Mar 23, 2009 00:07
The question of what the most important virtue is for the times we live in could easily expand to book length-I would be surprised if several had not already been written. The keystone to this question, in these times, seems actually more likely to reside in the hopefully accurate perception of the times we live in. Our era is becoming increasingly characterized by uncertainty; I strongly feel that the investigation and evidence required to even approach a remotely, comfortably convincing elucidation of our times is significantly beyond the scope of this essay. That said there are several trends worth mentioning.
The first and most obvious after relatively recent events, is the mounting pressure for a global realignment of political power. The United States has enjoyed disproportionate wealth and power, relative to the size of its population and resources, since World War II. There is a very strong historical correlation between the rise of economic strength and a following rise of political strength, followed by an equally strong historical correlation between the over-extension of military power to preserve its empire and the subsequent “passing of the torch” so to speak as a militarily top heavy economy sooner or later collapses. All political realignments following the collapse of empires are major. The current case however has the potential to be much too “exciting” for those living through it. First, for the first time in history the empire in question, namely the United States, has had a truly global empire and nearly hegemonic military, political and cultural power. Second, and much more importantly, the U.S. military-the true third rail in American politics-has expressly pursued policies with goal of preserving American power indefinitely through the development and use of the next generation of technological military advancement, euphemistically called “Full Spectrum Dominance,” including the use of untraceable laser weapons-already unofficially in use in places like Iraq-and the weaponization of space. If power is not largely relinquished voluntarily, like Great Britain did after WWII, the potential for disaster will increase dramatically, at the expense of the safety of the population of the entire planet.
The second trend, has the theoretical potential to make the previous paragraph largely irrelevant. This is the exponential rate at which technology is developing. This trend has actually been mutually reinforcing with the previous trend through, but not limited to organization like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), funding a significant portion of research and development, especially in the cross-disciplinary field of artificial intelligence. Among technologies already developed are packs of robots designed to hunt down humans. Fortunately most technology trends are less explicitly ominous. Ray Kurzweil wrote an entire book, titled, The Singularity Is Near, about the “singularity,” the point beyond which absolutely nothing can be predicted, and the seemingly fantastical possibilities and dangers that the approaching technological explosion poses to the human species-including, but not limited to the eventual possibility of uploading brains onto a non-biological substrate, and the dangers of “gray goo” or self-replicating nanobots (recently popularized in the film The Day the Earth Stood Still). It is also important to remind ourselves in the shorter term that technological development can put more power in the hands of individuals, increasing risk by decreasing the threshold required to be reached before dangerous weapons are available. The other side of that coin is the ability to control more people from the very top. As a mini case study we can compare Nixon’s wiretapping scandal to the most recent Bush’s “wiretapping” of the entire country. To put it mildly, we live in uncertain times.
The third trend, the most visible of the three, is the environmental destruction of the planet. Much has already been said, so I will only mention as a reminder that even if global warming were halted today, the mass extinction occurring today contributing to the growing threat to Earth’s life-support systems from the loss of biodiversity would continue.
In returning to the philosophy at hand and choosing a virtue for our times, it IS NOT and exaggeration to say that the fate of the planet is at stake. Even during comparatively quaint time known as the cold war, the potential for the destruction of humanity and countless other species had already existed, evidenced by such fun/dire ideas like the doomsday clock. I emphasize these points to call attention to the fact that at the absolute minimum, as mentioned in a previous paper, the survival of morality (and therefore virtue of any kind) depends on the survival of agents capable of virtue, and at this stage we know of no other species up to the task. Now that we have finally set the stage, what do we mean by virtue and what if any virtue is up to the task?
In studying Aristotle, we learn that the primary focus of virtue ethics is the character of the moral agent; neither the immediate consequences nor potential rules governing an act are emphasized. Virtue, like many other human traits and skills, is amenable to strengthening through repeated practice. Additionally, the virtuous life is one led in the rational and active pursuit of the strengthening of traits that allow and promote a healthy functioning with and within the community. Among the various virtues, “wisdom” is likely the only one up to the task.
Aristotle explains that multiple ends exist that therefore we should try to find a final end by finding an end that is an end in itself and not instrumental to other ends (Aristotle ?). Aristotle like many performing similar thought experiments conclude that the final end and thus highest good is happiness and that all other ends are seen as ends in themselves and as means to happiness. Furthermore, as reason is considered a unique quality of humans (of course historically and unjustly only men), reason is the function of human life. In order to attain excellence and thereby happiness, humans must excel at acting according to reason. It is worth emphasizing that happiness in Aristotle’s thought can only be appreciated as a by-product of the virtuous life that we must aspire to directly. Despite the strong appeal portion of his argument has, and I do admit to its applicability throughout human history, I find it not only presumptuous but dangerous to value so highly, even if only indirectly, because survival of the community must be fundamental moral concern. Incidentally some recent psychological literature supports Aristotle’s claims that happiness can follow from virtue as happiness, in psychobiological literature at least, is coming to be seen as an expression of the inner state of the health of an organism. The problem may lie in the size of the community under question. The community in Aristotle’s time was incredibly small compared the global community of our times, and the difficulty in successfully creating, supporting and functioning in this new global community that much greater, requiring that much more judgment and that much more wisdom.
Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtue. The former learned primarily from teaching and requiring experience and time, the provision of which is supplied by laws in a just society. Moral virtue, on the other hand, is formed as previously noted through habituation (Aristotle 416). Bad habits predict bad behavior, good habits good behavior, and both compound upon themselves. “Not by seeing frequently or hearing frequently do we acquire the sense of seeing or hearing, on the contrary, because we have the senses we make use of them. . . . But the virtues we get by first practicing them, as we do in the arts” (Aristotle 421) Therefore without continual events over an extended time it is impossible to become virtuous, and by the similar reasoning, it is unlikely to become excessively vicious or corrupt as well. Moral inquiry under Aristotle then is not to “know what virtue is but how to become good” (Aristotle 417). A descriptive understanding of virtue ethics is clearly inadequate because the construction of moral prescriptions that result in the increase of personal good is the true goal. I admire Aristotle for following these arguments by saying that in ethical thought and reasoning exactitude is impossible and we can only know an approximation of the good, so moral reasoning must be considered more of an art than a science, and leads eventually to approximation using notions of the mean between extremes. For example temperance lies between the “insensitive” person and the “licentious.” We should be especially wary of our natural bias in favor of our own pleasure and comfort. And as most people would intuitively expect the mean can very by individual. Even limiting ourselves to the context of Aristotle’s time wisdom is incredibly valuable in making the tough choices and judgment calls required in so many moral situations.
Consider for example the Bishop Bienvenu of Victor Hugo’s Les Miserable, admired for his benevolence. His benevolence, was clearly a form of wisdom. Wisdom, is really not only the most important virtue, it is the virtue whence all other virtues derive their value. Consider Frankena’s two favored virtues, justice and benevolence. Each derives its value from being used well, and wisdom provides the judgment necessary to keep the virtues meaningful, strong, and successful in the ultimate moral purpose of promoting the survival of our species.
Despite the preeminence I feel the virtue of wisdom requires and deserves, I very strongly agree with Frankena’s assessment regarding complementary nature of a humble deontology and virtues to drive, support, and reinforce positive moral growth from the level of the individual up. “I am inclined to think that principles without traits are impotent and traits without principles are blind” (467) I said “humble” deontology because I also agree with Frankena that, “Morality must recognize various sorts of excuses and extenuating circumstances” (468). These include the possibilities of a certain duty requiring an extraordinary sacrifice, a required action being unclear, and similarly a moral agent in the dark about relevant information.
Frankena again hits the nail on the head of morality. “All it can really insist on, then, except in critical cases, is that we develop and manifest fixed dispositions to find out what the right thing is and to do it if possible. In this sense a person must “be this” rather than “do this.” But it must be remembered that “being” involves trying to “do.” Being without doing, like faith without works, is dead” (Frankena 468).
Ross in his dissection of Kant’s stricter deontology was onto something when he said that all we can expect and hope for is, “fulfilling a higher duty after forming a considered opinion (never more)” (Ross 336). However, Nagel is correct when he says, “We judge people for what they actually do or fail to do, not just for what they would have done if circumstances had been different” (384). Like Nagel, we have to come to grips with what we are morally judged for, and realize that wisdom is the best and most likely avenue in the effective elaboration of other virtues like benevolence and justice.
The best part about wisdom as the most important virtue of our times, besides it being required to save the world, is that all it requires to really gain a foothold, is a public push or ad campaign emphasizing the tentative nature of knowledge. When people start becoming comfortable with wisdom being a life-long and accessible pursuit, it could become self-reinforcing trend. I would like to end this paper on a positive note, but there are some serious concerns that for the time-being remain unaddressed. Most of these concerns revolve around the nature of agency itself and the extent to which modern neuroscience may or may not be indicating that consciousness itself and hence all of rationality might function in the brain as a special kind of sense perception of the world. Increasingly research is indicating the extraordinary extent to which seemingly conscious decisions have been made before subjects think they consciously made said decisions. This seems to indicate that many so-called conscious decisions are actually -subconscious and our conscious awareness is only being informed of the decision. Interestingly this actually underscores the importance of virtue ethics as it already since Aristotle recognized the importance of habits, and the work it requires to change them. Furthermore, these findings have very interesting repercussions in the discussion of agency in general and in the context of freedom. It seems the limits of our freedom are not external to our bodies, and therefore do not limit the autonomy of our human entity, but that it is consciousness itself that has been shown to be increasingly more limited than traditionally expected. All of this emphatically underscores the need to have the best judgments possible, in whatever limited fashion our existence provides.