Soviet control, to ease tensions so that a more peaceful atmosphere would be created in Europe, and to work towards a situation between the two German states that would allow for their association or perhaps unification. He began the process when he was still foreign minister in Kurt Georg kiesenger’s government.. Ostpolitik coincided with a period of détente in the cold war. There were preliminary meetings held with the GDR’s primeminister Willy Stoph in Efrurt in March of 1970 and in Kaisel in the FDR in December 1970. The German-Soviet Treaty, based on cooperation in a European security conference, and technical and economic cooperation, financed by the Federal Republic, was signed in August 1070. This was the foundation stone of Ostpolitik as Brandt had known that any alteration of the relations between the two German states could happen only through Moscow. The treaty declared mutual agreement for the noormailisation of relaitions , and that both sides would abjure the use of forceagainst the other, and that both sides would accept the current boundaries of Europe as inviolable There was considerable conservative opposition to Ostpolitik as it neccesitated the acceptance of the permenant division of Germany. Here too Brandt’s political realism is demonstrated as his Ostpolitik was not concerned with dealing with matters as they should be, but as they were. In December of 1970 Brandt went to Warsaw (as mentioned above) to sign a treaty recognising the order-Neisse line. In September 1972 Brandt called for re-elections, which were fought almost entirely on the issue of Ostpolitik. The results of the election saw the SPD emerge as the largest party, so that Brandt’s policy was vindicated by the mandate of the people. He was then able to conclude the “Basic Treaty” which recognised the German situation as of “two German states in one German nation”. This was ratified in September 1973.
One of the main aims of Ostopolitik was to protect West Berlin and to improve the quality of life for all Belriners. This was especially significant for Brandt who had been mayor of Berlin from 1957 until 1966. He was dismayed when the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, and criticised the complacency with which the construction was met. In a speech made on August 16th 1961 he opined that
“This development has not changed the West Berlin population's will to resist, but it has lent itself to doubts about the ability of the Three Powers to react resolutely... After tolerating a Soviet measure that is illegal and has been designated as illegal, and in light of the many tragedies that are taking place today in East Berlin and in the Soviet Zone, none of us will be spared the risk of ultimate resoluteness.“
To signify the importance of the situation in West Berlin Scheel and Brandt made it clear that unless there was resolution of the issue, the Moscow Treaty would not be ratified. The Berlin Agreement was signed on September 3rd 1971. it provided that traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic would not be impeded, and that communications between West Berlin and the GDR would be improved. The rights of the occupying powers in Berlin were confirmed. However the Soviet Union retained the right to represent West Berlin internationally. As an achievement of Willy Brandt the Berlin Agreement did little more than confirm the status quo. However it made the status quo that bit more precise, and the stability that the Agreement implied for the people of Berlin was welcomed indeed.
Ostpolitik was not Brandt’s achievement alone. The Soviet government had shown itself willing to improve relations in a note to the Kiesinger government in 1969, before Brandt became Chancellor . Furthermore it was Egon Bahr, a junior minister in Brandt’s Federal Chancery, who conducted the actual negotiations in Moscow. Nor could Brandt’s plans for Ostpolitik have proceeded without the support of Walter Scheel, who was foreign minister, and of the FDP. Despite the fact that Scheel was put under pressure from his party colleagues after the FDP fared badly in the Land elections of June 1970, he remained firmly behind Brandt , risking his career in the process. However it would be difficult to underestimate his influence. In 1969 in his policy statements he was already expressing the ambitions that would later be realised.
