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[lady_king]

All right students, after having a number of classes with you, enjoying a majority of them, I would hate to tell you I would like a paper to be handed in about a history related subject. I do not want some scribble dribbles put on my desk, I want actual papers. If you give me crap, you will receive what you have given to me. This paper will count

Comments

Re: 2/3 I think, this essay is TL;DR unless you're really interested

[ninjamalaproper]

In the heat of the crisis, on October 22, 1962, Kennedy speaks to the nation, revealing and addressing the issues at stake with the missiles in Cuba. Only him, which Robert F. Kennedy- the younger brother and attorney general of John F. Kennedy- reflects in his memoir on the Cuban Missile Crisis, “it was now up to one single man. No committee was going to makes this decision” (25). However, President Kennedy had to portray that to the nation in an effective manner. Newspapers itched to get a hold of what the President kept so secret: “by Sunday [October 21, 1962] both the New York Times and the Washington Post had most of the story” (Hilsman 108). The president had to call them on Sunday and urge them to not publish the story until after his address to the nation on Monday night. By this point everyone around the world except for the Americans knew the speech would pertain to the missiles in Cuba, even Castro and the Cubans as Jorge Risquet, a former Central Committee Chairman of Cuba in 1962, states (Glinkin). All eyes were on the President during this crucial speech. His picture filled the papers the next day.
This picture of President Kennedy, as simple and one-dimensional as it seems, projects, in my opinion, a very powerful image of not only Kennedy but also the country he represented. To begin, his posture exemplifies this: he appears not rigid but firm, opposing the enemy with strong but not brute force. The Iron Curtain that divided Germany defined the inflexible ways of the “Commies,” they were unable to see any sort of compromise to the situation to the point that they blockaded West Berlin to where essential supplies had to be flown in by American forces. On the other hand, Kennedy, in his speech, does not use the term “blockade,” despite the militaristic notions he campaigned and assumed mental state of the American people. Despite the fear that America would be seen in the same light as France and Britain in 1930s Europe, the “quarantine” in no way directly threatened the Soviet Union itself, “it began at the lowest level in the use of force and permitted a step-by-step progression up the ladder of coercion, giving the Soviets repeated opportunities to consider again” (Hilsman 102). In a sense to say, “We are not the Commies and we will never be,” especially emphasized by the flag with the eagle on it in the background of the image-the epitome of freedom in the Western world.
Again, in the image presented in the New York Times, Kennedy appears not too far away instead rather very close at hand at a social distance; his upper torso remains the lowest we see of him, as if sitting there with him in his tirade against the Soviets. This further villainizes the Soviet Union because we identify ourselves with Kennedy, he is our hero not theirs. We share a certain level of intimacy with the man who we elected to take care of us in times of crisis like these. This intimacy gives him a romantic and heroic image, as he does not sit as an immature and inexperienced President who the Premier of the Soviet Union does not respect, he sits as a defender of peace and liberty with a level head to handle even the toughest of challenges that the world and its threats can throw. This mentality continues to draw upon the mental images that a single man can stand against evil, like a superhero in modern culture.

Re: 3/3 I think, this essay is TL;DR unless you're really interested

[ninjamalaproper]

Another particular interesting element to take in about the picture is the angle at which it was taken. In this state, Kennedy does not speak to the American people; he addresses the enemy. This decision, I believe further emphasizes the idea that we as Americans cannot and should not identify with the “evil” Communists. Kennedy stands before us, representing us to the enemy and protecting not only us but also the freedom that we so deeply treasure behind him. Even then, we have no need to hide behind him: we have nothing to hide, unlike the Soviets who engaged in this warmongering behavior. This attitude draws up the mental picture of Kennedy as the parent who catches this bad behavior; we are merely present at their scolding because we should learn that “neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate a deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small” (Kennedy 154). Just him, only one man makes this decision. For this, though, we place our undying trust in him, as witnessed in the articles present around his photo splashed across the front page of the New York Times; they unanimously agree with him and support him.
Speaking to the public, and the subsequent attention his image in the newspaper received, may have finally thrown the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs from Kennedy’s shoulders. He stood firm against the Soviet Union without sending in an invasion force or resorting to an alternative militaristic solution. The image represents this through his posture in the picture, drawing away from all of the chatter of “appeasement” tactics during his campaign. We can clearly draw conclusions that he fights for us against the dark forces of the world. He directly spoke to not only the Soviets and the Cubans or even Communists, but to all the past, present, and future enemies of America all around the world. He is one single man redeeming himself and the country he serves and saving the entire world in the process from the threat of nuclear war.

Works Cited

Allison, Grahm T. Essence of Decision. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1971.
Finney, John W. "Nation's Involvement With Cuba Began Under Jefferson's Reign." New York Times 23 Oct. 1962: 21. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Herman B. Wells Library, Bloomington, IN. 21 Feb. 2009
.

Glinkin, Anatoli, dir. Defcon 2- Cuban Missile Crisis. Prod. Discovery Channel. Youtube. 23 May 2008. 21 Feb. 2009 .

Hilsman, Roger. The Cuban Missile Crises : The Struggle over Policy. New York: Praeger, 1996.

Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days : A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ed. Richard Neustadt and Graham T. Allison. Boston: W. W. Norton & Company Limited, 1971.

Weisbrot, Robert. Maximum Danger : Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 2001.

XD you didn't have to actually write one, unless you had this on file.

[lady_king]

Good work. I enjoy reading about American History, exspecial something that is current. You have pass this class.

I had it on my hard-drive from a History class. XD

[ninjamalaproper]

Thank you, Professor Saber.