Idealism
I believe the confusion that has led to the philosophical doctrine of idealism lies within the nature of sense-data in distinction to a sensation. A sense-datum is a logical object which stands distinct from any subject. It merely is and nothing more. Whereas a sensation is logically complex and involves a subject, the one perceiving, and the object, the sense-data.
Putting it shortly and plainly a sensation is logically of the form: "x perceives y"; whereas sense-data is merely represented as "x", or "x is y", or any other non-subjective logical arrangement. Sense-data is that which is the object in a sensation; that which is perceived. Thus, logically we can deduce that sense-data must exist in order for sensation to be valid for otherwise, if it did not exist, then there could be no possible way of the subject having a relation to it. This brings us back to a familiar maxim, viz. that something cannot have a relation to nothingness.
So there are some preliminary thoughts in a introductory outline form of some work in epistemology here. Hehe. These concepts aren't entirely novel, but they shall be expanded upon later.
Putting it shortly and plainly a sensation is logically of the form: "x perceives y"; whereas sense-data is merely represented as "x", or "x is y", or any other non-subjective logical arrangement. Sense-data is that which is the object in a sensation; that which is perceived. Thus, logically we can deduce that sense-data must exist in order for sensation to be valid for otherwise, if it did not exist, then there could be no possible way of the subject having a relation to it. This brings us back to a familiar maxim, viz. that something cannot have a relation to nothingness.
So there are some preliminary thoughts in a introductory outline form of some work in epistemology here. Hehe. These concepts aren't entirely novel, but they shall be expanded upon later.