“The job of practical politics in the years lying ahead of us is to maintain the unity of the nation by easing the current tensions in the relationship between the two parts of Germany. Germans are not only linked by their language and their history - with all its glory and its misery; Germany is home to all of us. We also have common duties and a common responsibility: to secure peace among ourselves and in Europe…Our national interest does not permit us to stand between the West and the East. Our country needs cooperation and coordination with the West and understanding with the East. Against this backdrop, I say emphatically: the German people need peace in the full sense of the word with the peoples of the Soviet Union, and with all the peoples of the European East. “
Furthermore, throughout his pursuit of Ostpolitik he did not lose sight of the importance of maintaining good relations with the West. Ostpolitik depended on acceptance within the international framework, a reality which Brandt recognised. He said, in 1968 that the problem was to find “an orientation which places the German Question in its European context”. Ostpolitik did cause some concern to those in Paris, Washington and London who feared that any improvement of German-Soviet relations was a return to the treaty of Rapallo. However if West Germany was not seen to be doing enough they were damned as damaging possible prospects of peace. Brandt diplomatically waited until he was granted permission by the Western Allies before proceeding with negotiations with Moscow in 1969. Rather than causing alarm by disregarding the Hallstein Doctrine, which stated that”the Federal Republic of Germany had the exclusive right to represent the entire German nation, and with the exception of the Soviet Union, West Germany would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognized East Germany.” , he developed a theory of nations with a birth defect. According to this theory the Eastern States, because of their dependence on Moscow, had no choice but to recognise the GDR, and so could not be held accountable, as countries, which had a choice, were. Through this he was able to justify trade missions to Warsaw, Hungary and Romania from 1966, as minister for foreign affairs. Because of his sensitivity to European politics, and resulting diplomacy Brandt did not have to sacrifice good western relationships for the sake of Ostpolitik. This was a considerable achievement.
A substantial criticism of Ostpolitk is that although it aimed, on Brandt’s side, to improve the lives of East Germans through relaxation of traffic procedures between the two states, the East German government failed to comply with its promises. It seems that the GDR did not want to substantially change its internal affairs, but only wanted positive international recognition. This points to the fundamental differences in the aims of the two German governments in Ostpolitk. Brandt hoped that relaxation of tensions between the states would lead to reunification, and the end of communism, while the Eastern government hoped that relaxation would consolidate communism. The conservative argument that the communists were being appeased without benefit to West Germany, and that the positive economic relationship between the two states was being used to prop up an illegitimate regime, was not altogether unfounded.
If Brandt’s achievement of Ostpolitik can be criticised for anything it must be the emphasis placed on it at the expense of the domestic reform, which had been promised so emphatically in 1969, when Brandt spoke of “daring more democracy” Because of the haste with which the Brandt-Scheel government was established, they had not drawn up a comprehensive plan of reform. Therefore the FDR could oppose any reforms it didn’t like, without breaking its promises, for none had been made. Furthermore the CDU/CSU was strongly represented in the Bundesrat, and could obstruct Brandt’s reforms from there. Despite these barriers the government succeeded in establishing the breakdown of marriage the sole ground for divorce, and exempting pornography from prosecution unless it caused social offence. However, as the political parties at large approved these reforms this meagre achievement was not Brandt’s alone. Little progress was made in the area of workers’ rights. Workers’ co-determination was extended to all firms employing more than 2000 people. The limited nature of these reforms frustrated the more left wing of the SPD. Perhaps if Brandt had spent more time lobbying the FDP at home, and less time on his Ostpolitik he would have been able to pass more reforms.
Willy Brandt was a European statesman during a period often referred to as the “dark ages of the European Community.” The 1970s were a turbulent time in the international economic system, seeing the collapse of the international monetary system, the oil crisis, and the onset of stagflation, which made domestic governments less eager to pursue integration at the expense of national sovereignty. Brandt became chancellor of Germany at the same time as George Pompidou was taking over from Charles de Gaulle, and these two representatives were responsible for refocusing the direction of the European Community. This was done through the Hague Summit of 1969, which defined the objectives of the European Community in the next years as completion (of policies already underway), widening (of the European Community) and deepening (of the bonds of the European Community). Brandt played a major role in the successful outcome of this conference. Completion was achieved, as was widening, with the ascension of Ireland, Britain and Denmark. The objective of deepening was achieved with less success, because of continuing economic problems.
The SPD had been concerned with strengthening the democratic element in the European institutions, but in the grand coalition of 1966-69 devoted little time to this reform plan, as the overriding feeling in the EC was relief that the French had ceased their empty chair protest. Furthermore Brandt’s role in government was to define foreign policy and his priorities lay elsewhere. Pro-integration rhetoric built up public expectations, which were frustrated by slow progress due to the defence of German interests. In West Germany at the time there was commitment to the idea of community in principle, but little enthusiasm for the actual practicalities. The federal government’s European policies were formulated at a technical level, and did not overly involve the ministers. For this reason it rarely caught the attention of the electorate, who were more interested in the nature of relations with East Germany than with Western Europe. Brandt’s leadership and enthusiasm in the Hague Summit can be seen as a more superficial achievement than it appears, as he excelled more at praising the Union in evocative terms, but was reluctant to make financial sacrifices to the attainment of European goals.
