Negative Facts and Self-Contradiction
The following are three common objections to various intellectual positions in metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of mind, and one example from the history of science. My question is are these statements truly self-contradictory, or do they just appear to be because of a conflation between "positive" and "negative" facts.
Relativism (i.e. that objective Truth does not exist):
The nonexistence of objective Truth would be a fact about objective Truth.
Therefore, the nonexistence of objective Truth is self-contradictory.
Moral Nihilism (i.e. that moral Truth does not exist):
The nonexistence of moral Truth would be a fact about moral Truth.
Therefore, the nonexistence of moral Truth is self-contradictory.
Eliminative Materialism (i.e. that mental states do not exist):
The nonexistence of mental states would be a fact about mental states.
Therefore, the nonexistence of mental states is self-contradictory.
The Molecular Kinetic Theory of Heat (i.e. that caloric fluid does not exist):
The nonexistence of caloric fluid would be a fact about caloric fluid.
Therefore, the nonexistence of caloric fluid is self-contradictory.
A negative fact is the non-existence of a state of affairs, that "something is not the case," in contrast to a positive fact, the existence of a state of affairs, that "something is the case." There has been debate about the nature of negative facts. Russell believes that negative facts exist and are represented by negative propositions. Wittgenstein claims that all elementary propositions depict positive facts and that negative facts, rather than really existing, merely indicate that there is no such combination between objects or things.
It seems pretty apparent to me that Wittgenstein's view is correct. By proposing a negative fact about the nonexistence of the subject in question, what is being questioned is the content of the discourse itself and whether or not it is referential. Furthermore, it seems that any accusation of self-contradiction begs the question by assuming the existence of precisely what is being denied. It appears that if these intellectual positions are to stand or fall it will be for reasons other than internal incoherence and self-contradiction.
Relativism (i.e. that objective Truth does not exist):
The nonexistence of objective Truth would be a fact about objective Truth.
Therefore, the nonexistence of objective Truth is self-contradictory.
Moral Nihilism (i.e. that moral Truth does not exist):
The nonexistence of moral Truth would be a fact about moral Truth.
Therefore, the nonexistence of moral Truth is self-contradictory.
Eliminative Materialism (i.e. that mental states do not exist):
The nonexistence of mental states would be a fact about mental states.
Therefore, the nonexistence of mental states is self-contradictory.
The Molecular Kinetic Theory of Heat (i.e. that caloric fluid does not exist):
The nonexistence of caloric fluid would be a fact about caloric fluid.
Therefore, the nonexistence of caloric fluid is self-contradictory.
A negative fact is the non-existence of a state of affairs, that "something is not the case," in contrast to a positive fact, the existence of a state of affairs, that "something is the case." There has been debate about the nature of negative facts. Russell believes that negative facts exist and are represented by negative propositions. Wittgenstein claims that all elementary propositions depict positive facts and that negative facts, rather than really existing, merely indicate that there is no such combination between objects or things.
It seems pretty apparent to me that Wittgenstein's view is correct. By proposing a negative fact about the nonexistence of the subject in question, what is being questioned is the content of the discourse itself and whether or not it is referential. Furthermore, it seems that any accusation of self-contradiction begs the question by assuming the existence of precisely what is being denied. It appears that if these intellectual positions are to stand or fall it will be for reasons other than internal incoherence and self-contradiction.