Since it has been a while...
I have decided to be kind enough to supply an update. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, though it is just a simple paste of my last essay written in philosophy. It is nothing exceptional but, like most my work, I am still somewhat proud of it at least. The topic? A critical dismissal of Platonic forms and mild praise for the metaphysics of Aristotle. Enjoy.
Aristotle represents a distinct departure from the view of his predecessors and specifically his eminent teacher Plato in terms of metaphysics. This digression from the intangible and transcendent into the physical and empirical is one that is worthy on the account of its ingenuity as well as the fact that it is much more logically succinct and on the mark.
For my part, I dissent from the Platonic conception of universals on two grounds: one logical and the other epistemological or metaphysical. Aristotle did not explicitly contest Plato’s doctrine on strictly logical grounds but rather did so metaphysically; however, the underlying premises of the Aristotelian theory are based in a logical objection to Plato. I shall, therefore, attempt to explain my concerns with the failings that I see within Plato’s doctrine of the types and then give my tentative support for some of Aristotle’s theory.
The first and foremost challenge to Plato’s doctrine of types is that by introducing intangible entities he is unnecessarily complicating the matter. If, given any sort of phenomena, we can explain the occurrence without reference to inferred entities of any sort that exist outside of the phenomena itself, then we should do well to get on without them. For what purpose or gain could be had by the introduction of the universal forms which exist in this transcendent heaven if we can very well get by without these forms as Aristotle demonstrated? When the number of variables or entities in a given class of propositions in a certain ontology increases, so does the chance for error. Moreover, if these entities are unnecessary to account for the experiences with which we are attempting to classify or explain, then there seems to be no valid reason to allowing them place within our ontology. In logic simplicity is the key to efficiency and by reducing the amount of basic propositions of a given system one is much more likely to attain truth rather than run the risk of error. If I can explain a certain phenomenon P by means of the variables of x and y, then why add z to the equation if we gain no new insight or it does not add to our certainty that P follows from x and y?
Beyond the fact that Plato has introduced unnecessary entities into his ontology he has also unknowingly fallen into a grievous logical error in concernment of the recognition of forms. To recognize a certain object x as having the property or function f it is necessary and sufficient that I should also have some acquaintance with the form of f. This is all well and good until we analyze this acquaintance in terms of logical relations. To know the truth of f(x), or in other words that x is a member of the class of all things f where f is a predicate or property, one must according to Plato recognize the relation of similarity between the form of f and the empirical properties of x which correspond. Therefore we see that the empirical properties of x correspond to the form of f and thusly conclude f(x); we, in other words, recognize the relation S of similarity between the empirical properties and the intangible form f. Now the question arises, “How do we recognize this relation S that stands between the empirical properties of x and the form f?” Well, it stands to reason that there must be a form that represents this relation of recognizing the previous relation that stood between the properties of x and the form of those said properties. But then we fall now into a vicious circle. If we must recognize the relation form between the properties of the object and the form of these properties, then we must recognize the form of this recognizing relation, we must further recognize the form of that form of recognizing the prior relation, and so on ad infinitum.
Putting aside the purely logical errors of Plato’s doctrine I shall now take up metaphysical and epistemological objections to his theory of types. The first and foremost charge against Plato is plainly that there is a lack of evidence or reason to believe in the existence of these eternal forms. True enough, Plato does supply a series of ingenious arguments for the existence of these forms but they are all fallacious. Plato begins with the presupposition that all words denote, that they all must have a logical extension. Therefore, in Plato’s ontology unicorns, golden mountains, and round-squares all exist in some form in Platonic heaven (although it is difficult to even conceive of how a round-square could be accounted for even by Plato). There is no necessity in the idea that words must denote, it should be simple enough that when they fail to denote any specific entity that they merely connote or have intension.
However, I have digressed from the primary point of lack of sufficient ground to believe in the existence of these forms. I have no intention of denying that such entities could exist for there is no logical impossibility in the fact. While there may be serious logical difficulties in Plato’s specific conception of these forms, there is no logical contradiction or impossibility in their existence. However, for the same reason that we conclude that there is no Lochness monster we should be compelled to admit that there are no Platonic forms. It could be gainsaid that there could not really be any demonstrative a posteriori proof of the existence of such entities and this I may be willing to concede. However, what I cannot concede is that this in any fashion bolsters the argument for their existence for I shall maintain the existence can only be demonstrated a posteriori and never purely a priori. By what means do I conclude that I am currently sitting in a chair and that my fingers are dancing along a keyboard? I have a series of sense-data, or in Hume’s language “impressions”, which I am experiencing. From this class of data I can make inferences to the existence of the objects in my environment such as the computer monitor, the keyboard, and my chair. I know these things because I can have empirical verification of them. I have tactile sensation of the keyboard and while I do not with the monitor I could, hypothetically, if I was unsure if I were seeing a mere mirage such as Macbeth’s dagger, reach out and experience tactile sense-data of the monitor. For my part I cannot conceive of any other means of verification of the existence of entities. I can reason soundly that my car does in fact currently still exist where I last parked it but I cannot be certain of this fact. I have good reason to believe it still exists in the same spatio-temporal location, but I cannot know this to be the case without verifying it empirically. These criteria for the apprehension of existence disqualify Platonic forms from being known to us.