In 1970 Brandt won the Nobel Prize for peace. Although this was not at the end of his career it indicates the value of his achievements, those behind him, and those yet to come. He himself sums up the core of his contribution. On receiving the Prize he described “how much it means to me that it is my work "on behalf of the German people" which has been acknowledged; that it was granted me, after the unforgettable horrors of the past, to see the name of my country brought together with the will for peace”. Throughout the crucial years of 1966-1974 he demonstrated unwavering political realism. He operated by acknowledging how things were, not how they ought to be. He was instrumental in ushering in a new phase of German history.
Bibliography
Books
Balfour, Michael, West Germany: A Contemporary History , (Kent 1982)
Bulmer,Simon and Paterson, William, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community, (London 1987)
Edited by Burdick, Charles, Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, Kudszus, Winifried, Contemporary Germany: Politics and Culture,(Boulder 1984)
Feld, Werner J, West Germany and the European Community: Changing Interests and Competing Policy Objectives, (New York 1981)
Fulbrook, Mary, The Fontana History of Germany 1918-1990, (London 1991)
George, Stephen and Bache, Ian, Politics in the European Union, (Oxford 2001)
Nichols, A.J., The Bonn Republic: West German Democracy 1945-1990, (Essex 1997),
Websites
Wikipedia: Willy Brandt http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willy_Brandt
14th November 2005
Wikipedia: The Hallstein Doctrine, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallstein_Doctrine
14th November 2005
Nobelprize.org http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1971/brandt-cv.html,
14th November 2005
An account of Brandt's time in office as Chancellor, by Prof. Gerhard Rempel.
http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/germany/lectures/47brandt.html
14th November 2005
German History in Documents and Images: “Excerpts from Willy Brandt's Policy Statement, "Easing the Tensions" (1969)”
and
“Willy Brandt on the Building of the Berlin Wall (August 13, 1961)”
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=86
14th November 2005
Student Name: Emer Tannam
Student Number: 04354923
Course: German History, 1918-1973
Lecturer/Tutor: Dr Christoph Müller
Essay question: Critically evaluate the achievements of Willy Brandt as a German and European statesman.
Word count including footnotes:2,571 Due date:28th November Date submitted: 28th November
Student Declaration
This essay was researched by me and is written in my own words. It has not been submitted for credit in any other course. I understand that plagiarism is the unacknowledged use of other people’s research and words and that it carries penalties that include the failure of this essay.Signature___________________________________
Assessment (marker use only)
Check list Ex. V. Gd Good OK Weak Comment
ü Relevance of answer to question
ü Structure, originality and force of argument
ü Effective use of assigned primary sources
ü Depth, breadth and critical use of secondary sources
ü Written expression, grammar & spelling
ü Critical apparatus including footnotes & bibliography
University Marking Scheme
70-100/ I 60-69/ 2.i 50-59/ 2.ii 40-49/ 3 - Pass 0- 40/ Fail Not Gradable (eg plagiarism) MARK %
Additional Comments
Critically evaluate the achievements of Willy Brandt as a German and European statesman.
In evaluating the achievements of Willy Brandt (1913-1992) as a German and European statesman this essay will focus on the years 1966 to 1974, when Brandt was a prominent member of government, as foreign minister 1966-1969, and as chancellor, 1969-1974. His achievements in the European Community define him as a European statesman, although he is always acting with his nation in mind. His domestic policies indicate the value of his actions as a German statesman. In his Ostpolitik it must be argued that although he was acting as a German statesman, his progress had a wider significance and European wide repercussions, so he was also a European statesman.
