Random thoughts and other such detritus

[leafofgrass]

*I arrived home safely on Wednesday evening after driving the 20-something hours from Memphis. Upon arrival, I checked my e-mail to discover that I had passed my comprehensive exam--only three more to go! Unless, of course, I decide to transfer

Comments

warning: writing under the influence of recent Dennett consumption

[noetickerf]

" [...] Do I really want to read another tale of how sodium and electricity in my brain work together to give me qualitative self-awareness?" The answer to that was a clear "no" so I moved on.

ok, knowing your devotion to heidegger, i'm pretty sure i can sketch out the beginnings of why the "no" would be so strong from you, but (since you're bored) i thought you might tell me to what extent the "no" is aesthetic, and to what extent it's principled. in particular, are you committed to a position in which we posit something called "qualitative self-awareness" that should not be able to be descibed in terms of the movement of sodium and potassium ions? if so, will you tell me something about the underpinnings of this position. (i admit that asking the question so naively is a little forced, but i really am up in the air about the relation of consciousness/subjectivity/awareness in existential philosophy to the above in neuroscience, and it's keeping me awake at night (as witness recent post about being an object) so i'm soliciting all suggestions.)

three cheers for the tlp! have you read agamben's potentialities or the coming community?? his debt to wittgenstein there is so huge that I think it clinches the case for it being necessary to treat the latter as a major continental figure in addition to his obvious status in the anglophone world.

Re: warning: writing under the influence of recent Dennett consumption

[leafofgrass]

My problem isn't necessarily with mental causation in general, it the fact that there is so much built into the acceptance of such a belief. Being a huge fan of Merleau-Ponty, I like to base things in the body and, additionally, I don't have an automatic distaste for the findings of science. That when I think sodium, potassium, calcium, and whatever else floats around in my brain (to use technical language), I cannot deny. But what does that mean? To date, no one has sufficiently explained to me how these chemicals translate into experience--Kripke's identity theory response strikes me as a particularly poor attempt at understanding the issue--and until someone can, I reject to biological reductionist response. This is not an ad ignoratum for the simple reason that I am not claiming the opposite--the independent existence of some sort of "mind"--to be true. I just don't think that the solution to the mind-body problem is going to come from any of the metaphysical realist positions.

So what do I think. Well, the "no" is pretty principled, we can start from there. I do think that I am self-aware, but I did carefully try to avoid speaking of consciousness because that immediately implies some sort of cordoned-off interiority inaccessible to others. I don't like that idea because I find that others frequently do have access to my thoughts and demeanors. Not in the sense that they could think my thoughts, of course, but at least see my disposition and perhaps even my intentions. That word I use deliberately, since I find that intentionaliy is at least partially "exterior". Of course, being a good follower of MP, exterior and interior are no longer the most useful of terms.

Since I feel as if I am just rambling on and on, maybe I'll just answer your question directly. Yes, I believe that there is something that can be loosley referred to as "qualitative self-awareness" that is not reducible to physical chemical causation in the brain. What does this mean: it means that while I can acknowledge physical phenomena, I reject the metaphysical position that is assumed to follow from such an acknowledgement (that there is a physical-brain process that corresponds to my experience, therefore the experience must be that process and everything is physical). Even if one accepts the premise that "everything is physical", I think there is enough evidence to state that physical does not necessarily mean a metaphysical realism. For both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, I would argue, everything is physical, but there is still transcendence and certainly no realism.

In my dealings with analytic philosophy, generally speaking, I am disappointed by the lack of reflection on that basic metaphysical assumption. What I find truly distressing is that Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in particular is being assimilated and read as a realist thinkers when clearly neither is true. It almost makes me want to take Len's position that analytic philosophy is not really philosophy at all because it lacks a certain tendency to reflect upon its foundational premises.

Being tired, I don't think I've made any sense. I apologize. Maybe I'll think this over more tomorrow when I'm awake and post a more coherent statement of a position. :-P