the "Mind"-"Body" problem for phenomenology: Excusing the question
Troubled by my inability to address such a canonical question as how brain chemistry relates to the lived body, I have had several mini-epiphanies as of the last few days. The first relates to my issues with language that I alluded to. By asking the mind-body question in terms of consciousness and physicalism, it becomes virtually impossible for
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Nonetheless I think it is important to attempt to bridge that gap, so long as the interlocutor is open to rational dialogue. The difficult concepts in the diverse field of "continental" philosophy have to be earned; not assumed from the outset as an article of faith. We don't want transcendent critique of analytic philosophy that arrogantly takes its starting point from the outside. I think it's more productive to explode the metaphysical realist worldview (for example) from the inside out, and thereby show why the insights of continental philosophy necessarily follow.
This is one of the reasons why I think it is so important to have a fluent grasp of Kant. First, many of the problems of contemporary philosophy that do not find their solution in Kant can at least find orientation there. But second, I think Kant's philosophy contains within it many of the eroneous assumptions of modern philosophy and of modernity in general, and an immanent critique of Kant shows us ways to critique some of the other trends of modern philosophy. Not only that, but the gestures of many continental thinkers (especially Heidegger in Being and Time) can be understood as a continuation of the Kantian project.
Quine's is fixed and in need of quantification and description, while Heidegger's is in flux and incapable of being divorced from the consideration of a subject (I realize this is a more complicated claim to make in reference to later Heidegger, but is true at least of Being and Time).
I'm not sure that I would characterize this as the major difference between someone like Quine and Heidegger. The difference in Heidegger is that the practical grounds the theoretical. Presence-at-hand is a restriction of the equipmental background, of things ready-to-hand. The practical projects an ontology before itself that must in a certain way be more primordial than the ontology projected by the theoretical. (And in this he is following very closely Kant's project of a moral ontology in the third critique.) What is powerful about this is not only that it evades the problems of making the theoretical primary -- as many analytical philosophers do -- but it gives an account of how we move from things ready-to-hand to seeing them as present-at-hand. You could make Heidegger totally compatible with natural science without damaging either of them. Heidegger's insight, though, is that there is a "background" level which evades theoretical explanation. The theoretical is a "subset" of it. That's what I see as the big difference (and the big advantage, of course).
[sigh]
I'd just like to say that I enjoy having you on my friend's list, and it's a pleasure both to read and respond to your posts!
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The key to the entire situation seems to be the openness of the analytic interlocutor. Although this situation might change, I have not encountered many analytics that are willing to listen, and the establishments are, largely, theirs. I don't see this situation changing much in the near future--especially given the severe pragmatic (in the non-philosophical sense) bent of our society--so I'm just going to carry on with what I think is important in peace.
As far as Quine-Heidegger go, I was just using them as exemplars of metaphysics competing with ontology. I like how you have treated Heidegger's thought as a subversion of reason, so to speak. My own philosophical project lies down this path as well, but not in the sense of being a-rational or irrational, or even in the prioritizing of practical concerns (though I do think this is the correct order of things!).
Just as a general comment: I think the implications of the third critique incontemporary continental thought is an area that is left largely unexplored. Merleau-Ponty was obviously very influenced by Kant as well, not coincidental, I think, with Brunschvig as a teacher!
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One of the great things about the Critique of Judgment is that it is, in so many ways, a brilliant work in the philosophy of science. It succeeds in demonstrating the consequence of the primacy of the practical for Kant: that the Newtonian account of the universe does not stand on its own, it is not self-grounded, but rather it presupposes a non-conceptual background that has the principle of purposiveness as the condition of the space of its operation. One's reading of the third critique is crucial in this regard. If you take the pedestrian reading of it -- the idea that the third critique makes the world safe for the other two critiques -- then you're going to be a lot more amenable to analytic philosophy. But if you take a more radical, "explosive" reading of it, you're going to find that the basic divisions of the system -- divisions which constitute in many ways the way of being of dogmatic philosophy -- unstable and in need of revision. It comes down to whether or not you think questions of aesthetics destabilize the traditional notion of truth. I see this as a major difference between continen
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As a post scriptum: Suzanne Langer's book Mind is supposed to be an analytic attempt to bring stability to the analytic project through the introduction of aesthetic concerns. Not very surprisingly, Langer's being both a female and an aesthetician, the analytic establishment has largely failed to recognize her contributions. I'll get back to you if it's worth reading.