When Willy Brandt heard the results of the 1969 election he said that "tonight, finally and for ever, Hitler lost the war." One of the major achievements of Willy Brandt as a German statesman was that his time in office demonstrated a decisive turning away from Nazi Germany, something that had not happened under Konrad Adenaur. Willy Brandt was the assumed name of Herbert Ernst Karl Frahm, which he adopted in 1933 to avoid Nazi detection. He had been involved with the socialist movement in Germany from 1929 and so had to leave Germany to escape persecution. For this reason, and because of his activism while in exile, Brandt was in no way implicated by Nazi Germany, and represented opposition to Nazism. Konrad Adenaur, on the other hand, had believed in the necesity of continuity in governmental structures to ensure stability. Through this justification former Nazis were accomadated in Adenaur’s Germany. By the 1950s between 50 and 80% of state officials were former NSDAP members. Indeed Adenaur’s chief aide was Hans Globke, who had written the official commentary of the Nuremberg race Laws for the Nazis in 1953. Although this approach seems to have been vindicated by the success and prosperity of the federal republic, Brandt’s clean record was nevertheless a welcome change. In December 1970 Brandt went to Warsaw to sign and treaty, and while he was there he visited the site of a Jewish ghetto. There, he fell to his knees in a public act of contrition, on behalf of the German people. Although this achievement is hard to substantiate it was a significant factor in his role as a German statesman. Furthermore it contrasted with the previous attitude to Nazism characteristic of Adenaur’s era, that of seeing the German people as victims of Adolf Hitler’s regime, and unaware of the full scale of the atrocities of the era. Adenaur had, during his Chancellorship, sought to empphasise the continuity between the Second Reich and the Bonn Republic. Brandt rejected this and stated that he would not accept “any mistaken ideas about continuity…whereby Hitler’s war was ostensibly consigned to oblivion or its consequences rescinded”
Willy Brandt’s biggest achievement, and the policy which largely characterised his Chancellorship, was his Ostpolitik. It has been described as “the cement that held the government together.” In this too, Brandt demonstrated a break from the past. Because of his anti-communism Adenaur had closely identifies with the United States in terms of foreign policy. This meant hostility to the Soviet Union, and the East. However over a quarter of West Germany’s population were refugees from the East, with a strong interest in reunification. The Social Democratic Party advocated reunification, despite the fact that this would necessitate neutrality in the Cold War. So after 1969, under Brandt, the emphasis in foreign policy shifted from reestablishment of sovereignty and reconstruction, to reconciliation with the German Democratic Republic. The aims of Ospolitik were to imporve the situation of the Germans living under Soviet control, to ease tensions so that a more peaceful atmosphere would be created in Europe, and to work towards a situation between the two German states that would allow for their association or perhaps unification. He began the process when he was still foreign minister in Kurt Georg kiesenger’s government.. Ostpolitik coincided with a period of détente in the cold war. There were preliminary meetings held with the GDR’s primeminister Willy Stoph in Efrurt in March of 1970 and in Kaisel in the FDR in December 1970. The German-Soviet Treaty, based on cooperation in a European security conference, and technical and economic cooperation, financed by the Federal Republic, was signed in August 1070. This was the foundation stone of Ostpolitik as Brandt had known that any alteration of the relations between the two German states could happen only through Moscow. The treaty declared mutual agreement for the noormailisation of relaitions , and that both sides would abjure the use of forceagainst the other, and that both sides would accept the current boundaries of Europe as inviolable There was considerable conservative opposition to Ostpolitik as it neccesitated the acceptance of the permenant division of Germany. Here too Brandt’s political realism is demonstrated as his Ostpolitik was not concerned with dealing with matters as they should be, but as they were. In December of 1970 Brandt went to Warsaw (as mentioned above) to sign a treaty recognising the order-Neisse line. In September 1972 Brandt called for re-elections, which were fought almost entirely on the issue of Ostpolitik. The results of the election saw the SPD emerge as the largest party, so that Brandt’s policy was vindicated by the mandate of the people. He was then able to conclude the “Basic Treaty” which recognised the German situation as of “two German states in one German nation”. This was ratified in September 1973.
