The Question of Metaphysics
Thanks to nonexistent I have been inspired to lay out my thoughts on the matter of metaphysics with relation to an empiricist doctrine.
I suppose much of what I have to say prima facie will seem very much like the logical positivist doctrine of the verification of meaning. It is true that certain methods of the Vienna Circle have influenced my thought, but I cannot rightly label myself as a logical positivist as I disagree with them on many fundamental points. With that said, I shall begin my exposition upon the place of metaphysics for the empiricist.
I adopt the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge as well as, unlike Quine, analytic and synthetic statements. There was a time, due to the influence of J.S. Mill, that I disregarded the a priori, but that is no more. More or less I follow the typical analytical approach of all a priori knowledge as being synthetic and limiting it to mathematical and logical tautologies. Knowledge of all things however, in distinction from knowledge of the abstracted concepts such as mathematical and logical form, is known a posteriori. All I have been saying so far is the foundation to my thought and I have no desire to defend these fundamentals. What I wish to maintain is that while in order for anything to be known as a fact it must be theoretically capable of empirical verification, this does not imply that all metaphysical assertions are therefore meaningless or nonsense.
Granting that I am indeed an empiricist, how is it that I can grant meaning or validity to propositions concerning a transcendent reality or a fundamental structure to the universe that I cannot observe? Well, there are many points raised by such a question and I suppose the first I wish to address it that no matter one's philosophy, one cannot escape metaphysics. Epistemology itself is a branch of metaphysics. To say that human knowledge is limited to the observable is to employ a metaphysical theory. To say that metaphysics is nonsense, which is nonsense itself, is another metaphysical theory. F.H. Bradley once said that any man who wished to prove that metaphysics was impossible was nothing but a brother metaphysician with a rival theory. Thus for anyone to approach metaphysics with the idea that metaphysics is strictly nonsense by virtue of its form or claims is immediately taking out the very foundation from his or her own theories. There is an underlying metaphysic in all of us, no matter our doctrines and beliefs.
Taking it into account that the banishment of metaphysics is self-defeating and contradictory, I can move on to much more substantive points. If I were to be in an argument with a metaphysician who asserted such a proposition that there is no, or perhaps could not be, any empirical evidence for I cannot rightly impute that he speaks nonsense (strictly speaking). I can, of course, say that his argument is nonsense by virtue of his logic or possible evidence contrary to it, but the fact that the nature of the claims are beyond verification do not immediately result in his propositions to be meaningless, per contra to the logical positivist doctrine. If I were, that would be a clear cut case of an argument from ignorance. While he cannot prove his theory to me, I equally cannot disprove him.
Furthermore, one who argues that we cannot know something because we cannot observe it is unduly limiting human knowledge with no grounds whatsoever for supposing the fact. I see no reason to believe that we know the precise limits of observation. Perhaps we shall eventually discover new empirical manifestations, some new form of energy, that we are now ignorant to that would have great philosophical implications. It is not at all unconceivable that we could extend our empirical data through scientific instrumentation. I do not profess to know the exact limits of empirical knowledge for as Wittgenstein said, "in order to draw a limit to thinking, we should have to think both sides of this limit." And surely, I doubt any empiricist would claim to have experience of the "other side" of this limit.
At this point if we cannot arrive at some conclusion based upon rational argument, then we diverge accepting that we adopt different epistemological and metaphysical views of the world and human knowledge. It it merely a matter of preference and a pragmatic decision when we venture into the realm of which cannot be known. For my part, I find no reason to believe in eternal substance or ego, some immutable Absolute, or some other, in my opinion, silly and unnecessary metaphysical construct. Applying Occam's razor, I can get by on a fairly undiluted empiricist doctrine and still maintain that things exist when unperceived and can persist through time and so forth. Another philosopher may feel that my approach is half-assed and insignificant and believe that I neglect the apparent causal relationship between an entity and its properties. These disputes cannot be decidedly proved, but to argue that because we cannot demonstrate the truth of the matter, it is therefore meaningless to speculate is just silly.
In conclusion, metaphysics is clearly not nonsense even if metaphysical claims escape the process of verification. Reason should be sufficient in these cases to determine the likelihood of any metaphysical proposition. I personally could not assent to gross metaphysical propositions asserting unobserved substances, but that goes along with my own approach to philosophy and I could be wrong. But if, as I believe, the logical positivist and strict empiricist really strive for avoidance of error by limiting knowledge to the observable, then they commit a flaw in thinking when they decide to discount metaphysics on account of its claims. They presuppose their own infallibility by doing such. That's all I have to say I guess.