For these reasons I cannot assent to the Platonic conception of universals and therefore side more so with Aristotle concerning this matter. Aristotle himself, while certainly not free from criticism, is much more on target when it comes to approaching the means of knowledge and the subject of ontology.
Aristotle represents a distinct departure from the view of his predecessors and specifically his eminent teacher Plato in terms of metaphysics. This digression from the intangible and transcendent into the physical and empirical is one that is worthy on the account of its ingenuity as well as the fact that it is much more logically succinct and on the mark.
For my part, I dissent from the Platonic conception of universals on two grounds: one logical and the other epistemological or metaphysical. Aristotle did not explicitly contest Plato’s doctrine on strictly logical grounds but rather did so metaphysically; however, the underlying premises of the Aristotelian theory are based in a logical objection to Plato. I shall, therefore, attempt to explain my concerns with the failings that I see within Plato’s doctrine of the types and then give my tentative support for some of Aristotle’s theory.
The first and foremost challenge to Plato’s doctrine of types is that by introducing intangible entities he is unnecessarily complicating the matter. If, given any sort of phenomena, we can explain the occurrence without reference to inferred entities of any sort that exist outside of the phenomena itself, then we should do well to get on without them. For what purpose or gain could be had by the introduction of the universal forms which exist in this transcendent heaven if we can very well get by without these forms as Aristotle demonstrated? When the number of variables or entities in a given class of propositions in a certain ontology increases, so does the chance for error. Moreover, if these entities are unnecessary to account for the experiences with which we are attempting to classify or explain, then there seems to be no valid reason to allowing them place within our ontology. In logic simplicity is the key to efficiency and by reducing the amount of basic propositions of a given system one is much more likely to attain truth rather than run the risk of error. If I can explain a certain phenomenon P by means of the variables of x and y, then why add z to the equation if we gain no new insight or it does not add to our certainty that P follows from x and y?
Beyond the fact that Plato has introduced unnecessary entities into his ontology he has also unknowingly fallen into a grievous logical error in concernment of the recognition of forms. To recognize a certain object x as having the property or function f it is necessary and sufficient that I should also have some acquaintance with the form of f. This is all well and good until we analyze this acquaintance in terms of logical relations. To know the truth of f(x), or in other words that x is a member of the class of all things f where f is a predicate or property, one must according to Plato recognize the relation of similarity between the form of f and the empirical properties of x which correspond. Therefore we see that the empirical properties of x correspond to the form of f and thusly conclude f(x); we, in other words, recognize the relation S of similarity between the empirical properties and the intangible form f. Now the question arises, “How do we recognize this relation S that stands between the empirical properties of x and the form f?” Well, it stands to reason that there must be a form that represents this relation of recognizing the previous relation that stood between the properties of x and the form of those said properties. But then we fall now into a vicious circle. If we must recognize the relation form between the properties of the object and the form of these properties, then we must recognize the form of this recognizing relation, we must further recognize the form of that form of recognizing the prior relation, and so on ad infinitum.
Putting aside the purely logical errors of Plato’s doctrine I shall now take up metaphysical and epistemological objections to his theory of types. The first and foremost charge against Plato is plainly that there is a lack of evidence or reason to believe in the existence of these eternal forms. True enough, Plato does supply a series of ingenious arguments for the existence of these forms but they are all fallacious. Plato begins with the presupposition that all words denote, that they all must have a logical extension. Therefore, in Plato’s ontology unicorns, golden mountains, and round-squares all exist in some form in Platonic heaven (although it is difficult to even conceive of how a round-square could be accounted for even by Plato). There is no necessity in the idea that words must denote, it should be simple enough that when they fail to denote any specific entity that they merely connote or have intension.
However, I have digressed from the primary point of lack of sufficient ground to believe in the existence of these forms. I have no intention of denying that such entities could exist for there is no logical impossibility in the fact. While there may be serious logical difficulties in Plato’s specific conception of these forms, there is no logical contradiction or impossibility in their existence. However, for the same reason that we conclude that there is no Lochness monster we should be compelled to admit that there are no Platonic forms. It could be gainsaid that there could not really be any demonstrative a posteriori proof of the existence of such entities and this I may be willing to concede. However, what I cannot concede is that this in any fashion bolsters the argument for their existence for I shall maintain the existence can only be demonstrated a posteriori and never purely a priori. By what means do I conclude that I am currently sitting in a chair and that my fingers are dancing along a keyboard? I have a series of sense-data, or in Hume’s language “impressions”, which I am experiencing. From this class of data I can make inferences to the existence of the objects in my environment such as the computer monitor, the keyboard, and my chair. I know these things because I can have empirical verification of them. I have tactile sensation of the keyboard and while I do not with the monitor I could, hypothetically, if I was unsure if I were seeing a mere mirage such as Macbeth’s dagger, reach out and experience tactile sense-data of the monitor. For my part I cannot conceive of any other means of verification of the existence of entities. I can reason soundly that my car does in fact currently still exist where I last parked it but I cannot be certain of this fact. I have good reason to believe it still exists in the same spatio-temporal location, but I cannot know this to be the case without verifying it empirically. These criteria for the apprehension of existence disqualify Platonic forms from being known to us.
For these reasons I cannot assent to the Platonic conception of universals and therefore side more so with Aristotle concerning this matter. Aristotle himself, while certainly not free from criticism, is much more on target when it comes to approaching the means of knowledge and the subject of ontology.