One of the main aims of Ostopolitik was to protect West Berlin and to improve the quality of life for all Belriners. This was especially significant for Brandt who had been mayor of Berlin from 1957 until 1966. He was dismayed when the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, and criticised the complacency with which the construction was met. In a speech made on August 16th 1961 he opined that
“This development has not changed the West Berlin population's will to resist, but it has lent itself to doubts about the ability of the Three Powers to react resolutely... After tolerating a Soviet measure that is illegal and has been designated as illegal, and in light of the many tragedies that are taking place today in East Berlin and in the Soviet Zone, none of us will be spared the risk of ultimate resoluteness.“
To signify the importance of the situation in West Berlin Scheel and Brandt made it clear that unless there was resolution of the issue, the Moscow Treaty would not be ratified. The Berlin Agreement was signed on September 3rd 1971. it provided that traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic would not be impeded, and that communications between West Berlin and the GDR would be improved. The rights of the occupying powers in Berlin were confirmed. However the Soviet Union retained the right to represent West Berlin internationally. As an achievement of Willy Brandt the Berlin Agreement did little more than confirm the status quo. However it made the status quo that bit more precise, and the stability that the Agreement implied for the people of Berlin was welcomed indeed.
Ostpolitik was not Brandt’s achievement alone. The Soviet government had shown itself willing to improve relations in a note to the Kiesinger government in 1969, before Brandt became Chancellor . Furthermore it was Egon Bahr, a junior minister in Brandt’s Federal Chancery, who conducted the actual negotiations in Moscow. Nor could Brandt’s plans for Ostpolitik have proceeded without the support of Walter Scheel, who was foreign minister, and of the FDP. Despite the fact that Scheel was put under pressure from his party colleagues after the FDP fared badly in the Land elections of June 1970, he remained firmly behind Brandt , risking his career in the process. However it would be difficult to underestimate his influence. In 1969 in his policy statements he was already expressing the ambitions that would later be realised.
“The job of practical politics in the years lying ahead of us is to maintain the unity of the nation by easing the current tensions in the relationship between the two parts of Germany. Germans are not only linked by their language and their history - with all its glory and its misery; Germany is home to all of us. We also have common duties and a common responsibility: to secure peace among ourselves and in Europe…Our national interest does not permit us to stand between the West and the East. Our country needs cooperation and coordination with the West and understanding with the East. Against this backdrop, I say emphatically: the German people need peace in the full sense of the word with the peoples of the Soviet Union, and with all the peoples of the European East. “
Furthermore, throughout his pursuit of Ostpolitik he did not lose sight of the importance of maintaining good relations with the West. Ostpolitik depended on acceptance within the international framework, a reality which Brandt recognised. He said, in 1968 that the problem was to find “an orientation which places the German Question in its European context”. Ostpolitik did cause some concern to those in Paris, Washington and London who feared that any improvement of German-Soviet relations was a return to the treaty of Rapallo. However if West Germany was not seen to be doing enough they were damned as damaging possible prospects of peace. Brandt diplomatically waited until he was granted permission by the Western Allies before proceeding with negotiations with Moscow in 1969. Rather than causing alarm by disregarding the Hallstein Doctrine, which stated that”the Federal Republic of Germany had the exclusive right to represent the entire German nation, and with the exception of the Soviet Union, West Germany would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognized East Germany.” , he developed a theory of nations with a birth defect. According to this theory the Eastern States, because of their dependence on Moscow, had no choice but to recognise the GDR, and so could not be held accountable, as countries, which had a choice, were. Through this he was able to justify trade missions to Warsaw, Hungary and Romania from 1966, as minister for foreign affairs. Because of his sensitivity to European politics, and resulting diplomacy Brandt did not have to sacrifice good western relationships for the sake of Ostpolitik. This was a considerable achievement.
A substantial criticism of Ostpolitk is that although it aimed, on Brandt’s side, to improve the lives of East Germans through relaxation of traffic procedures between the two states, the East German government failed to comply with its promises. It seems that the GDR did not want to substantially change its internal affairs, but only wanted positive international recognition. This points to the fundamental differences in the aims of the two German governments in Ostpolitk. Brandt hoped that relaxation of tensions between the states would lead to reunification, and the end of communism, while the Eastern government hoped that relaxation would consolidate communism. The conservative argument that the communists were being appeased without benefit to West Germany, and that the positive economic relationship between the two states was being used to prop up an illegitimate regime, was not altogether unfounded.
