Frank Jackson's Turnaround
"I am what is sometimes known as a 'qualia freak' I think that there are certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes... Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain... [and] you won’t have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pants of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky."
- Frank Jackson in "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982)
"Color experience presents to us as if it were the acquisition of information about highly salient, more or less intrinsic features of our surroundings. But there are no physical features fitting this characterization; in consequence, color experience presents itself to us as if it were information about certain nonphysical features. Indeed, we may want to go so far as to say that sensing red misrepresents how things are. If this is right, we should say that nothing is red, for nothing would be as our experience of red represents things as being; we should be eliminativists about red and about color in general. A more moderate position is that although our experience of color contains a substantial degree of misrepresentation - the misrepresentation that leads dualists astray - there are complex physical properties 'out there' that stand in relations near enough to those captured by the color solid for us to be able to identify them with the various colors."
- Frank Jackson in "Mind and Illusion" (2003)
- Frank Jackson in "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982)
"Color experience presents to us as if it were the acquisition of information about highly salient, more or less intrinsic features of our surroundings. But there are no physical features fitting this characterization; in consequence, color experience presents itself to us as if it were information about certain nonphysical features. Indeed, we may want to go so far as to say that sensing red misrepresents how things are. If this is right, we should say that nothing is red, for nothing would be as our experience of red represents things as being; we should be eliminativists about red and about color in general. A more moderate position is that although our experience of color contains a substantial degree of misrepresentation - the misrepresentation that leads dualists astray - there are complex physical properties 'out there' that stand in relations near enough to those captured by the color solid for us to be able to identify them with the various colors."
- Frank Jackson in "Mind and Illusion" (2003)