I suppose much of what I have to say prima facie will seem very much like the logical positivist doctrine of the verification of meaning. It is true that certain methods of the Vienna Circle have influenced my thought, but I cannot rightly label myself as a logical positivist as I disagree with them on many fundamental points. With that said, I shall begin my exposition upon the place of metaphysics for the empiricist.
I adopt the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge as well as, unlike Quine, analytic and synthetic statements. There was a time, due to the influence of J.S. Mill, that I disregarded the a priori, but that is no more. More or less I follow the typical analytical approach of all a priori knowledge as being synthetic and limiting it to mathematical and logical tautologies. Knowledge of all things however, in distinction from knowledge of the abstracted concepts such as mathematical and logical form, is known a posteriori. All I have been saying so far is the foundation to my thought and I have no desire to defend these fundamentals. What I wish to maintain is that while in order for anything to be known as a fact it must be theoretically capable of empirical verification, this does not imply that all metaphysical assertions are therefore meaningless or nonsense.
Granting that I am indeed an empiricist, how is it that I can grant meaning or validity to propositions concerning a transcendent reality or a fundamental structure to the universe that I cannot observe? Well, there are many points raised by such a question and I suppose the first I wish to address it that no matter one's philosophy, one cannot escape metaphysics. Epistemology itself is a branch of metaphysics. To say that human knowledge is limited to the observable is to employ a metaphysical theory. To say that metaphysics is nonsense, which is nonsense itself, is another metaphysical theory. F.H. Bradley once said that any man who wished to prove that metaphysics was impossible was nothing but a brother metaphysician with a rival theory. Thus for anyone to approach metaphysics with the idea that metaphysics is strictly nonsense by virtue of its form or claims is immediately taking out the very foundation from his or her own theories. There is an underlying metaphysic in all of us, no matter our doctrines and beliefs.
Taking it into account that the banishment of metaphysics is self-defeating and contradictory, I can move on to much more substantive points. If I were to be in an argument with a metaphysician who asserted such a proposition that there is no, or perhaps could not be, any empirical evidence for I cannot rightly impute that he speaks nonsense (strictly speaking). I can, of course, say that his argument is nonsense by virtue of his logic or possible evidence contrary to it, but the fact that the nature of the claims are beyond verification do not immediately result in his propositions to be meaningless, per contra to the logical positivist doctrine. If I were, that would be a clear cut case of an argument from ignorance. While he cannot prove his theory to me, I equally cannot disprove him.
Furthermore, one who argues that we cannot know something because we cannot observe it is unduly limiting human knowledge with no grounds whatsoever for supposing the fact. I see no reason to believe that we know the precise limits of observation. Perhaps we shall eventually discover new empirical manifestations, some new form of energy, that we are now ignorant to that would have great philosophical implications. It is not at all unconceivable that we could extend our empirical data through scientific instrumentation. I do not profess to know the exact limits of empirical knowledge for as Wittgenstein said, "in order to draw a limit to thinking, we should have to think both sides of this limit." And surely, I doubt any empiricist would claim to have experience of the "other side" of this limit.
At this point if we cannot arrive at some conclusion based upon rational argument, then we diverge accepting that we adopt different epistemological and metaphysical views of the world and human knowledge. It it merely a matter of preference and a pragmatic decision when we venture into the realm of which cannot be known. For my part, I find no reason to believe in eternal substance or ego, some immutable Absolute, or some other, in my opinion, silly and unnecessary metaphysical construct. Applying Occam's razor, I can get by on a fairly undiluted empiricist doctrine and still maintain that things exist when unperceived and can persist through time and so forth. Another philosopher may feel that my approach is half-assed and insignificant and believe that I neglect the apparent causal relationship between an entity and its properties. These disputes cannot be decidedly proved, but to argue that because we cannot demonstrate the truth of the matter, it is therefore meaningless to speculate is just silly.
In conclusion, metaphysics is clearly not nonsense even if metaphysical claims escape the process of verification. Reason should be sufficient in these cases to determine the likelihood of any metaphysical proposition. I personally could not assent to gross metaphysical propositions asserting unobserved substances, but that goes along with my own approach to philosophy and I could be wrong. But if, as I believe, the logical positivist and strict empiricist really strive for avoidance of error by limiting knowledge to the observable, then they commit a flaw in thinking when they decide to discount metaphysics on account of its claims. They presuppose their own infallibility by doing such. That's all I have to say I guess.