If Brandt’s achievement of Ostpolitik can be criticised for anything it must be the emphasis placed on it at the expense of the domestic reform, which had been promised so emphatically in 1969, when Brandt spoke of “daring more democracy” Because of the haste with which the Brandt-Scheel government was established, they had not drawn up a comprehensive plan of reform. Therefore the FDR could oppose any reforms it didn’t like, without breaking its promises, for none had been made. Furthermore the CDU/CSU was strongly represented in the Bundesrat, and could obstruct Brandt’s reforms from there. Despite these barriers the government succeeded in establishing the breakdown of marriage the sole ground for divorce, and exempting pornography from prosecution unless it caused social offence. However, as the political parties at large approved these reforms this meagre achievement was not Brandt’s alone. Little progress was made in the area of workers’ rights. Workers’ co-determination was extended to all firms employing more than 2000 people. The limited nature of these reforms frustrated the more left wing of the SPD. Perhaps if Brandt had spent more time lobbying the FDP at home, and less time on his Ostpolitik he would have been able to pass more reforms.
Willy Brandt was a European statesman during a period often referred to as the “dark ages of the European Community.” The 1970s were a turbulent time in the international economic system, seeing the collapse of the international monetary system, the oil crisis, and the onset of stagflation, which made domestic governments less eager to pursue integration at the expense of national sovereignty. Brandt became chancellor of Germany at the same time as George Pompidou was taking over from Charles de Gaulle, and these two representatives were responsible for refocusing the direction of the European Community. This was done through the Hague Summit of 1969, which defined the objectives of the European Community in the next years as completion (of policies already underway), widening (of the European Community) and deepening (of the bonds of the European Community). Brandt played a major role in the successful outcome of this conference. Completion was achieved, as was widening, with the ascension of Ireland, Britain and Denmark. The objective of deepening was achieved with less success, because of continuing economic problems.
The SPD had been concerned with strengthening the democratic element in the European institutions, but in the grand coalition of 1966-69 devoted little time to this reform plan, as the overriding feeling in the EC was relief that the French had ceased their empty chair protest. Furthermore Brandt’s role in government was to define foreign policy and his priorities lay elsewhere. Pro-integration rhetoric built up public expectations, which were frustrated by slow progress due to the defence of German interests. In West Germany at the time there was commitment to the idea of community in principle, but little enthusiasm for the actual practicalities. The federal government’s European policies were formulated at a technical level, and did not overly involve the ministers. For this reason it rarely caught the attention of the electorate, who were more interested in the nature of relations with East Germany than with Western Europe. Brandt’s leadership and enthusiasm in the Hague Summit can be seen as a more superficial achievement than it appears, as he excelled more at praising the Union in evocative terms, but was reluctant to make financial sacrifices to the attainment of European goals.
In 1970 Brandt won the Nobel Prize for peace. Although this was not at the end of his career it indicates the value of his achievements, those behind him, and those yet to come. He himself sums up the core of his contribution. On receiving the Prize he described “how much it means to me that it is my work "on behalf of the German people" which has been acknowledged; that it was granted me, after the unforgettable horrors of the past, to see the name of my country brought together with the will for peace”. Throughout the crucial years of 1966-1974 he demonstrated unwavering political realism. He operated by acknowledging how things were, not how they ought to be. He was instrumental in ushering in a new phase of German history.
Bibliography
Books
Balfour, Michael, West Germany: A Contemporary History , (Kent 1982)
Bulmer,Simon and Paterson, William, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community, (London 1987)
Edited by Burdick, Charles, Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, Kudszus, Winifried, Contemporary Germany: Politics and Culture,(Boulder 1984)
Feld, Werner J, West Germany and the European Community: Changing Interests and Competing Policy Objectives, (New York 1981)
Fulbrook, Mary, The Fontana History of Germany 1918-1990, (London 1991)
George, Stephen and Bache, Ian, Politics in the European Union, (Oxford 2001)
Nichols, A.J., The Bonn Republic: West German Democracy 1945-1990, (Essex 1997),
Websites
Wikipedia: Willy Brandt http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willy_Brandt
14th November 2005
Wikipedia: The Hallstein Doctrine, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallstein_Doctrine
14th November 2005
Nobelprize.org http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1971/brandt-cv.html,
14th November 2005
An account of Brandt's time in office as Chancellor, by Prof. Gerhard Rempel.
http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/germany/lectures/47brandt.html
14th November 2005
German History in Documents and Images: “Excerpts from Willy Brandt's Policy Statement, "Easing the Tensions" (1969)”
and
“Willy Brandt on the Building of the Berlin Wall (August 13, 1961)”
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=86
14th November 2005