(no subject)
This is officially cool!
In other news, with the economy the way it is, everyone at hubby's workplace is being denied more than two hours of overtime per week. This means significantly lower paychecks, which in turn means it's a good thing we just paid off the car. It also means that, unless overtime comes open again soon, tutoring/substitute teaching will no longer be something I might look into, it'll be something I have to do if we want to continue doing things like eating and drinking and living in a house. (Well, not quite that bad. But bill-paying will, for the first time in ages, go back to being sheer ulcer-causing horror.)
So I'll be filling out some e-paperwork at the local high schools' websites and hopefully something will come through. Ugh. On the other hand, given my inherent laziness, this may be the only way I'd actually get off my butt and go find a job anyway.
And finally, Levine continues to steal my heart in a brain-crush sorta way:
Pantheism has a non-anthropocentric conception of human well-being. The human good is characterized partly in terms of relational properties. One must have a certain kind of relation to the Unity in order to live "properly." The set of properties common and unique to humans, which also define the good for humans as such, include relational properties. When a person exemplifies their essential human nature in this way--and it can only be exemplified in this relational way--they are living the "good" life and can thereby achieve well-being and happiness. This non-anthropocentric conception of human well-being constitutes pantheism's standard of human perfection and virtue. It is a standard of intrinsic value.
As in the case of Aristotle's essentialist conception of the nature of things, the human good (defined as it is in terms of human nature) will be different from an animal's good or a plant's good. For the pantheist, however, the good of these other things must also be understood partly in terms of their relation to the Unity. Furthermore, the good associated with various things (humans, plants etc.) is incommensurable. ... What this means is that there is no standard external to each kind of thing by which all things can be measured in terms of perfection, or virtue, or instrinsic value. There is no such thing as intrinsic value epr se given an essentialist account of the nature of things which includes essentialist standards of perfection. It is not just wrong to say that a human being is intrinsically more valuable than a tree. It is also nonsense.
In other news, with the economy the way it is, everyone at hubby's workplace is being denied more than two hours of overtime per week. This means significantly lower paychecks, which in turn means it's a good thing we just paid off the car. It also means that, unless overtime comes open again soon, tutoring/substitute teaching will no longer be something I might look into, it'll be something I have to do if we want to continue doing things like eating and drinking and living in a house. (Well, not quite that bad. But bill-paying will, for the first time in ages, go back to being sheer ulcer-causing horror.)
So I'll be filling out some e-paperwork at the local high schools' websites and hopefully something will come through. Ugh. On the other hand, given my inherent laziness, this may be the only way I'd actually get off my butt and go find a job anyway.
And finally, Levine continues to steal my heart in a brain-crush sorta way:
Pantheism has a non-anthropocentric conception of human well-being. The human good is characterized partly in terms of relational properties. One must have a certain kind of relation to the Unity in order to live "properly." The set of properties common and unique to humans, which also define the good for humans as such, include relational properties. When a person exemplifies their essential human nature in this way--and it can only be exemplified in this relational way--they are living the "good" life and can thereby achieve well-being and happiness. This non-anthropocentric conception of human well-being constitutes pantheism's standard of human perfection and virtue. It is a standard of intrinsic value.
As in the case of Aristotle's essentialist conception of the nature of things, the human good (defined as it is in terms of human nature) will be different from an animal's good or a plant's good. For the pantheist, however, the good of these other things must also be understood partly in terms of their relation to the Unity. Furthermore, the good associated with various things (humans, plants etc.) is incommensurable. ... What this means is that there is no standard external to each kind of thing by which all things can be measured in terms of perfection, or virtue, or instrinsic value. There is no such thing as intrinsic value epr se given an essentialist account of the nature of things which includes essentialist standards of perfection. It is not just wrong to say that a human being is intrinsically more valuable than a tree. It is also nonsense.