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Right. The third critique in its entirety is something like an attempt at a moral ontology. He showed that freedom exists and that it is absolute, but this requires that the world be the kind of place in which freedom can exist. Therefore he has to revise the account of the world put forward in the first critique, because Newtonian science is incompatible with the demands of freedom. This is very close to what Heidegger is doing in Being and Time, and that's why it's his most Kantian book. Both books are an attempt at a teleology without a telos.
re: Guyer
I haven't read his book, although I've read Allison's. As my teacher Jay Bernstein has remarked, if there is a 9th level of hell, Allison and Guyer will be in it, circling around each other in an unending Death Match.
Allison is a great Kant scholar. He gives a very fair, even charitable reading of Kant. The problem is that he doesn't think Kant ever made a bad argument anywhere!
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I really like that image of Allison and Guyer's bloodsport! The Kant prof in Memphis, Hoke Robinson, although he loves Allison, frequently jokes about how Allison seemingly effortlessly just invents interpretations of Kant to make him more coherent. The problem with this, of course, is that by making Kant's thought seemless you close off the possibility for its evolution--and the possible flaw of the project itself (such as you pointed out earlier).
Hey! This is great! We're actually shooting the breeze about philosophy, which is the reason I started this journal in the first place. Are you going to be applying around in the Spring to go on for our Ph.D. in the Fall? If you are, I can keep you posted on the goings on down here in Memphis. Although the city itself is no NYC, far from it actually, our program is full of a bunch of great people... students and faculty. Hoke would be particularly happy to have someone else interested in Kant, apparently I'm the first one in the history of the program (but, like I said, his reading tends to favor Allison's perspective). If you are interested in German Romanticism, though, for your dissertation, I wouldn't even consider us. We cover Heidegger and French philosophy pretty thoroughly, however.
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The problem with this, of course, is that by making Kant's thought seemless you close off the possibility for its evolution
The Stamp Collection attitude toward doing philosophy, yeah. Adorno likes to make fun of that in his book on Kant's first critique. (That book is hilarious, by the way.)
I don't know what I'm doing for my PhD. I'm going to finish the MA here, but then I don't know. New School is really expensive, disorganized, and there are just too many people in the program. On the other hand, of all the programs I looked at, this one was by far the most desirable in terms of who is here and the curriculum. (Critical theory is an important aspect of our program.) The location is also great fo
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I may apply to other places just to see what they throw at me. If I got a good scholarship and thus could avoid going into further mountains of debt, I might just have to take advantage of that. Then again, maybe my own program will finally recognize my genius and offer to pick up the slack ... but I'm not holding my breath. :)
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Yes, that's right. I am forgetting my B-Deduction. Hoke stressed this as we were going through it: since every new apperception adds to the synthetic unity thereof, there can be no way to have a completed or total unity. Since science is based in perceptions and apperception, it too cannot be completed because there will always be a smaller part to discover or a larger classification to make. Although I'm not so sure how much I buy Hoke's take on that last part, the former seems to play well with what he says in the third Critique. Maybe we should see what jupitah has to say about this? :-)
As far as grad school goes, maybe check out DePaul? They do a lot of Critical Theory and Heidegger, I think. Chicago might not be so bad either; I liked it when I was there. You are right, though, Memphis is not that exciting (although the student community makes it worthwhile). I think I'm starting to get antsy because my hard-core philosophy discussion buddies are all going to graduate in the next year (I fell in with the older students). Like I said, I'm the only one reading Kant and definitely the only phenomenologist. Len supports me completely, but he is also the person who wrote an article entitled something like "The death of phenomenology".
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